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CONTENTS

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Supreme Council Decrees Published	1
Status of Deputies [SOVETSKAYA LITVA 15 Mar]	1
TV, Radio Broadcasting [EKHO LITVY 24 Mar]	1
Law on Government [EKHO LITVY 24 Mar]	1
'Antistate' Acts [EKHO LITVY 28 Mar]	2
Lithuanian Provisional Basic Law Published [SOVETSKAYA LITVA 15 Mar]	2
Landsbergis, Sabutis Interviewed 22 Mar [EKHO LITVY 24 Mar]	14
Lithuanian Interior Minister Interviewed [EKHO LITVY 28 Mar]	15
Prunskiene Letter to Ryzhkov on Draft Published [EKHO LITVY 4 Apr]	16
Moderate Appraisal of Lithuanian Situation Cited [NEDELYA No 13]	16
Readers View Lithuanian, Estonian Events [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Apr]	19
Latvian Constitutional Oversight Decree Published [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 8 Mar]	21
Kochetov Addresses Meeting on Latvian Draft [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Apr]	21
Latvia's Political Factions Assessed [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 15]	22
Latvia's Alksnis Answers Readers' Questions [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Mar]	25
Estonian Laws on Government Given First Reading [PRAVDA 19 Apr]	26
Estonia Holds Meetings To Support Lithuania	26
Popular Front Participates [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 24 Mar]	26
Message to Gorbachev Adopted [EKHO LITVY 28 Mar]	26
Estonian Deputies Cited on Lithuanian Events [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 24 Mar]	27
Estonian Groups Differ on Referendum Issue [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 27 Mar]	27
Estonian Committee Concerned at Politician's Murder [Tallinn Radio]	28

RSFSR

Leningrad Plenum Critiques CPSU Platform [LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 25 Feb]	29
Committee Meets on RSFSR Party Formation [LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Feb]	39
Neftekamsk 'Referendum' Criticizes Bashkir AES [IZVESTIYA 1 Mar]	39
Tselinograd Oblast Party Plenum Held [Moscow Radio]	39
Poll Set To Elect Shcherbitskiy Replacement [IZVESTIYA 10 Mar]	40
Russian Electoral Commission Chairman Interviewed [Moscow Radio]	40
RSFSR Fuel Industry Minister Arkhipov Retires [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 12 Mar]	40
Demands for Balkar TV Chief's Dismissal Cited [IZVESTIYA 13 Mar]	41
Decree on Trade Abuses Produces Immediate Effects [PRAVDA 12 Mar]	41
Mercury Contaminates Barnaul Water Supplies [PRAVDA 13 Mar]	41
Revived German Autonomy in Lower Volga Protested [Moscow TV]	41
Situation in Voronezh Gorkom, Obkom Viewed [PRAVDA 5 Mar]	42
Supply Problems Force Halt to Projects in Komi [IZVESTIYA 14 Mar]	44
Interethnic Relations Surveyed in Chelyabinsk [IZVESTIYA 10 Mar]	45
'Sensitive Issues' Raised at Amur Obkom [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 21 Feb]	45
Altay Kray First Secretary Resigns [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Feb]	46
Moscow Joint Ventures Association Formed [TASS]	46
New Bashkirian Weekly Begins Publication [Moscow Radio]	46
Actions of Amur Obkom First Secretary Criticized [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 10]	46
Socioeconomic Problems of Karelia Noted [PRAVDA 12 Mar]	50
RSFSR Trade Union Congress Opens 21 Mar [TASS]	51

Trade Union Official Discusses Mission, Tasks	[TASS]	52
Republic Supreme Soviet Election Progress Noted	[Moscow TV]	52
RSFSR Writers Union Plenum Ends With Appeal	[TASS]	52
RSFSR Secession Called Russia's Salvation	[Rodoman in ATMODA No 7]	53
Status of Leningrad Green 'Party' Questioned	[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Mar]	55
N. Osetian Party Chief Elected Soviet Chairman	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 22 Mar]	55
RSFSR Runoff Election Results Reported	[IZVESTIYA 22 Mar]	55
Moscow's Communists View Upcoming Elections	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 22 Mar]	56
Leningrad Referendum on RSFSR Party	[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 13 Feb]	56
Leningrad Meeting Opposes Nationalism	[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 13 Feb]	57
Leningrad Party Publishes Budget Figures	[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 21 Feb]	58
RSFSR Finance Ministry Issues Bonds	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 7 Mar]	58
Election Fraud in Moscow Oblast Alleged	[TRUD 14 Mar]	59
Cooperation With 'Informals' Discussed	[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 2 Mar]	60
Independent Trade Union Federation Founded	[TASS]	63
Party Members Lominate New Russian Parliament	[TASS]	63
Dagestan Election Deemed Invalid	[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 23 Mar]	63
RSFSR First Round Election Results Given	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 14 Mar]	64
Yeltsin on Leningrad Culture Center Plan	[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Feb]	64
Lukyanov Cited on Small Ethnic Community Problems	[TASS]	67
Buryat Obkom Expresses Confidence; Releases Belyakov	[Moscow Radio]	67
Stavropol Abolishes Rayon Party Committees	[Moscow Radio]	67
RSFSR TV Founding Congress Statement	[TASS]	67
Gosplan Reply Disappoints Tyumen Official	[IZVESTIYA 18 Mar]	68
Prokofyev Interviewed on Multiparty System	[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 17 Mar]	68
Russian Nationalists Go Unchallenged in Vologda	[IZVESTIYA 27 Mar]	72
Vorotnikov Views RSFSR Election Outcome	[PRAVDA 26 Mar]	72
Sverdlovsk Power Struggle Analyzed	[IZVESTIYA 25 Mar]	75
Vorotnikov Chairs RSFSR Supsov Presidium Session	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 29 Mar]	79
'Duty Reporter' Answers Readers' Queries	[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Mar]	80
RSFSR Writers Plenum Proceedings Reported	[IZVESTIYA 23 Mar]	80
Penza Obkom First Secretary Elected	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 30 Mar]	82
Moscow Plenum Discusses CPSU Platform	[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Feb]	83
Krasnoyarsk Kray Leaders Censured	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 30 Mar]	95
Kaliningrad Liberation Anniversary Celebrated	[Moscow Radio]	97
Commission Adopts Resolution on Kemerovo Pollution	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 Apr]	97
Klochkov Backs Strong Unions in RSFSR	[TRUD 22 Mar]	98
Moscow Soviet Apparatchiks View Future	[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 14]	107
Moscow Mayoral 'Candidates' Interviewed	[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 14]	107

Western Republics

Results of Belorussian Elections Assessed	[SOYUZ No 10]	109
Moldavian Finance Minister Released From Post	[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 13 Mar]	109
Ukraine To Form Peasant-Democratic Party	[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 12 Mar]	110
Ukrainian Informals' Election Tactics Criticized	[PRAVDA 30 Mar]	110
Ukrainian Party Clubs Prepare For Party Split	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 31 Mar]	113
Potential Donetsk Oblast Leaders Profiled	[PRAVDA 2 Apr]	114
Ukrainian Plenum Sociopolitical Decision	[PRAVDA UKRAINY 24 Feb]	115
Ukrainian 'Rukh' Leader Drach Interviewed	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 25 Mar]	117
Ukrainian Communist Party Plenum Viewed	[SOYUZ No 9]	118

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Supreme Council Decrees Published

Status of Deputies

90UN1318F Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
15 Mar 90 p 3

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic on Legal Status of USSR People's Deputies from Lithuania]

[Text] Considering that in accordance with the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council enactment on restoration of an independent state of Lithuania not henceforward bound by any obligations with the effect of the USSR Constitution, USSR people's deputies elected by the people of Lithuania forfeit their status; in appreciation of the fact that the USSR people's deputies from Lithuania have performed important work in the cause of the achievement of independence and the restoration of the statehood of the Lithuanian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council resolves:

1. To empower the USSR people's deputies to participate in the special Third Congress of People's Deputies with the status of representatives of the state and to familiarize the USSR Government and also the public with the decisions of the first session of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council concerning restoration and recognition of the Lithuanian Republic.

2. To accord the former USSR people's deputies elected by the people of Lithuania the right to participate in the work of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council on a nonvoting basis.

3. To express gratitude to the former USSR people's deputies from Lithuania, who, delegated from public organizations, worthily represented Lithuania's interests at the congresses of USSR people's deputies.

4. To determine that citizens of the Lithuanian Republic do not have the right without special authorization of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council to participate in the work of the highest organs of state power of other states, including the USSR.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.
Vilnius, 13 March 1990.

TV, Radio Broadcasting

90UN1430AWA1904191990 Vilnius EKHO LITVY
in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 1

[Republic of Lithuania Law on Reorganization of the Republic of Lithuania State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council resolves:

1. To liquidate the Republic of Lithuania State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. To establish in its place Lithuanian Radio Broadcasting and Television.

2. To establish that Lithuanian Radio Broadcasting and Television is directed by an administration and general director appointed by the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council. The Supreme Council confirms the status (charter) of Lithuanian Radio Broadcasting and Television.

3. To make it incumbent upon the administration appointed by the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council to have prepared within a month following its formation a draft statute of Lithuanian Radio Broadcasting and Television and to have submitted it for approval by the Supreme Council.

4. To dissolve the temporary commission of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council for a change in the status of the Lithuanian Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. To charge the Supreme Council Standing Commission for Education, Science and Culture to have within a week submitted proposals to the Supreme Council concerning the composition of the Lithuanian Radio Broadcasting and Television Administration.

[signed] V. LANDSBERGIS, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.
Vilnius, 22 March 1990

Law on Government

90UN1430C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
24 Mar 90 p 1

[Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council Decree on the Procedure for Realization of the Law on the Republic of Lithuania Government]

[Text] The republic of Lithuania Supreme Council resolves:

1. To establish that the Law on the Republic of Lithuania Government takes effect the day it is enacted.

2. To instruct the republic of Lithuania government to have before 1 June 1990 converted the ministries and departments which are operating currently in accordance with the list of ministries and departments and their jurisdiction determined by the Law on the Republic of Lithuania Government.

3. To instruct the structures of state administration operating at the present time to continue the exercise of their functions up to the implementation of the conversions stipulated by this decree.

[Signed] V. LANDSBERGIS, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.
Vilnius, 22 March 1990.

'Antistate' Acts

90UN1449C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 90 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania "On Measures To Provide for the Normal Functioning of State and Public Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations"]

[Text] In recent days in separate places in Lithuania there has been unauthorized occupation of the buildings of institutions and organizations, people are being called to disobey the laws and decisions of the state organs of the Republic of Lithuania, and there are attempts to violate the normal functioning of state enterprises, institutions, and organizations, to incite conflict, and to provoke disorder. The Armed Forces of the USSR are also committing similar and other illegal actions. As a result the state sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania is being violated and people's lives and health are in danger.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania decrees:

1. That the procurator, the minister of internal affairs, and the courts of the Republic of Lithuania should take decisive measures to suppress antistate and criminal actions. Persons who have committed crimes and other violations should be called to account immediately.
2. To explain, in accordance with Article 214 "Arbitrariness" of the Criminal Code of Lithuania, responsibility is borne not only by those who commit the crime but also by those persons who engage in instigation and organize the illegal seizure of buildings and other facilities, misappropriation of property, and other similar actions.
3. To explain, in accordance with Article 67 "Sabotage" of the Criminal Code of Lithuania, responsibility is also borne by those who call for the nonobservance of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania and of the decisions of the organs of state power and the administration if it might give rise to a violation of the normal activity of industry, transportation, agriculture, or other spheres of the economy of the republic and the work of state organs and social organizations.
4. This decree goes into effect as soon as it is passed.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania calls upon all residents of Lithuania to preserve peace and public order, not to yield to provocation instigation, and not to take part in actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of Lithuania.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania

Vilnius, 26 March 1990.

Lithuanian Provisional Basic Law Published

90UN1318A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
15 Mar 90 pp 1, 2, 3

["Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic"]

[Text] Chapter 1. General Provisions

Article 1. The Lithuanian Republic is a sovereign democratic state expressing the common wishes and interests of the people of Lithuania.

Article 2. Sovereign state power belongs to the people of Lithuania. The people freely express their sovereign power via the initiative of legislative proposals, elections of deputies, the voting of citizens or deputies on constitutional issues, and a democratic referendum. No one has the right to infringe this power or appropriate it.

State power in Lithuania is exercised by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, the government of the Lithuanian Republic, and the courts.

Article 3. Basic questions of state and public life are submitted for discussion by the people and are also decided by way of referendum.

A referendum is announced by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council on its own initiative or when this is demanded by 300,000 enfranchised citizens of Lithuania.

The procedure of the submittal of the most important issues of state life for nationwide discussion and the holding of a referendum is determined by law.

Article 4. The territory of the Lithuanian Republic is single and indivisible, and its borders may be changed only by international treaty following its ratification by four-fifths vote of all deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Article 5. Parties, public organizations, and public movements are formed in the procedure determined by law and operate within the framework of the Provisional Basic Law and the laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 6. In accordance with the mission of their statutes and programs, political, professional, youth, women's, veterans', cooperative, and public organizations and public movements, artistic unions, and scholarly societies participate in the administration of state and public affairs and the solution of political, economic, and social questions.

Article 7. The official language of the Lithuanian Republic is Lithuanian.

The Lithuanian Republic provides for the use of Lithuanian in the activity of the state and public authorities, educational, cultural, scientific, and production establishments and in other establishments, at enterprises, and in organizations, and the concern of the state for the all-around development and teaching of Lithuanian.

[sentence as published] Conditions are created for the use and development of the languages of the national communities.

Article 8. The region's defenses are regulated by law.

Propaganda of war in the Lithuanian Republic is forbidden.

Article 9. The official coat of arms of the Lithuanian Republic is the white knight on a red background.

Article 10. The official flag of the Lithuanian Republic is the national flag representing a panel of three equal horizontal bands: the upper, yellow; the middle, green; the lower, red. The ratio of the flag's width and length is 1:2.

Article 11. The national anthem of the Lithuanian Republic is the "National Song" of V. Kudirka.

Article 12. The capital of the Lithuanian Republic is the city of Vilnius, the primordial historical capital of Lithuania.

Chapter 2. Citizenship of Lithuania

Article 13. The content of the citizenship of Lithuania and the conditions and procedure of acquiring and losing it are determined by the Citizenship of Lithuania Act.

A citizen of Lithuania may not, as a rule, be simultaneously a citizen of another state as well.

A citizen of Lithuania outside of the Lithuanian Republic is protected and taken care of by the Lithuanian state.

Immigration into the Lithuanian Republic is controlled by law.

Article 14. Citizens of Lithuania are equal before the law, regardless of race, sex, origins, social and property situation, social views, religion, and nationality.

The equality of Lithuanian citizens is ensured in all spheres of economic, political, social, and cultural life.

Article 15. Women and men in Lithuania have equal rights.

The exercise of these rights is ensured by according women equal rights with men, equal opportunities in obtaining education and vocational training, in work, compensation therefore and promotion, and in participation in social and political and cultural activity and also by special measures pertaining to women's work safety and health.

Motherhood and the family are under the special care of the state. The laws provide for protection of the rights of mother and child, material and moral assistance, including paid leave and allowances for pregnant women, large families and mothers and benefits at the time of childbirth and a reduction in working hours for working women with small children.

The work of mothers raising two or more children at home is deemed to be socially significant activity and is compensated in the procedure determined by law.

Article 16. Citizens of Lithuania of different race and nationality have equal rights. Any limitation, direct or indirect, whatever of the rights of citizens of Lithuania, the establishment of direct or indirect advantages depending on their origins, social views, religious beliefs, or nationality and the humiliation of a citizen on this basis, as, equally, any propaganda of racial or national exclusiveness, enmity, or contempt, is punishable by law.

Article 17. Foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Lithuanian Republic are guaranteed rights and liberties provided for by law, including the right to appeal to a court of law and other state authorities for protection of their personal, property, family, and other rights.

Foreign citizens and stateless persons on the territory of Lithuania are obliged to comply with the Provisional Basic Law of Lithuania and other laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

Chapter 3. Basic Rights, Liberties, and Duties of Citizens of Lithuania

Article 18. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to work paid in accordance with the quantity and quality thereof and not less than the minimum amount established by the state and also the right to choice of profession and type of occupation or work in accordance with their calling, capabilities, occupational training, and education, and with regard for society's requirements.

Article 19. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to recreation. This right is secured by the establishment of a work week of not more than 41 hours, annual paid leave and weekly days off, and also an expansion of the network of cultural and educational and convalescent establishments, the development of general sports, physical culture and tourism, and the creation of favorable opportunities for recreation at the place of residence and other conditions of the rational use of free time. The length of the work time and recreation of kolkhoz [collective farm] members is regulated by the kolkhozes.

Article 20. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to health care. This right is secured by free qualified medical assistance rendered by state health care establishments, the expansion of the network of establishments for the treatment and strengthening of the health of the citizens, the development and improvement of safety equipment and industrial hygiene, the implementation of wide-ranging prophylactic measures, particular concern for the health of the younger generation, including the prohibition of child labor unconnected with tuition and labor training, and the development of research geared to the prevention of disease and a lowering of morbidity and to the citizens' long and active life.

Article 21. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to material support in old age and in the event of illness and total

or partial disability and also in the event of loss of the breadwinner. This right is guaranteed by the social insurance of the workers, employees, and kolkhoz members and temporary disability benefits, the payment by the state and the kolkhozes of retirement and invalid pensions and benefits in the event of loss of the breadwinner, the employment of citizens with partial disability, care of elderly citizens and invalids, and by other forms of social security.

Article 22. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to a dwelling. This right is secured by the development and protection of state and public housing, assistance to cooperative and individual housing construction, and the fair allocation under public supervision of living space made available as the program of the construction of well-appointed homes is realized and also by low rent for an apartment and municipal services. Citizens of Lithuania are obliged to adopt a solicitous attitude toward the dwelling made available to them.

Article 23. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to education.

This right is secured by free education of all types, the general secondary education of the youth and the extensive development of vocational-technical, secondary specialized, and higher education, state scholarships and benefits to trainees and students, the free distribution of school textbooks, the possibility of tuition at school in the native language, creation of the conditions for self-education.

Laws of the republic provide for instances where the higher educational institutions operate on an academic autonomy basis.

Article 24. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to enjoy the achievements of culture.

This right is secured by the general accessibility of the values of Lithuanian and world culture in state and public collections, the development and even location of cultural-educational establishments on Lithuanian territory, the development of television and radio, book publishing, and the periodical press and the network of free libraries, and the expansion of cultural exchange with foreign states.

Cultural repositories, establishments, and collections realizing official subsidies and the interests and independent activity of strata and groups of society are national property.

Article 25. Citizens of Lithuania are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic creativity. It is secured by the expansion of research and invention activity and efficiency promotion and the development of literature and art. The state creates the necessary material conditions for this and renders the artistic unions support.

The rights of authors, inventors, and efficiency promoters are protected by the state.

Article 26. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to participate in the administration of state and public affairs and in the discussion and adoption of statewide laws and decisions of local significance.

This right is secured by the possibility of electing and being elected to the soviets of people's deputies and other elective state bodies and participating in nationwide discussion and votes, in the work of the control and state authorities, public organizations, and public independent action authorities and in meetings of the work force and meetings at the place of residence.

Article 27. Each citizen of Lithuania has the right to submit to the state authorities and public organizations proposals concerning an improvement in their activity and to criticize shortcomings in their work.

Citizens of Lithuania also have the right of petition; that is, the right to address the organs of state administration with a demand for the solution legislatively or otherwise of socially significant questions which they raise.

Officials are obliged to examine the citizens' proposals, applications, and petitions, provide answers to them, and adopt the necessary measures within the established time frame.

Persecution for criticism is prohibited. Proceedings are instituted against persons engaging in persecution for criticism.

Article 28. Citizens of Lithuania are guaranteed the right to collect and disseminate information on all questions except for those associated with official secrets and the infringement of the dignity and honor of the individual.

Article 29. Citizens of Lithuania are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, mass meetings, street marches, and demonstrations.

The exercise of these political freedoms is secured by public buildings, streets, and squares being made available to the working people and their organizations, the extensive dissemination of information, and the possibility of the use of the press, television, and radio.

These political freedoms may not be used for purposes of propaganda of racial or national enmity and inhumane views.

Article 30. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to unite in political parties and public organizations for the realization of their political, economic, ecological, scientific, cultural, religious, and other interests unless they are contrary to the law.

Organizations are guaranteed conditions for their accomplishment of their statutory tasks.

The procedure of the establishment, registration, and liquidation of political parties and public organizations is determined by law.

Article 31. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief or nonbelief, and the equal right to worship alone or in communion and to peacefully express and disseminate one's beliefs and views are guaranteed in the Lithuanian Republic.

No one can compel another person or himself be compelled to speak, behave, or act against his conscience or beliefs.

State institutions and their teaching and educational establishments are secular. These institutions and establishments practice in the procedure determined by legislation cooperation with the church and other religious organizations in the education of public morality.

The status of legal entity is accorded the church and other religious organizations, and they are guaranteed the right of independent arrangement of their internal life.

Article 32. The family is under the protection of the state.

Marriage is based on the voluntary consent of man and woman; husband and wife are completely equal in family relationships.

Article 33. Citizens of Lithuania are guaranteed inviolability of the person.

Proceeding from the presumption of innocence, no one can be prosecuted as a criminal without due cause provided for by law and due process. No one may be arrested other than in instances determined by legislation and only on the basis of a court order or with the prosecutor's approval.

Each citizen is guaranteed legal defense from the time of his arrest.

Article 34. Citizens of Lithuania are guaranteed inviolability of abode. No one has the right without legitimate grounds to enter an abode against the wishes of the persons residing therein.

Article 35. The private life of the citizens and the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraph communications are protected by law.

Article 36. Respect for the person and protection of the rights and liberties of the citizens are the duty of all state authorities, public organizations, and officials.

Citizens of Lithuania have the right to judicial remedy against encroachments on honor and dignity, life and health, and personal freedom and property.

Article 37. Citizens of Lithuania have the right to appeal the actions of officials and state and public authorities. The appeals must be examined in the procedure and within the time frame determined by law.

Actions of officials which violate the law, exceed their authority and infringe citizens' rights may in the established procedure be appealed in a court of law.

Citizens of Lithuania have the right to restitution of loss caused by the unlawful actions of state or public organizations and also officials in their exercise of their official duties.

Article 38. The exercise of rights and liberties is inalienable from the citizen's performance of his duties.

The citizen of Lithuania is obliged to comply with the Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic and other laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 39. The citizen of Lithuania is obliged to guard the interests of the Lithuanian state and to defend it.

Military service in the Army of the Lithuanian Republic is the honorary duty of citizens of Lithuania.

Article 40. It is the duty of each citizen of Lithuania to respect the honor and dignity of another person.

Article 41. Citizens of Lithuania are obliged to display concern for the upbringing of children and to prepare them for socially useful labor. Children must show concern for their parents and render them assistance.

Article 42. Citizens of Lithuania are obliged to safeguard nature, preserve its riches, and create a healthy natural environment.

Article 43. Concern for the preservation of historical monuments and other cultural values is the duty and obligation of the citizens of Lithuania.

Chapter 4. Economic System

Article 44. The basis of the economic system of Lithuania is the property of the Lithuanian Republic, which is composed of the private property of the citizens, the property of citizens associated in groups (collectives) and state property.

Property relations are regulated by the laws of Lithuania and contracts concluded by the subjects of ownership.

The conditions of the location on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic of objects of the ownership of other states and international organizations and also citizens of other states and groups thereof (collectives) are determined by the laws of Lithuania and interstate treaties.

The Lithuanian Republic guarantees all subjects of ownership the opportunity to independently possess objects belonging to them by right of ownership and to enjoy and dispose of them in accordance with the laws of Lithuania. For realization of the rights of ownership in accordance with the laws of Lithuania proprietors have the right to hire other persons.

Uniform legal measures of protection are determined for all subjects of ownership.

The Lithuanian Republic protects the rights of the subjects of ownership in other states.

Article 45. The land, its interior, inland and territorial waters, forests and other flora and fauna, and other natural resources are the national property of Lithuania and in the exclusive ownership of the Lithuanian Republic. The right of ownership of the interior of the land may belong only to the Lithuanian state. Other objects of the exclusive ownership of the Lithuanian Republic may by right of ownership belong to citizens of Lithuania and groups (collectives) thereof also.

The Lithuanian Republic has exclusive right to the air space above the territory of the Lithuanian Republic, its continental shelf, and the economic zone in the Baltic.

Article 46. Property belonging to the Lithuanian Republic on the basis of state ownership may in the procedure determined by the laws of Lithuania be transferred to the ownership of citizens and groups (collectives) thereof for a fee or free of charge.

In exceptional instances the property of citizens and groups (collectives) thereof and also of other states and their citizens or groups (collectives) may for the purpose of protection of the interests of Lithuania be nationalized with reimbursement therefor.

Chapter 5. Budget System

Article 47. The budget system of the Lithuanian Republic is composed of independent budgets of the Lithuanian state and local self-administrations.

The part of the national income intended for the implementation of programs in the sphere of education, science, health care, and social assistance of the Lithuanian Republic and the development of its economy and infrastructure, the maintenance of establishments of state power and administration, and for the coverage of expenditure connected with the region's defense is accumulated in the budget of the Lithuanian state. Financial resources for satisfaction of the requirements of local self-administration also are redistributed by means of this budget.

Article 48. The draft budget of the Lithuanian Republic is compiled by the Council of Ministers on the basis of official programs which are planned and being fulfilled and current laws of the Lithuanian Republic and is submitted for approval by the Supreme Council.

Article 49. The budget of the Lithuanian Republic is discussed and approved by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council on the basis of a report of the Lithuanian Republic Council of Ministers and the findings of the standing commissions.

During the discussion deputies of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council may propose an increase in the expenditure provided for in the draft only by having indicated the source of defrayment of this expenditure.

The general indicators of the approved budget are published for general notification.

Article 50. The Lithuanian Council of Ministers caters for organization of the fulfillment of the budget of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 51. The report on fulfillment of the budget of the Lithuanian state is drawn up by the Council of Ministers and examined and approved by the Supreme Council. The general indicators of fulfillment of the budget are published for general notification.

Article 52. Each local self-administration has an independent budget. Resources for the financing of social, economic, and other programs of local significance and the maintenance of self-administration establishments are accumulated in the budgets of the self-administrations.

Article 53. The income and expenditure of the budget of the Lithuanian Republic are distributed among components of the budget system in accordance with the law on the budget structure of the Lithuanian Republic and other legislative enactments of the Lithuanian Republic.

Chapter 6. Social Development and Culture

Article 54. The state renders assistance to all disabled persons, trainees, or citizens temporarily out of work.

Article 55. National communities constituting appreciable numbers of citizens have the right to independently administer the affairs of their national culture, public education, charity, and mutual assistance. The state renders them assistance.

Article 56. The Lithuanian Republic protects the health of its citizens and develops systems of social security.

Article 57. A national system of education in keeping with the region's historical and cultural traditions and also the directions of the economy operates in the Lithuanian Republic. The system of education provides inhabitants with vocational training and the humanitized general education necessary for the raising of consciously and socially active citizens.

Opportunities are afforded the national communities in Lithuania for preschool and for teaching children in the native language and also for training teacher personnel, developing their own national culture, mastering Lithuanian, and familiarizing themselves with Lithuanian culture and the history of the people.

Organization of the system of public education is determined by the Lithuanian Republic Public Education Act.

Article 58. The state concerns itself with the development of science and national culture, the multiplication and development of spiritual values, and the protection of the cultural heritage—historical monuments, monuments of architecture and art, and other cultural monuments—and their extensive use for people's moral and aesthetic education and higher culture.

The development of professional art and folk artistic creativity is encouraged in every possible way in Lithuania.

Article 59. The Lithuanian Republic displays concern for the requirements of Lithuanians residing overseas in respect of national culture and education.

Chapter 7. The system of Soviets of People's Deputies and the Principles of Their Activity

Article 60. The soviets of people's deputies—the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council and the rayon, city, community, and village soviets of people's deputies—constitute a single system of representative organs of state power of Lithuania.

The soviets of people's deputies are on their territory the sovereign executors of the wishes of the population acting on the basis of democracy and the law.

Article 61. The term of the authority of the soviets of people's deputies is five years.

Elections of deputies of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council and the local soviets of people's deputies are scheduled not later than three months prior to the expiration of their authority.

Article 62. Most important matters of state and local significance are discussed and decided at sessions of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council and the local soviets of people's deputies.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council elects the chairman of the Supreme Council and forms the Presidium. The local soviets of people's deputies elect a chairman, and the rayon soviets and soviets of cities of the republic form their own presidium also.

The soviets of people's deputies form standing commissions and executive and also other bodies accountable to them.

Officials elected or appointed by the soviets of people's deputies may not exercise their duties for more than two terms in succession.

Each official may be relieved of his duties ahead of time if he fails to perform them properly.

Article 63. The soviets of people's deputies display concern directly and via the bodies which they form for state, economic, and sociocultural matters on the corresponding territory, adopt decisions, and provide for and monitor their fulfillment.

Article 64. The activity of the soviets of people's deputies is based on the collective, free, and businesslike discussion and solution of questions, glasnost, the regular accountability of the executive bodies and other bodies formed by the soviets to the soviets and the populace, and the extensive enlistment of the citizens in their activity.

The soviets of people's deputies and the bodies which they form take account in their activity of public

opinion, present to the citizens for discussion the most important questions of state and local significance, and systematically give notice of their work and the decisions they adopt.

Chapter 8. Electoral System

Article 65. Citizens of Lithuania are elected deputies to all deputies' soviets on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, given secret balloting.

Article 66. The elections of deputies are general: citizens of Lithuania who have attained 18 years of age have the right to elect.

A citizen of Lithuania who has attained 18 years of age may be elected a deputy of local soviets of people's deputies, and a deputy of the Supreme Council upon reaching 21 years of age.

A deputy of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council may not be a deputy of another soviet.

Persons who constitute the Council of Ministers and organs of administration formed by local soviets of people's deputies and also leaders of ministries, state committees, and departments, judges, prosecutors, and state arbiters, and also other officials may not be deputies of the soviet which elects, appoints, or approves them.

Citizens found by a court of law to be incompetent and persons held in places of confinement on the basis of a judgment (ruling) or in connection with a criminal investigation and also those sent by a judicial ruling to places of compulsory treatment cannot participate in elections.

Article 67. The elections of deputies in the electoral districts are equal: The voter has one vote, and the voters take part in elections on equal terms.

Article 68. The elections of deputies are direct: The citizens elect the deputies directly.

Article 69. Voting in elections is personal and secret; control of the electorate's free expression is not permitted.

All voters are ensured identical voting conditions.

Article 70. Political parties, public organizations, public movements, and meetings of the electorate in industrial collectives and at the place of residence have the right to nominate candidates for deputy.

The number of candidates for deputy is not restricted. Each participant in an election meeting has the right to propose for discussion the candidacy of any citizen of Lithuania, his own included.

Any number of candidates may be entered on the ballot papers. Expenditure connected with the preparation and realization of the election of deputies is borne by the state.

Article 71. Elections of deputies are prepared openly and publicly.

Elections are conducted by electoral commissions, which are formed from representatives of political parties, public organizations, and public movements and representatives of meetings of the electorate in the industrial collective and at the place of residence.

Citizens of Lithuania, industrial collectives, political parties, public organizations, and public movements are guaranteed the opportunity for free and comprehensive discussion of the political, professional, and personal qualities of the candidates for deputy and also the right to canvass for or against a candidate at meetings, in the press, and on television and radio.

The procedure of the elections of deputies is determined by legislation of Lithuania.

Complaints concerning breaches of the law on elections of deputies are examined by the electoral commissions and courts of Lithuania in the procedure determined by law.

Article 72. The electorate gives instructions to its deputies.

The pertinent soviets of people's deputies examine the instructions, take them into consideration when the budget is being compiled and also when decisions on other issues are being prepared, organize the realization of the instructions, and notify the citizens of their realization.

Chapter 9. The Deputy

Article 73. Deputies are competent representatives of the people in the soviets of people's deputies.

Participating in the work of the soviets, the deputies decide questions of state, economic, and sociocultural building, organize the practical implementation of the soviets' decisions and exercise supervision of the work of the state authorities, enterprises, establishments, and organizations.

The deputies are guided in their activity by state interests, take account of the requirements of the population of the electoral district and seek the implementation of the electorate's instructions.

Article 74. A deputy of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council may with the consent of the Supreme Council exercise his authority without taking time off from his labor activity. A deputy's work in the Supreme Council is compensated in the procedure determined by law.

A deputy of a local soviet of people's deputies exercises his authority without, as a rule, taking time off from shop floor or office activity.

For the time of meetings of sessions of the local soviets of people's deputies and also for the exercise of a deputy's authority in other instances provided for by law a deputy is released from shop floor or office duties with reimbursement of his expenditure connected with deputies' activity and compensation for his wages from the resources of the local budget.

Article 75. The deputy has the right to put an inquiry to the appropriate state authorities and officials, who are obliged to respond to the inquiry at a session of the Supreme Council or the local soviet of people's deputies.

The deputy has the right to address all state and public authorities at enterprises and in establishments and organizations on matters of deputies' activity, obtain from them the requisite information, and participate in the examination of the questions he has raised. The leaders of the pertinent state and public organizations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations are obliged to immediately receive the deputy and examine his proposals within the established timeframe.

Article 76. A deputy is provided with the conditions for the unimpeded and effective exercise of his rights and duties.

Deputy immunity and also other guarantees of deputies' activity are determined by law.

Article 77. The deputy is obliged to render account of his work and the work of the appropriate soviet to the electorate and also to the collectives, political parties, public organizations, and public movements which nominated him for deputy.

A deputy who has failed to justify the trust of the electorate may at any time be recalled by decision of a majority of the electorate in the procedure determined by law.

Having given his consent and having been appointed or elected to state bodies formed by this soviet, a deputy forfeits his deputy's authority, and new elections are held in his former electoral district.

Chapter 10. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council

Article 78. The highest organ of state power of the Lithuanian Republic is the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council is empowered to decide questions of:

1. The adoption of the Lithuanian Republic Constitution and alterations thereto;
2. The scheduling of elections of people's deputies of the Lithuanian Republic and approval of the composition of the republic Electoral Commission;
3. Approval of draft basic programs of the economic and social development of the Lithuanian Republic, approval of the budget of the Lithuanian state, the monitoring of fulfillment of the program and budget, approval of the reports on their fulfillment, and changes, if necessary, to the budget;
4. Legislative regulation of property relations in the republic, organization of the activity of management of the economy and the sociocultural sphere, relations of the budget-finance system, pay, pricing, and taxation in the republic and utilization of the resources of nature and environmental conservation and also organization

of the realization of the constitutional rights, liberties, and duties of the citizens and other relations;

5. Interpretation of the laws of the Lithuanian Republic;

6. Determination of the procedure of formation of the highest and local organs of state power of the Lithuanian Republic and their activity;

7. Determination of the system of the procuracy, the courts, and other organs of justice of the Lithuanian Republic and the legislative enshrinement of their competence and *modus operandi*;

8. Election of the chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council;

9. Election of the deputy chairmen and the secretary of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council;

10. Appointment of the prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, approval, per his submission, of the Council of Ministers and changes thereto; the creation and abolition, per the proposal of the Council of Ministers, of ministries of the Lithuanian Republic;

11. Election of the Lithuanian Supreme Court and court (rayon, municipal) judges and the appointment of the prosecutor and his deputies and the chief state arbiter of Lithuania; approval of the board of the Lithuanian Republic Procuracy and the board of the Lithuanian State Arbitration Tribunal;

12. Regular hearing of accounts of the elective authorities which it organizes and also of the officials it appoints; if necessary, a decision by secret ballot on the question of confidence in the Government of the Lithuanian Republic or a specific member thereof;

13. Determination of the necessary measures in the sphere of state security and public order; discussion, if necessary, of questions of national and interethnic relations;

14. The formation of new rayons, the renaming of rayons and the abolition of rayons; the establishment and abolition of the status of cities of the republic; a change in the names of cities of the republic;

15. Determination of the procedure of the solutions of questions of the administrative and territorial division of the Lithuanian Republic; the formation of cities; the renaming of cities, communities, villages, and other localities; the determination and alteration of boundaries of rayons, cities, communities, and villages; the solution of other questions of the administrative and territorial structure;

16. Discussion of the Lithuanian Republic's relations with foreign countries and other questions of foreign policy;

17. Ratification and denunciation of international treaties of the Lithuanian Republic;

18. Establishment of state awards of the Lithuanian Republic;

19. The adoption of a decision on holding a national ballot (referendum) when demanded by no fewer than 300,000 citizens of the Lithuanian Republic;

20. Promulgation of acts of amnesty;

21. Reversal of ordinances and regulations of the Council of Ministers and also decisions of the rayon soviets and soviets of cities of the republic if they conflict with the law;

22. The solution of other questions of state significance.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council enacts laws and adopts decrees of the Lithuanian Republic.

Laws of Lithuania may be enacted by nationwide ballot (referendum) also.

Article 79. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council consists of 141 deputies elected in electoral districts with an equal number of voters.

In accordance with submission of the credentials commission which it has elected, the Supreme Council adopts a decision on recognition of the authority of the deputies. If an instance of violation of election law has been noted in any electoral district which has proven decisive for the outcome of the elections, the election of the deputy for this district is deemed invalid.

Article 80. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council meets annually for regular—spring and fall—sessions. The spring session begins on 1 March and ends no later than 30 June, and the fall session begins on 1 September and ends no later than 15 December.

Special sessions are convened by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Presidium on its initiative or in accordance with the proposal of no less than one-third of the deputies of the Supreme Council.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council session consists of meetings of the Supreme Council and also meetings of the Supreme Council standing commissions held in the period between sessions. The session opens and ends at meetings of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

The meetings of the Supreme Council are chaired by the chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council or his deputy.

The first meeting of the Supreme Council following the elections is opened by the chairman of the republic Electoral Commission, and subsequently the meeting is chaired by the chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council or his deputy.

The session of the Supreme Council is competent if no less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the Supreme Council participate therein.

Article 81. The right of legislative initiative in the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council belongs to deputies of the Supreme Council and the Supreme Council Presidium, the Supreme Council chairman, the standing commissions of the Supreme Council, and the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor of the Lithuanian Republic.

Right of legislative initiative is held also by political parties and public organizations in the shape of their republic bodies.

Article 82. Draft laws and other questions submitted for examination by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council are preliminarily discussed at sessions thereof, after which they are passed on for examination by one or several commissions of the Supreme Council.

Discussion of these drafts and other questions at sessions of the Supreme Council continues after the findings and recommendations of the corresponding commissions for the drafts have been heard.

Laws of the Lithuanian Republic and decrees of the Supreme Council or other instruments are considered enacted if a majority of the deputies of the Supreme Council taking part in the session has voted for them.

Draft laws and other most important questions of state and public life of the republic may by decision of the Supreme Council be submitted for public discussion.

Article 83. Laws of the Lithuanian Republic and decrees of the Supreme Council or other instruments are published after they have been signed by the chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

Article 84. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Presidium is a body accountable to the Supreme Council providing for the organization of the work of the Supreme Council and exercising other powers within the limits stipulated by the Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic and other laws.

The Supreme Council Presidium incorporates ex officio the chairman of the Supreme Council, the deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council, and the secretary of the Supreme Council, and the chairmen of the Supreme Council standing commissions.

Other deputies of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council may by decision of the Supreme Council also be elected to the Presidium.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Presidium is headed by the chairman of the Supreme Council.

Article 85. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Presidium:

- 1) convenes the first session of the new Supreme Council not later than two months after the elections;
- 2) organizes the preparation of Supreme Council sessions;

3) coordinates the activity of the Supreme Council standing commission;

4) if necessary, assists the Supreme Council deputies in the exercise of their authority;

5) decides questions of methods assistance rendered the local soviets of people's deputies;

6) organizes the preparation and holding of referenda and also public discussion of other most important questions of the state and public life of the republic;

7) grants citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic; decides questions concerning the loss of Lithuanian citizenship and the granting of asylum;

8) confers awards of the Lithuanian Republic and bestows badges of honor;

9) pardons persons convicted by Lithuanian courts of law;

10) appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of Lithuania in foreign states and international organizations;

11) receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited to it;

12) performs other commissions of the Supreme Council.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Presidium promulgates nonenforceable proclamations and adopts decrees.

Upon the expiration of the term of authority of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council Presidium retains its authority up to the convening by the newly elected Supreme Council of the first session and the formation of a new Presidium.

Article 86. The chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council is the highest official of the Lithuanian Republic and represents the Lithuanian Republic in international relations.

The chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council is elected by the Supreme Council from the ranks of Supreme Council deputies by secret ballot for a term of five years and for no more than two terms in succession. He may by way of secret ballot be recalled by the Supreme Council.

The chairman of the Supreme Council is accountable to the Supreme Council.

Article 87. The chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council:

1) exercises overall leadership of the preparation of the questions to be discussed by the Supreme Council; signs laws of the Lithuanian Republic and other instruments enacted by the Supreme Council and the Supreme Council Presidium;

2) presents to the Supreme Council reports on the situation in the republic and on important questions of Lithuania's domestic and foreign policy;

3) presents to the Supreme Council nominations for election to the offices of deputy chairman of the Supreme Council and secretary of the Supreme Council;

4) presents to the Supreme Council nominations for appointment or election to the office of prime minister of Lithuania, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Court, prosecutor of the Lithuanian Republic and chief state arbiter of Lithuania;

5) conducts negotiations and signs international agreements of the Lithuanian Republic, submitting them for ratification by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

The chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council issues instructions.

Deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council exercise, as authorized by the chairman, certain of his functions and substitute for the chairman if he is absent or cannot perform his duties.

Article 88. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council elects from the ranks of Supreme Council deputies standing commissions for the preparation of bills and the preliminary examination and preparation of questions within the province of the Supreme Council and also for assisting the implementation of laws of the Lithuanian Republic and other decisions adopted by the Supreme Council and supervision of the activity of state bodies and organizations.

If necessary, the Supreme Council forms investigative, auditing and other commissions on any issue.

Article 89. Officials who constitute the Lithuanian Council of Ministers and judges of the Lithuanian Supreme Court and also members of the boards of the Lithuanian Republic Procuracy and Lithuanian State Arbitration Tribunal are elected and appointed given a finding by the pertinent standing commissions of the Supreme Council.

All state and public authorities, organizations, and officials are obliged to comply with the requirements of the Supreme Council commissions and to make available to them the necessary material and documents.

Recommendations of the commissions are to unfailingly be discussed by state and public authorities, establishments, and organizations. The results of the discussion and the measures which have been adopted have to be communicated to the commissions within the timeframe they determine.

Article 90. A deputy of the Supreme Council has the right at sessions of the Supreme Council to address an inquiry to the chairman of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers and the leaders of other bodies formed or elected by the Supreme Council. The body or official which has received the inquiry is obliged to give a verbal or written response at the given session of the Supreme Council within no more than three days or as otherwise determined by the Supreme Council.

Proceedings may not be instituted against a deputy of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, he may not be

arrested, and administrative penalties in legal form may not be imposed in respect of him without the consent of the Supreme Council, and when it is not in session, without the consent of the Supreme Council Presidium.

Article 91. The procedure of the activity of the Supreme Council and its bodies is determined by the Supreme Council standing orders and other laws of the Lithuanian Republic promulgated on the basis of the Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 92. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council exercises supervision of the activity of all state bodies accountable to it.

For exercise of the functions of state control the Lithuanian Supreme Council creates control authorities. The procedure of their organization and activity is determined by law.

Chapter 11. The Government of the Lithuanian Republic

Article 93. Executive authority in the Lithuanian Republic is exercised by the government. The Lithuanian Republic Council of Ministers (government) consists of a prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and ministers.

Article 94. The prime minister heads the government and represents it.

The prime minister is appointed by the Supreme Council in accordance with the proposal of the chairman of the Supreme Council. The deputy prime ministers and ministers are approved by the Supreme Council at the proposal of the prime minister.

Article 95. The Lithuanian Council of Ministers is responsible to the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council and accountable to it, and when the Supreme Council is not in session, to the Supreme Council Presidium, to which it is accountable.

The Council of Ministers regularly renders account of its work to the Supreme Council and is obliged to have its confidence. If by a two-thirds majority of its total number of deputies the Supreme Council expresses by secret ballot no confidence in the Council of Ministers or an individual minister, the entire Council of Ministers or this minister are obliged to tender their resignation.

Article 96. A deputy prime minister substitutes for the prime minister if the prime minister cannot perform his duties or if the prime minister so instructs.

Article 97. On the basis and in execution of legislative instruments of Lithuania the Lithuanian Council of Ministers adopts decisions and issues instructions and organizes and verifies their fulfillment.

Ordinances and regulations of the Council of Ministers are binding throughout Lithuanian territory.

Article 98. Within the limits of its competence the Lithuanian Council of Ministers has the right to revoke enactments of the ministries and other bodies within its jurisdiction. The Council of Ministers has the right to protest in the Supreme Council decisions of an upper-level self-administration soviet in the event of their being contrary to Lithuanian law.

In instances provided for by Lithuanian legislation the Council of Ministers may suspend and protest decisions of the organs of administration of upper-level self-administration in the soviet of the given self-administration. In the event of a dispute arising, the issue is settled conclusively by the Supreme Council.

Article 99. The Council of Ministers yields its authority to the newly elected Supreme Council at its first session.

Article 100. The composition, competence, and principles of the activity of the government are determined by government law.

Chapter 12. Local Soviets of People's Deputies

Article 101. The Lithuanian Republic determines its own administrative and territorial division.

The Lithuanian Republic has the following:

rayons: Akmyanskiy, Alitusskiy, Anikshchayskiy, Birzhayskiy, Varenskiy, Vilkavishskiy, Vilnyusskiy, Zarasayskiy, Ignalinskiy, Ionavskiy, Ionishskiy, Kayshyadorskiy, Kaunasskiy, Kedaynskiy, Kelmesskiy, Klaypedskiy, Kretingskiy, Kupishskiy, Lazdiyskiy, Mariyampolskiy, Mazheykskiy, Moletskiy, Pakruoyskiy, Pasvalskiy, Panevezhskiy, Plungeskiy, Prenayskiy, Radvilishskiy, Raseynskiy, Rokishskiy, Skuodasskiy, Shakyayskiy, Shalchininkskiy, Shvenchenskiy, Shilalskiy, Shilutskiy, Shirvintskiy, Shyaulyskiy, Tauragskiy, Telshyayskiy, Trakayskiy, Ukmergskiy, Utenskiy, Yurbarkskiy;

cities of the republic: Vilnius, Alitus, Birshonas, Druskininkay, Kaunas, Klaypeda, Mariyampole, Neringa, Palanga, Panevezhis, Shyaululyay.

Article 102. The organs of state power of the rayons, cities, communities, and villages are the pertinent soviets of people's deputies.

Article 103. The local soviets of people's deputies decide all questions of local significance, proceeding from state interests and the interests of the citizens residing on the territory of the soviet and also the principles of self-administration, implement decisions of the higher state authorities, discuss questions of state significance, and submit their proposals in respect of them.

The local soviets of people's deputies direct on their territory state, economic, and sociocultural building; approve the local budget and the report on its fulfillment; head the leadership of the bodies, enterprises, and organizations within their jurisdiction and monitor the

activity of the establishments, enterprises, and organizations located on their territory; ensure compliance with the Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic and the laws, state and public order, and citizens' rights.

Article 104. Within the limits of their authority the local soviets of people's deputies provide for comprehensive economic and social development on their territory; monitor compliance with the laws on the part of the enterprises, establishments, and organizations of higher jurisdiction located on their territory; coordinate and monitor their activity in the sphere of land use and the use of other natural resources, nature conservation, construction, the use of labor resources, protection of historical and cultural monuments, the production of consumer goods and sociocultural, consumer, and other services.

Article 105. The local soviets of people's deputies adopt decisions within the limits of their authority accorded them by Lithuanian legislation. The decisions of the local soviets are binding on all enterprises, establishments, and organizations and also officials and citizens on the territory of the soviet.

Article 106. The local soviets of people's deputies are competent to examine and decide at their sessions any questions pertaining by legislation to their jurisdiction. The list of questions to be discussed and decided exclusively at sessions is determined by law.

Article 107. The local soviets of people's deputies elect from the ranks of the deputies standing commissions for the preliminary examination and preparation of questions within the province of the local soviets and also for assisting the implementation of the decisions of the soviets and supervision of the activity of the state authorities, enterprises, establishments, and organizations.

The recommendations of the standing commissions of the local soviets are unfailingly to be examined by the pertinent state and public authorities, enterprises, establishments, and organizations. The results of the examination or the measures adopted must be communicated to the commissions within the established timeframe.

Article 108. The self-administration soviet of people's deputies of the lower level of the component has the right to protest decisions of the organs of self-administration of the upper component to the Supreme Council on matters exclusively within the province of lower-level self-administration.

An upper-level self-administration soviet of people's deputies has the right to suspend decisions of the organs of lower-level self-administration in instances of their being contrary to Lithuanian legislation. In the event of a dispute arising, the matter is settled conclusively by the Supreme Council.

Article 109. The local soviets of people's deputies exercise their activity in close connection with the public organizations and the work force, submit the most

important issues for discussion by the citizens and enlist them in the work of the standing commissions and other bodies accountable to the soviets, direct the work of the local volunteer societies, and develop the public independent activity of the population.

Chapter 13. Organs of Administration of Local Self-Administration

Article 110. For implementation of the laws of Lithuania and also the decisions of the local soviets of people's deputies the self-administration soviets form organs of administration accountable to them.

Article 111. Upon the expiration of the authority of the self-administration soviets the organs of administration retain their authority up to the formation by the new self-administration soviets of organs of administration.

Article 112. The procedure of the formation of local self-administration organs of administration is determined by Lithuanian legislation governing local self-administration.

Chapter 14. Justice and Arbitration

Article 113. Justice in the Lithuanian Republic is exercised only by a court of law. Courts endowed with special powers may not be formed in Lithuania.

The courts of the Lithuanian Republic are the Lithuanian Supreme Court and rayon (municipal) courts.

The organization and procedure of the activity of Lithuania's courts are determined by Lithuanian law.

Article 114. Lithuania's courts are formed by way of the election of judges and judicial assessors.

The judges of rayon (municipal) courts and judges of the Lithuanian Supreme Court are elected by the republic Supreme Court.

The judicial assessors of the rayon (municipal) courts are elected by the local soviets of people's deputies, and assessors of the Lithuanian Supreme Court, by the Supreme Council.

Judges of the courts are elected for a 10-year term, and judicial assessors, for a five-year term.

Judges and judicial assessors are responsible to the organs of power which elected them and may be recalled in the procedure and on the grounds determined by law.

Article 115. The Lithuanian Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in the Lithuanian Republic exercising justice and supervision of the judicial activity of the courts of Lithuania in the procedure determined by Lithuanian law.

The Lithuanian Supreme Court consists of a chairman, deputy chairmen, and judges and judicial assessors.

Article 116. Civil and criminal cases are heard in all courts in full session, except for instances stipulated by law.

In the exercise of justice judicial assessors enjoy all the rights of a judge.

Article 117. Judges and judicial assessors are independent and subordinate only to the law.

Judges and judicial assessors are ensured the conditions for the unimpeded and effective exercise of their rights and duties.

Interference of organs of state power and administration, political parties, public organizations, public movements, officials, and other citizens in the activity of the judges and judicial assessors in respect of the exercise of justice is prohibited and entails criminal liability in the procedure determined by law.

The immunity of judges and judicial assessors and also other assurances of their independence are determined by the Lithuanian law on judicial administration and the status of judges and other legislative instruments of Lithuania.

Article 118. All citizens of Lithuania are equal before the law and the court.

Article 119. The investigation of cases is in all instances open. The hearing of cases in camera is permitted only in instances determined by law, with observance of all the rules of judicial administration.

Article 120. A person against whom proceedings have been instituted is ensured the right to defense.

Article 121. Judicial administration in the Lithuanian Republic is conducted in Lithuanian. Persons participating in a case who do not know Lithuanian are ensured the right of full familiarization with the material of the case and participation in the court proceedings via a translator and the right to speak in court in their native language.

Article 122. A person is considered innocent until his guilt is proven in the procedure determined by law and recognized by a sentence of the court which has taken legal effect. Sentences are passed in the name of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 123. Legal aid is rendered citizens and organizations by the bar. In instances provided for by legislation legal aid is rendered the citizens free of charge.

The procedure and organization of the activity of the bar are determined by Lithuanian law.

Article 124. Economic arguments between enterprises, establishments and organizations are settled by the organs of state arbitration within their jurisdiction.

Chapter 15. The Procuracy

Article 125. The highest supervision of the precise and uniform execution of the laws by all ministries, departments, enterprises, establishments and organizations, executive bodies of the local soviets of people's deputies,

kolkhozes, cooperative and other public organizations and officials, and also citizens on the territory of Lithuania is exercised by the Lithuanian prosecutor and the prosecutors subordinate to him.

Article 126. Upon a submission of the chairman of the Lithuania Supreme Council the prosecutor of the Lithuanian Republic is appointed by the Supreme Council, to which he is responsible and accountable.

Article 127. Deputy prosecutors of the Lithuanian Republic are appointed by the Supreme Council upon a submission of the republic prosecutor.

Rayon, municipal, and other prosecutors are appointed by the Lithuanian Republic prosecutor.

Article 128. The term of the authority of the Lithuanian Republic prosecutor and his deputies and all lower prosecutors is five years.

Article 129. The organs of the Lithuanian Procuracy exercise their authority independently of the organs of state administration and self-administration bodies, subordinate only to the Lithuanian Republic prosecutor.

The procedure of the organization and exercise of the activity of the procuracy are determined by the Lithuanian Procuracy Act.

Chapter 16. Final Provisions

Article 130. All laws of Lithuania and other enactments of state authorities are promulgated on the basis of this Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic and in accordance with it.

Article 131. An alteration to the Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic is made by decision of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council adopted by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the Supreme Council or by referendum.

Article 132. An intention concerning an alteration of or addition to the Provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic must be discussed by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council if it has been presented by no less than one-tenth of all deputies of the Supreme Council or the government.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
Vilnius, 11 March 1990.

Landsbergis, Sabutis Interviewed 22 Mar

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24 Mar 90 p 3

[ELTA correspondents I. Bagdanskis and R. Chesna report: "Press Conference in the Supreme Council"]

[Text] A press conference for republic and foreign journalists was held on the evening of 22 March in the Supreme Council. Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of

the republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, and Supreme Council Secretary Lyudvikas Sabutis took part. The conference was conducted by Algimantas Chekuolis, chief editor of the weekly GIMTASIS KRASHTAS, who immediately suggested that the journalists note the fourth issue of the publication VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL, which publishes documents which had been concealed from the Soviet public for 50 years. They testify to the deal between Stalin's USSR and fascist Germany in connection with the appropriation of Lithuania and the other Baltic states, although it had hitherto been maintained that these documents had not been kept.

Opening the press conference, Lyudvikas Sabutis noted as a very significant fact that, following thorough discussion, the session had ratified the Law on the Lithuanian Government. He reported also that the question of the militarized Organization for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy operating in Lithuania had been discussed. It was ascertained that, in fulfillment of a Moscow assignment, the organization has been registering means of transport and keeping a record of local aircraft, recreational aircraft, in particular, and sporting-type weapons, preparing to hand this over to the military units, and engaging in other unacceptable activity having nothing in common with technical types of sport.

Lyudvikas Sabutis also commented on the edict of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, "Additional Measures To Safeguard the Rights of Soviet Citizens and Protect USSR Sovereignty on the Territory of the Lithuania SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," emphasizing that the edict misinforms the Soviet and world public. It is an attempt to persuade it that Lithuania is preparing for armed resistance. But, he observed, there are no symptoms of armed struggle or preparations for the use of weapons in Lithuania. Lithuania's sole weapon in this situation is strong will, a staunch position and parliamentary struggle and all constitutional means connected with this. It is merely to be regretted that a variety of emissaries intent on interfering in the activity of our legal institutions are being dispatched to Lithuania from Moscow on false pretexts on account of the imaginary danger. At the same time Lyudvikas Sabutis observed that the parliament had approved the republic's new prosecutor. It is to be hoped that he will know how to scrupulously defend the interests of our citizens.

Evaluating Moscow's attitude toward Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis briefly replied approximately as follows: all that we are doing from the viewpoint of the USSR Government is illegal and unlawful, including our presence here.... But you walk the streets of Vilnius and can see for yourselves how everything is in reality, Vytautas Landsbergis observed.

Incidentally, if we are speaking of crimes, there really are many of them. The fact that there has lately been in Lithuania a halt in the growth of crime and that the number of crimes has not been increasing as quickly as before gives us hope. Crime is a problem of the state, of

society, and is acute not only in Lithuania but in the USSR and neighboring countries also.

Speaking of the manifestations of extremism in Lithuania, the chairman of the Supreme Council observed that representatives of the CPSU in Lithuania were calling on people to disobey the laws of the republic and inciting them against the state. It is this which should be seen as extremism.

To the question as to how it happened that such an organization as "Yedinstvo" came to be officially registered in Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis replied that this had been done by the former government of the republic. He was also asked whether police officers had the right to exercise the functions of customs officers? It was said in reply that if some rules of law were needed for this, they could be effected quickly. The police should continue the fight against profiteering and the embezzlement of valuables or their export outside of the republic. The police had embarked on these functions earlier also and should not abandon them now. Continuing this thought, Lyudvikas Sabutis observed that in this case the police could also avail themselves of the right of legislative initiative.

Vytautas Landsbergis was asked such questions as whether there had been a change in M.S. Gorbachev's position on Lithuania and whether it would not be ruined, being independent, as the Soviet RABOCHAYA GAZETA had written.

It was said in reply that M.S. Gorbachev adheres to the provisions of the decree of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies on Lithuania and that his position on Lithuania had become tougher, ours, more precise. As far as the ruination of Lithuania is concerned, it is time to have done with talk about this. Lithuania lived pretty well before the war even and now lives better than the Soviet Union. Such concern for others' affairs is astonishing.

In the course of the conference Gary Davis, a representative of the World Citizens' Association, presented Vytautas Landsbergis with an international citizen's passport, which permits travel without visas.

This is a symbol of freedom, possibly, for all citizens of independent Lithuania....

Lithuanian Interior Minister Interviewed

90UN1449D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 90 p 1, 2

[Interview with M. Misyukonis, minister of internal affairs of the Lithuanian Republic, by ELTA correspondent; date and place not given: "Maintain Order!"]

[Text] [ELTA] What is your evaluation of the crime rate in Lithuania these days?

[Misyukonis] I will answer briefly. On the whole, the situation in the republic is normal. No special crime

situation is established even when we study the reports of crimes from 1 January of this year. The situation over the past two weeks has not deteriorated in comparison with the corresponding period last year.

[ELTA] On Tuesday morning the news circulated among the residents of Vilnius that armed soldiers, using force, abducted more than 10 youths they found in one of the capital's hospitals. Please comment on that event.

[Misyukonis] It took place on 27 March at about 0245. Approximately 60 armed soldiers drove up in two cars and burst into the Republic Psychoneurological Hospital. They arrested the militia worker, cut the telephone wires, broke through the doors, and overturned the beds and the furniture. Lithuanian youths who refused service in the Soviet Army had taken refuge in that building, over which the flag of the International Red Cross Organization was flying. Several of them managed to run away, but those who remained in the ward were beaten, forced outside, and driven away in an unknown direction. It is believed that approximately 12 youths were abducted. On that same night soldiers used force to break into the Zhegzhdryayskiy Psychiatric Hospital in Kaunasskiy Rayon. Workers of the militia who arrived at the hospital to restore law and order were subjected to insults, their personal weapons were taken away, and Senior Lieutenant A. Strogis was beaten. All of this has been documented, registered, and criminal proceedings have been instituted.

[ELTA] What do you know about the arbitrary seizure of public buildings?

[Misyukonis] At this time the Vilnius higher party school, the Lithuanian Communist Party Gorkom [city committee], and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Political Education Club have been occupied with the aid of soldiers, and attempts have been made to occupy the building of the Lithuanian Communist Party Klaipeda Gorkom. And on Tuesday morning armed soldiers seized the building of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee. Because this is connected with the property claims of the CPSU, the militia have not interfered in these cases. They must be decided legally. On the other hand, it is unclear why similar actions are continuing. We in the Supreme Council have met with the soldiers. During the conversation they promised that all future misunderstandings or conflicts would be settled through negotiation.

At the suggestion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], a coordinating council has been created at governmental level. The council includes a representative of the military leadership; Vatslovas Zabarauskas, deputy minister of internal affairs; Arturas Paulauskas, procurator of the republic; and Edmundas Baltinas, deputy chairman of the KGB. The council is headed by Romualdas Ozolas, deputy prime minister of the republic. A constantly functioning staff which will control the situation on the scale of the republic has been created in our ministry.

The primary goal is to maintain a stable and normal life in the republic so that people will be governed less by rumors and will receive information from the coordinating council when necessary.

In addition, 110 people have been given authority as members of public order squads by instruction of the Council of Ministers.

[ELTA] Have you had any visitors yet from the USSR MVD?

[Misukonis] Yes. One group arrived from the USSR MVD Political Administration. They explained to me that a verification was underway of the situation concerning the depoliticization of the internal organs—whether workers in the political department and political workers in the republic as a whole were resentful. They were also interested in how they could adapt to our new structure and how we were finding employment for former political workers. Another group arrived to monitor how the USSR president's Edict on the Surrender of Weapons was being carried out.

[ELTA] Incidentally, the period for handing in hunting rifles and other weapons has expired. Did many residents obey those explicit instructions from Moscow?

[Misukonis] Some hunters, approximately 170, brought their rifles to the departments of internal affairs. Personally I am against the surrender of hunting rifles. I have repeatedly spoken to the soldiers about this too. There is no extraordinary situation in Lithuania; the situation is normal. There are no reasons for or any sense in disarming hunters.

Prunskiene Letter to Ryzhkov on Draft Published

90UN1487B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
4 Apr 90 p 1

[Letter from K. Prunskiene, republic of Lithuania prime minister, to N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of USSR Council of Ministers]

[Text] Esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich!

In conjunction with the adoption of USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 305 dated 29 March 1990 on the next draft of citizens to military service, we communicate that the republic of Lithuania Government, in execution of Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council Resolution dated 14 March 1990, obligated city and rayon executive committees to suspend operations on carrying out the spring draft, as well as the provision of services to military commissariats.

With a view to preventing further complications in relations between the state organs of Lithuania and respective organs of the USSR, we once again propose to immediately embark on negotiations and on working out corresponding agreements on the entire set of issues associated with the defense interests of the USSR in Lithuania.

[Signed] Republic of Lithuania Prime Minister K. Prunskiene

Moderate Appraisal of Lithuanian Situation Cited

90UN1437A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 13
26 Mar-1 Apr 90 p 14

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy: "Crossroads. A Lithuanian Diary"]

[Text] "...In jungles of many languages. I know them all," said the boy. "You know some, but far from all..." the bear muttered. "Well, what is the word of all tribes of hunters?" "We share the same blood, you and I," answered Mogli. He said this, as is done in Hunting Tribes, in bear language, and then he repeated it in the language of the bird tribes and the language of snake tribes. "We share the same blood..." (From Kipling)

"Lithuania has left." My cautious colleague advises not to be hasty with conclusions or at least to put a question mark at the end of this dramatic communication: "Lithuania has left?" For a declaration of withdrawal from the USSR is not the same thing as a withdrawal. It is a declaration. Decisions of Lithuanian parliamentarians are declared illegal and an assessment of them is given in the documents of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the declarations of the USSR Government. The position of the country's president is also unequivocal.

And the straightforward "Lithuania has left" is an erroneous formula. Because there is nowhere for Lithuania to go; its destiny is to spend eternity on the border between West and East, to bear the cross of suffering that usually befalls such people. A handful of grain between the millstones that are moving but not engaged—these are my impressions of this geographical inevitability.

The history of Lithuania in the 20th century has been brewed with wild yeast. First it left Russia and rejoiced, proclaiming independence with the tacit approval of the Kaiser's troops, then it was left without the capital of Vilnius, then in the face of the absolute neutrality of the Red Army it went bearing red banners to Stalinist socialism, not knowing the thorny crown the tyrant would place on it the very next day...

Now that the bitterness of suffering is behind them and it would seem that it would be possible to "live and let live on earth," the pendulum has moved in the other direction—toward the West. As far away from the East as possible.

Would it have been possible to predict such a development of events, say, five years ago? Three years ago?

In April of 1986, having received an assignment to Lithuania, I saw Vilnius blissfully satisfied, peaceful, and complacent. The central press was already making threats everywhere against stagnation and the bureaucrats but their Lithuanian continued as before to glorify

certain events and achievements. In the official institutions they spoke about internationalism with emphatic politeness and devotion and took pride in their participation in the great construction projects in the Russian North, the non-Chernozem zone, and the petroleum regions of Tyumen and Siberia.

And at that time I received a letter from Yu. Semin, an engineer from Syzran, which I have not managed to print either in the light of glasnost or subsequently. I think now is the time to quote the essence of Yu. Semin's reflections so as to get at the roots and the explanation of today's unofficial situation.

"I lived in Lithuania for more than 10 years and, as the poet wrote, 'I got used to understanding a foreign tongue.' I love Lithuania and consider it my home. Because of circumstances, however, I had to leave, as Lithuanians say, for the Union. And now my new friends who have passed through or paid a short visit to the Baltic states flood me with questions: Why do they dislike Russians so much in Lithuania (Estonia, Latvia)? I cannot give them a precise answer to that question. The more so since this is not a question but an opinion. Well, how do you explain to a blind person the color of the sunrise. A blossoming field? These things have to be seen...

"I saw this. I lived in it. I want to share my thoughts with you—maybe they will be helpful.

"When I was living there, in Lithuania, I somehow got used to things rather quickly, and it seemed ridiculous and embarrassing to me that somewhere there was an unresolvable problem with releasing glass containers, repairing footwear, a problem with public transportation, live flowers in the middle of winter, a piece of sausage or vegetables from the store, not to mention from the bazaar, and elementary consumer services. I do not wish to idealize the Lithuanians, they are people like everyone else. But what is true is true—they have a knack for business, they are enterprising, and they are not afraid of work. If they see that their neighbor is doing something better, they do not turn green with envy but immediately adopt that which is better.

"When a Russian arrives in Lithuania and also in Estonia or Latvia and sees this normal life which he finds extraordinary he mutters—they are living high on the hog... They have gotten fat... He is driven crazy by how neat and clean the streets are, the absence of fences and enclosures even in the villages, and the roads without puddles or potholes. He is angered by his inability to understand the foreign language that is being spoken everywhere. If you ask them something in Russian, they answer you and then go on speaking in their Lithuanian.

A Russian rarely thinks about what he must do in order to live as well as the Lithuanians (Estonians, Latvians). After all, in the final analysis they have reached their level in our socialist state."

It is not difficult to refute the author of the letter word for word, line by line. He has included among the Russians all those coming to the Baltic area to the bazaar for shopping, especially singling out that category of citizens who will find fault with anything just so long as they can blame others rather than themselves. But if we read this "anti-Russian" letter more carefully, it turns out that it is about something more important than declared nationalism—it is about the ability to live, to conduct business, and to take charge of one's destiny.

Did I, a new person with no knowledge of the Lithuanian language, experience a dislike for "Russians," that is, non-Lithuanians? I solemnly swear and testify: Neither in the most remote villages nor at the plants nor at the construction sites nor among the intelligentsia from the provinces or the capital did I ever hear either a word or a hint of this dislike. Even when the ethnic world in the republic was in turmoil, when I met with and argued with irreconcilable ideological opposition, even then the most offensive thing that was said to me was: You are not a Lithuanian and you cannot understand Lithuanians.

And herein lies perhaps one of the most mysterious paradoxes: Few "outsiders"—as people coming to Lithuania are now called, even though they may have lived all their lives in the republic—complain about insult to their honor and dignity because of ethnic factors. But all together the immense number of Russian-speaking people have been regularly insulted and offended. Why?

The Lithuanian people have an unhealed wound and an unforgiven offense—deportation. Until recently this was a forbidden subject in the central press or else it was covered simply and clearly since it was impossible to remain silent: Enemies and their accomplices were exiled.

I remember the "alpha" of the Lithuanian situation—a rally commemorating the victims of Stalinism on 23 August 1987. About 300 people gathered at the monument to Mitskevich, mainly the aktiv of the Lithuanian Freedom League and—more than half—soviet and party aktiv and onlookers. The date, you understand, was not picked at random—it was the anniversary of the signing of the Ribentrop-Molotov pact. Of course this rally was regarded in the traditional way—as a manifestation of nationalism. The rally was harshly denounced in enterprises, institutions, and kolchozes [collective farms]. In spite of the slogans for perestroika, the pendulum of our ideology was moving with a constant speed and in the given direction.

The statements at the meeting were frankly "brutish" and vulnerable to dispute, but none of the speakers took issue with them. I consider it necessary to mention this because this is precisely where one finds the point of reference of the "great silence" which led ultimately to our defeat.

It has become accepted to think that peace and harmony in Lithuania were disrupted by Sajudis—the Lithuanian movement for perestroika. And at first glance that seems to be the case. The movement selected as its main direction national rebirth—a lever which could move the world. Many (if not all!) the proposals were perceived by official circles as blasphemy and by the people—with rapture. Sajudis demanded: Return the national flag to Lithuania! Return the national symbols! The national anthem! Recognize the Lithuanian language as the state language!

The “circles” fell stubbornly silent and then, under pressure from the masses, gave in. The “sacrilegious” concessions, strangely, caused no catastrophes, the milk yields did not decline, labor productivity did not decrease, the sky did not fall in. But the conviction of the masses became, by degrees, formed and cemented: Only Sajudis could lead the nation forward to the cherished goal of national rebirth.

National rebirth, it seems to me, is impossible without consolidation of national forces. The movement dealt successfully with this task. So successfully that the slogans of interethnic dissension, which did crop up during those impassioned days of rallies, did not bother anybody. Except for those against whom they were directed. It hardly came into anybody's head to demand resettlement of the Russians to Siberia or to send all the Poles to crematoriums! Standing at the sails and helm of the reborn Sajudis, the leaders—one must tell the truth—condemned these slogans and separated themselves from them. But the seed had fallen on fertile soil...

The rallying of proponents of perestroika on a national basis occurred so rapidly that all the people experienced a condition close to euphoria—this is the rejoicing of a person standing in front of an abyss with a thin log thrown across it, afraid of the very idea of crossing, and then, blinded by courage, having thrust himself over the obstacle, there on the other side, he feels that he is a different person, one who is capable of actions and deeds.

By the will of fate Lithuania turned out to be the country in the Baltic region with the most homogeneous population—80 percent of the population are Lithuanians. Their hearts and souls rapturously accepted the ideas of sovereignty and independence. But if we return to the image of the thin log placed across the abyss, the 20 percent of the population that speaks Russian (mainly Poles, Belorussians, and Russians) were left standing confused still facing the log. The Lithuanians are running—this is understandable, it is their rebirth. But where are we to go? Why should we want this?

Why did they suddenly feel that they were alien? And what does a Russian have to be (or become) in order to feel that he belongs in the reborn Lithuania?

I searched for a long time for answers to these tormenting questions. I understood that the Lithuanians were at home, that they have no other land, and that they have the right to determine their destiny; that with all the

equality they have the decisive voice and the Russian-speaking part of the population has an advisory voice; that the real essence of the movement which has become the religion of the rebirth of Sajudis is comprised not of a radical extremist rabble but of strata of the masses who have reached a condition of activity.

God, how happy I was for Lithuania when all at once they gathered in the squares and the streets and danced and sang at festivals of rebirth. And—why hide it—how I envied Lithuania and the Lithuanians who had forged ahead of my homeland, the Ukraine, in the awareness and awakening of national dignity.

But the stronger the movement became, the less its leadership, its pastors, paid attention to those 20 percent. The Russian speakers. They began exerting powerful propaganda pressure against “aliens.” Neither a knowledge of the language nor roots that go back seven or eight generations in Lithuanian soil, nor respect for the culture and traditions of this land, nor conscientious labor for its good—none of this made any difference.

Ultimately it sometimes turned out that it was not even so important whether or not you were a Lithuanian. Because the ultimate criterion was: He who is not in Sajudis is not with Lithuania. So far he is still concealing his political goals and true intentions. His leaders have skillfully played the role of disinterested persons concerned only about the spiritual renewal of the nation and not striving—God forbid!—for power or position.

Two directions were determined with faultless precision in the tactics of the Sajudis leadership. The first was blatant criticism of the center, which encroaches on the legitimate rights and freedoms of Lithuanians. One facet of this is to defame the bearers of the ideas of the center, its “evil will.” The second is defaming the local apparatus of all ranks and levels and accusing them of toadying to Moscow.

It goes without saying that contrasted to the migrants, occupiers, and “footloose” types were the love of work, efficiency, quickness (and so forth) of the Lithuanians.

And now is the time to return to the letter from engineer Yu. Semin, to why he does not like Russians—because of their laziness, their dullness, their slovenliness, their enviousness...

If I were to set the goal of finding bearers of these vices among the Lithuanians there would be no shortage of them. Lithuanians are people like anyone else. And when we blame Russia's misfortunes on national peculiarities, on their character, seriously believing that Russians are poor workers, we somehow forget that this same Russian blood ran in the veins of the peasant Sivkov from Arkhangelsk, the builder Serikov, the ophthalmologist Fedorov, the lawyer Alekseyev, the economists Abalkin, Shatalin, and Tikhonov...

It was not a stupid person who thought up the formula—stagnation, in which everyone is made

equal without anybody's notice, from the doorman to the General Secretary. But how different this stagnation was for the peasants, for the workers, and the bureaucratic apparatus. I saw how, during the times of stagnation under Brezhnev, the peasants were working in the Ukraine and Siberia, how the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] was constructed and the North with its petroleum and its terrible living conditions was assimilated, and how diamonds and gold were mined, and how they raised cities up out of the taiga desert. Only a great people and great workers could accomplish all this in the quagmire of bureaucratic stagnation.

And when the Lithuanian Sajudis rose up against conservatism, the economic fetters, and slavery, they were applauded and everyone sympathized with them. Because we were all equally enslaved by the administrative-command system and had suffered equally from repressions and oppression. The number of those who suffered in Lithuania is terrible: 120,000 out of a population of 3 million. But what then can you say to the Ukraine which lost millions just during the time of the artificially created famine of 1933?

Is there reason for the Balts to dislike the Soviets? But what about the soldiers who fought on this land and remained there? The regime put the Lithuanians through the meat grinder of collectivization, as it did the entire country. But what about the teachers, builders, and engineers who came to Lithuania after the war?

Think about the figures: Since 1940 the volume of industrial output in the republic has increased by a factor of 84. Some R50 billion have been invested in the development of the republic's economy during the years of Soviet power. These billions comprised the basis for high-quality goods, the art of production, the modern microrayons, the introduction of telephone service in the small hamlets and paved roads leading to each little village, and the restoration of the architectural monuments. Practically everyone can understand that in a poor country when something is given to one person there will be a shortage of it for another...

It would be quite interesting to investigate the conformist position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania which, having started out by rejecting the idea of Sajudis concerning withdrawal from the USSR, ultimately became an apologist for it. But we shall leave this task to political scientists and for ourselves keep this in mind: Evil does not go unpunished. The unfair, morally harmful position of the Sajudis machine with respect to national minorities in Lithuania today has become the main stumbling block in the acquisition of independence as it is understood by the "orthodox Lithuanians"—whoever you like but not the communists.

There was no fatal predetermination or inevitability in the development of the Lithuanian situation. It is my deep conviction that the separatist ideas put forth by Sajudis political leaders acquired force and won over the

masses only as a result of the "late ignition" of perestroika processes. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the thorny path of the idea of the economic independence of the union republics. Originating on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, for two years it beat its wings against the concrete of the outdated, thrice damned and hated, illogical administrative system and directive leadership which recognized only two arithmetic operations: take away and divide. Slowness and conservatism became the main argument in the system of proof in favor of withdrawing from the USSR.

"Lithuania has left" is not a signal of alarm and disaster. It comprises 0.3 percent of the territory of the USSR, 1.3 percent of the population, 1.4 percent of the national income, 1.5 percent of the industrial output, and 2.2 percent of the agricultural output. "Lithuania has left" is food for thought, mainly about why it left. Why did the small republic decide to leave the union where it did not have to worry about raw material for its industry or energy resources? No less curious is the question of where Lithuania is going. To what extent does the course laid out by the new republic leadership correspond to the interests of the people?

At the end of the 20th century our state, a unique multilingual combination of nations drawn together by mutual offenses and complaints that have accumulated over many centuries of living together, comes to a crossroads and decides: How should we exist? How should we live? The wisest seer will not risk predicting what will come of our inviolable union in 10 years. But there is one unquestionable truth: We must remain people. We must finally master what they know even in the jungles.

Readers View Lithuanian, Estonian Events

90UM0459A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Selection of readers' letters: "Listen to the Voice of Reason"]

[Text] From the abundant editorial mailbag, these letters on events in the Baltic republics are read with particular emotion. They contain anxiety, perplexity, and hope. What is happening today in Lithuania is echoing painfully in Soviet people's hearts. While sharing fully the concern at the current situation expressed in the appeal of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Council and the people of Lithuania, the authors of the letters ask: How is it possible, regardless of everything, to cancel out all that has united us in our union?

The actions being taken by the present Lithuanian leadership, which run counter to the USSR Constitution and are offensive to the country and all Soviet people, are not only jeopardizing the security of the people of Lithuania but are causing great concern in the country and are destabilizing the situation throughout society. And this is happening precisely now, when the Soviet Parliament

and the government of the country have embarked on the solution of fundamental questions of our federation on a truly democratic basis.

The letters which are published today in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA express the hope that the crisis will pass and that the restructuring of the political system and the renewal of interethnic relations which are under way currently will lead to positive results.

As Yet There Are More Questions

It was with hope that I read the appeal of the USSR President to the people of Lithuania and the republic Supreme Council. But, knowing the situation in Lithuania and having lived here for several years, I, an "immigrant," somehow have little optimism....

I understand that for members of the Lithuanian Parliament the word "independence" has become sweet. Why not? Uniforms, portfolios, law-making, and a passionate desire to get into the annals of history. But who will say what will happen to us Russians and Belorussians, who have from our cradles considered ourselves citizens of the USSR?

Landsbergis appeals from the television screen for meekness and transparently hints at the paradisaical life in the near future. But if we recall history: From Flavius to Mussolini and Ceausescu—they all promised prosperity....

[Signed] Georgiy Ivanov, blacksmith, Vilnius.

Invalids Are Being Deprived of Benefits

There were in all of Kaunas just two such stores, small and unremarkable. They catered to Great Patriotic War invalids. I would see severely wounded and crippled veterans calling here from time to time and purchasing some food items without having to push one another around in the wearying lines typical of our parts also. I personally, not an invalid, was pleased to see this display of at least some concern for people who had liberated our country from the Hitler aggressors.

Why "were," the reader will ask. However strange it may seem, we now have to speak about these stores in the past tense. In accordance with a decision of the executive committee of the Kaunas City Soviet of People's Deputies, service to invalids of the Great Patriotic War was abolished as of this March, and they have been deprived of one of the few benefits which they have been accorded.

Both the anti-Army hysteria and the blackening of the honor, glory and memory of the armed defenders of the motherland and the inculcation of hatred of the Soviet Army and Navy are in this same channel. This can be called nothing other than an outrage and mockery.

[Signed] Major of the Reserve Yu. Pavlov, Kaunas.

I Would Like To Believe

The appeal of the USSR president to the people of the Lithuanian SSR has strengthened me in my former opinion even more—the Lithuanian members of parliament have been in too much of a hurry. I believe that among many Lithuanians the aspiration to independence is now dominating their innate trait of taking a healthy and realistic view of matters. It is time to stop and look around. It is impossible in a matter of an hour to cancel out ties and relations which are tens and hundreds of years old. And then it is necessary to think about something else also—we have, as before, to live side by side, after all.

Belorussia has already laid claim to part of the territory of Lithuania, and many serious and, it seems to me, fair questions have accumulated among Russians also. How will Lithuania answer all this? Loudly slamming the door will not do here. It is unjust from the moral, socioeconomic and historical viewpoints. I would like to believe that Lithuania will come to understand this.

[Signed] Col N. Smaznov, Moscow Air Defense District.

Unobjective!

There was a program on Central Television in March entitled "What Is Happening in Estonia"? We believe that it was unobjective and did not reflect reality. We are not impressed by the assertions that it was filmed two months ago. This is not the main point. The main point is that the broadcast was varnished. The more so in that present events, particularly the congress of Estonian citizens held in February, fully bear out our words.

In spite of the statements of the heroes of the broadcast to the effect that "all is well here" and that the Popular Front is assisting perestroika, the opposite is happening in reality. There is a break with the state system, and measures to restore the republic which existed up to 1940 are being mapped out.

The media's influence on people is well known. And promises, following secession from the USSR, of a land flowing with milk and honey and demands for an end to the "occupation" of the republic are being heard here on television and radio and in the newspapers daily. This was happening when the filming was done also. Some politicians, including almost all the elected deputies of the Estonian Citizens' Congress, are already speaking of the creation of "their" army, which is to be deployed in the Chudskoye Lake area since the threat to the "Estonia's future," in their opinion, will emanate only from the East.

For whom, if not Central Television, was it manifestly inappropriate to delude people. After all, what has already happened in Lithuania is happening with us also. Many union laws do not operate on the territory of Estonia. The numbers of local officials of newly created departments, offices, and so forth, on the other hand, are considerably greater than in the former structures. In the guise of State Automobile Inspection posts points have

been set up at highways entering Estonia at which papers are being checked and belongings examined. For the sake of objectivity this should have been shown also.

[Signed] Voldemar Alekseyev, Karl Belts, Vasilii Tsibinog, Marina Balanenko, Tallinn.

'Enough of Heaping Dirt on the Army'

I could not watch without tears in my eyes the television coverage from Latvia when our officers stood carrying posters outside the republic Supreme Soviet building requesting that their rights and human dignity not be infringed. What have we come to! In what other country is such a thing possible? Any state treats its Army with respect, with pride, for the people who opted by profession for Army service and who are defending their people and their motherland with weapon in hand deserve this.

What, however, are the gentlemen from the Baltic popular fronts permitting themselves? They are advocating democracy in words, but in practice are depriving servicemen and the members of their families of that without which man simply cannot cope and which is guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution—accommodations, work, and other civil rights.

Enough of heaping dirt on our Army, enough of lies and insults. It should be remembered that it has always been not the worst who have gone into the Army but those who have had sufficient courage to serve not for honor but as conscience dictates, serve where they are commanded. And there are on Baltic soil many officers and members of their families who come to be there not from any desire of their own but because they have been so commanded and ordered by the motherland.

I am a mother. Eight years ago I was pleased that my son donned the uniform of an officer cadet and was proud when he became an officer. I am proud now also, but in my letters I beg him not to show himself unduly in uniform on the street. I feel ashamed, pained, and aggrieved. I am worried about one son, and my second is on the point of going off to do his military service. How can a mother's heart rest easy?

[Signed] V. Bruss, Volgograd.

We Consider it Our Duty

We Lithuanian soldiers drafted from Lithuania and serving in a remote garrison of the Pacific Fleet are puzzled by the decision of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Council to suspend the Law on Compulsory Military Service on republic territory.

We consider it our honorary duty, in this difficult period for the country, to carry out our constitutional obligations in respect of defense of our common motherland where we have been sent to serve by the people.

[Signed] Respectfully, MutsKaytis, Bashkis, Lakachauskas, Palyatskas.

Latvian Constitutional Oversight Decree Published

90UN1257B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 8 Mar 90 p 2

[Text of "Resolution of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet On Implementing on the Territory of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic the USSR Law of 23 December 1989 'On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR'"]

[Text] The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet resolves as follows:

1. Not to recognize the right of the USSR state organs as provided for in the USSR Law "On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR" to exercise oversight of the Constitution and laws of the sovereign Latvian SSR.

2. To submit a proposal to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies to make changes in the USSR Law "On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR," removing from this law (paragraphs 10-12, 19, and 21) the instructions regarding the exercise of oversight over the Constitution and laws of the union republics.

3. To deem it necessary to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a proposal on a candidate for election to the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee from the Latvian SSR.

[Signed] A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

[Signed] I. Daudish, secretary of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Riga, 1 March 1990.

Kochetov Addresses Meeting on Latvian Draft

PM0904141790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Major V. Zadubrovskiy report: "There Is To Be a Spring Draft"]

[Text] The Law on Alternative Service adopted by the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has faced the working people of the republic's military commissariats with a multitude of problems. It is essentially aimed at thwarting the next draft of young men for active military service. Many military commissariats have already received draftees' refusals to serve in the USSR Armed Forces. What should happen in such a situation, and what measures should be taken to ensure the fulfillment of the USSR Law on Compulsory Military Service? These and certain other questions were discussed at a 6 April conference with rayon and city military commissars at the Latvian SSR Military Commissariat. Army General K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister, and representatives of the Baltic Military District Staff and Directorate participated in it.

In the course of an exchange of opinions the conference participants arrived at the conclusion that the spring

draft can and must be ensured, being guided by the union laws. Local laws must not affect the manning of the USSR Armed Forces.

Latvia's Political Factions Assessed

90UN1472A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 15, 11 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondents T. Fast and G. Tselms: "Latvia: Are the Radicals Getting the Upper Hand?"]

[Text] It appears that we should get used to improvisations in politics occurring for a reason: They reflect existing reality. Nonetheless, a Lithuanian-style divorce caught many people unprepared. Members of Interfront are now pointing out: We have warned about the growth of separatism in the Baltic area. Indeed, they have been confusing separatism with the natural right of nations to self-determination in the process.

Lithuania has played a hand which has changed the Baltic situation as a whole and has reminded us, this time in a more resolute manner: Let us reckon with reality, that is, structure our relations taking into account the current situation. The situation at present is such that representatives of the NFL [National Front of Latvia] gained a majority in the elections to the local and supreme organs of power of the three western republics. The people's fronts have in a manner become part of the state structure.

Mixed as the new parliament of Latvia is, the victory of the NFL is obvious. Taking into account the demographic equilibrium in the republic, we may assume considerable support for the front among the Russian populace. What has caused this? A noticeable shift by the NFL after its second congress toward this very segment of the populace.

We quote: "We will only make progress toward independence if the political organizations and parties are going to have 50 percent of non-Latvians. There cannot be privileges or preferences with regard to nations or peoples." (I. Godmanis)

Certainly the statements by NFL leaders may be regarded as the trump cards of preelection programs. However, the fact remains: New deputies supported by the majority have come to power. The course toward restoring state independence proclaimed by a sociopolitical organization has become the course of the entire republic. Taking into account the victory of democratic forces in the three Baltic parliaments, it may also be considered the Baltic course.

As far as the voters themselves are concerned, the non-Latvian population, accounting for close to one-half of them, still feels unstable despite the shift toward the NFL. The lack of a law on citizenship causes alarm that is easy to explain. It is enhanced by the citizens committees, which acknowledge the constitutional rights only of those who

were born in Latvia prior to 1940. By now, these committees have registered 730,000 people. The case of Estonia, which has confirmed the powers of its congress (this is what the supreme organ of the citizens committee is called) does not make the people optimistic.

The elections indicated the increasing polarization of social forces. The radicals have been getting the upper hand; changes in the leadership of the movements and parties have shown this. Those who initiated perestroika have been increasingly often withdrawing from the arena. The reasons are found in their powerlessness to resolve anything, fear of extreme attitudes, and reluctance to assume responsibility for them.

Examples follow. For about a year now, the struggle against the democratic wing of the Interfront has been under way. We believe that power in its presidium has passed to the most intolerant person, Chairman A. Alekseyev.

A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and one of the most popular people in the republic, has been attacked increasingly often from both the right and the left, and the nature of their claims is the same—compromises. All of Gorbunov's prestige notwithstanding, the Brazauskas scenario, whereby the new parliament elects a more radical leader, is not ruled out.

The inability of the extremists to listen to each other is apparent. One categorical step immediately entails another. This is also apparent in Lithuania. The ultimatums of the Lithuanian parliament prompted Moscow to take measures in response. Pressure from the center immediately had repercussions in the two other Baltic republics. Latvian newspapers published this report: In the Estonian city of Valga, unknown individuals blew up a T-34 tank—a monument of the Great Patriotic War. Rallies adopting resolutions in support of Lithuania are being held in the Estonian and Latvian cities.

The extreme positions are the heritage of the past. While paying lip service to dissent, we still have not learned to reckon with it. This is also one of the factors that have caused a crisis in the communist parties.

A split in the party and mass withdrawals from its ranks are once again our common reality. In the Baltic area, though, it has an ethnic peculiarity: The idea of independence is the watershed. Hence "the independent" and "the steadfast"—those who consider themselves to be outside the framework of the CPSU and those within it.

There are other lines of division: For example, "the independent" reject the principle of democratic centralism, whereas "the steadfast" consider it sacrosanct.

It looks as though the communist parties of all three Baltic republics will lose one-half of their members, who will just turn in their party membership cards in the course of the split. This has already happened in Lithuania. Sociological surveys suggest that the same will

happen in Latvia. Many people have suspended their membership on their own "until the congress." In Kirovskiy Rayon of Riga 6,000 out of 14,000 have done this, for example.

In Lithuania "the independents" are twice as numerous as "the steadfast"; in Estonia the split is apparently going to be "50-50"; in Latvia "the independents" will have to become "mensheviks." Thus far 30,000 out of 176,000 are prepared to rally under their banner. Their following in large cities is quite weak, but is much stronger in the countryside.

The demographic situation in the republic explains it all: In general, non-Latvians account for almost one-half of the population in Latvia, and in the party they account for an overwhelming majority. The split, unfortunately, is proceeding along ethnic lines for now.

"The mensheviks" intend to rename themselves Social Democrats or socialists; because democratic socialism rather than communism is the ultimate goal, the name should correspond to it. To be sure, the "niche" has already been taken: The LSDRP [Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party] already exists in Latvia. Its organizer, V. Shteyn, gained notoriety for his slogan "Soviets without communists." This may be the reason the LSDRP is small and not particularly influential.

It appears that "the independents" are going to merge with the most moderate wing of the Social Democrats, forcing out the most agitated ones. However, it is definitely not going to be easy for them to gain a majority. So, does it turn out that the communists are the main force? "We should realize clearly that without Latvians, the Communist Party, even if numerous... will never be able to hold positions of any consequence in the spectrum of political forces of Latvia," said J. Vagris, former first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee. This is beyond any doubt, as is the fact that "the independents," having won representatives of just one nation for their cause, will never be able to become real social democrats or any other democratic party in a multinational republic.

These are the tasks facing the two parties. He who accomplishes them better will lay claim to power.

The organizers of "the independent" party intend to have it play a center role. A. Endzins, secretary of the university party organization, says: "We were extreme radicals within the CPSU. However, we would like to be the center in the current sociopolitical array of forces." That is to say, the party is looking for a niche for itself not on one flank or the other (left or right) but among all the parties and movements in operation. We do not know whether they can find such a center in principle while remaining a democratic party. However, we are certain that this party cannot count on popularity and acclaim in the immediate future. At present, appearing in this capacity means drawing fire from both the right and the left. The center always amounts to compromises, maneuvering, and consensus building. Meanwhile, our

entire history has conditioned us to loathe all compromises and to be intolerant. In the parlance we are used to, a conciliator is synonymous with a traitor. We have never stood on ceremony when it came to dissenters. This disease is already in our system, and it is not that easy to eliminate. This disease currently is manifesting itself in a particularly pernicious manner.

All of us badly miss the centrists. Riga and Moscow need them equally, and they are beginning to grasp this little by little. To be sure, everyone means something different by the word "centrist" at present.

Did the split weaken party forces? Did mass withdrawals weaken them? Could all of this have been avoided?

Apparently, answers to the first two questions are clear. However, let us not be in a hurry to answer them; after all, our 18 million-strong party has never been homogeneous. It is another matter that the lack of uniform thinking was impossible to detect when none of us were required to think at all. In their mass of many millions, party members differed little from nonparty members. This is why we believe that withdrawal from the party should not be particularly deplored. In a word, reduced numbers may turn into increased quality, power, and authority for the communists.

As far as the split is concerned—this split in the apparatus which decided everything, and us, the obedient party mass that decided nothing, did not happen just recently. What kind of unity is this? When a cup long ago cracked sits unused, it may well appear intact. However, just move it, use it for what it is meant for, and the crack will immediately become apparent—the cup will leak or even fall apart in your hands. But could it have been possible to glue the "cup" together?

At the 20th Congress in Lithuania the minority was given the rights of a faction—the right to disobey the majority—in order to avoid a split. However, "the steadfast" rejected the compromise.

In Estonia the Central Committee attempted to maintain unity at least for the duration of "a period of transition." They even managed to elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. However, the split occurred nonetheless; this time, "the independents" did not accept the compromise.

In Latvia the party in essence split even before the congress. One-third of the delegates, "the independence-minded ones," left the auditorium, where the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia was being held, after the very first day of the congress.

In this instance as well, attempts were made to prevent a conflict. The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee offered "the foundations" of a new program calling for "the unity of democratic forces" and "a free union of free republics." However, each of the extreme sides had its own notions of democracy and freedom. The leadership of the Central Committee turned out to

be between two chairs. The chairs moved apart, and... the Central Committee secretaries were left out.

At this point a certain "action group" (including young apparatchiks from the Central Committee), which drew up "The Third Alternative" democratic platform, made an attempt to preserve the unity of the party. The failure of this apparently centrist group is very instructive. Its idea appeared sound: Cut off the extremes, remove the main points of contention from the opposing platforms. However, it so happened that the baby was thrown out with the bath water. Thus, for example, the ideologists of "The Third Alternative" proposed not to raise the issue of "the framework of the CPSU" until the new statehood of Latvia is defined. In other words, if Latvia secedes, the party will too; but let us live amicably for now. However, a political organization cannot merely follow events. A principled question called for an equally principled answer. They avoided it, and they miscalculated. Here is one more lesson on how not to interpret centralism.

As we can see, the positions of politicians and leaders of the parties and movements with regard to the independence of Latvia and the possibility of its secession from the USSR are opposed. In the parliament, an obvious majority is in favor of secession. What about the people?

The leaders of the People's Front believe that the people have already expressed their will by showing preference for candidates. To be sure, the elections testify to a lot. However, the following reasoning cannot be ignored either: If 80 percent of the electorate took part in the elections and the victors gained only a share of these votes, it is still premature to refer to the opinion of the people. Certainly, failing to take part in the elections also represents a position. Still, it is not proper for a democrat to come out against a referendum when the issue involves the life of the people. This is the touchstone, the acid test which makes it possible to precisely distinguish democrats from nondemocrats. Incidentally, chief NFL ideologist I. Godmanis quite recently acknowledged the need for a referendum. At present, the leaders of the front are saying: Look, we still do not have a law on that. So let the parliament pass it without delay. They are also saying: As of now there is still no law on citizenship; it is not clear who can participate in the referendum. This means that this law also needs to be adopted immediately, all the more so because all the discussions seem to be behind us. Among the members of parliament "the zero option" has definitely prevailed: If you are permanently registered in Latvia you have a right to be considered its citizen, as long as you so desire.

Such a referendum would compel the parties and movements to fight for the confidence of the people. Once the people decide, it has been done. The people are the main judge. As we know, this supposedly simple truth had to be argued many times at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Initially the law on secession provided for the congress to have the final say. Fortunately, the people have it now. Could it be otherwise?

Apart from everything else, acknowledging the need for a referendum provides a reliable platform for negotiations, meaning a republic which has decided to secede from the union. After all, it is the main provision of the new law on secession.

To be sure, in the Baltic area they say: This law is not binding on us. We did not join the union voluntarily; there was no marriage, therefore a divorce is not required. The objection is: We have lived together for half a century, therefore there was a marriage, whether of a free will or not. Hence the opposition. Could we do without it? Say, agree on the need for a referendum and a period of transition? Is it important whether the law or democracy calls for it (a referendum) or common sense (the period of transition)?

It is believed that under the current circumstances it is not easy to word the main question for the referendum. "To leave or not to leave?" But Latvians say: "We did not join to begin with." "To join or not to join?" But many non-Latvians came to Latvia as a republic of the USSR. Could the issue of the status of the republic be raised, as A. Endzins ("the independent") suggests?

At present many people understand that "a political stalemate" has occurred in Lithuania. The parliament adopted close to a hundred legislative acts aimed at independence, but this has not brought more independence.

It is clear to all that negotiations with Moscow and a dialogue are needed. However, it is difficult to embark on them following the ultimatums they have given to each other. The politicians' leeway becomes narrower with every ultimatum step.

Unlike Lithuania, the parliaments of Latvia and Estonia began their dialogue with Moscow while still in their old composition and are still continuing them. For now it is not clear whether negotiations with Lithuania will take place. Both Riga and Tallinn insist on it; however, as one of the NFL leaders, I. Biser, said: "We do not consider ourselves bound by obligations; after all, the parliament of Lithuania made its decision without coordinating it with us."

There are various points of view in Latvia about Lithuania. The Latvian segment of the population is definitely in sympathy with Lithuania, and any harsh step taken by Moscow is taken very badly. As far as we know, this is also the case in Estonia. The moderates are turning into radicals right before our eyes. But the moderates are now needed as never before. They are the only ones who can rally the people and who are capable of dialogue and negotiations. In the course of "a divorce," many tight "knots" will have to be untied. Let us name just one: protection of the border. In Lithuania they are demanding complete and immediate demilitarization. Is it realistic? Is it conceivable to open up the Baltic border? In a word, time, good will, patience, and, certainly, the ability to take into account the interests of a

large state are needed. These are the fundamentals of diplomacy but, apparently, quite a few people have not mastered them.

...Therefore, the moderates are in great demand. Will the new Latvian parliament realize this when electing its leader at the first session?

What about now? It looks as though for now the radicals are getting the upper hand.

Here is fresh news from Riga. The city's evening newspaper RIGAS BALSS (circulation over 700,000) has been closed by a decision of the bureau of the Riga city party committee. Motives? Ideological and political. Here is one of them: "The editorial board has begun publishing disparaging, at times slanderous, articles about the work of the city committee and its leadership." It is easy to predict the response to the closure of the newspaper. It cannot be ruled out that this measure was "borrowed" from Lithuania—over there, the military interfered in a dispute over a publishing house.

Oh God! When will we all come to our senses?

Latvia's Alksnis Answers Readers' Questions

PM2703091090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Mar 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Report by parliamentary correspondent V. Urban, captain third rank, on phone-in question and answer session with Riga USSR People's Deputy Colonel V.I. Alksnis: "I Am a Supporter of a Calm But Firm Position"]

[Excerpts] As was announced in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the phone-in for 18 March changed its basic format for two hours. Colonel V.I. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy from Riga, answered readers' questions. [passage omitted]

[Yefimov] Is that People's Deputy Alksnis? Valeriy Nikolayevich Yefimov speaking. Reserve officer, from Moscow. I want to argue with you about the decisions of congress. I think that the congress' potential has considerably decreased, since there was no alternative to Gorbachev in the presidential elections.

[Alksnis] Well, let's argue. Presidential rule is being introduced partly for the very reason that an unstable situation has now formed in our country. About the alternative. The "Soyuz" deputies' group proposed three candidates: Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and Bakatin. As we know, the last two withdrew their candidacies. Probably this once again confirms the fact that there is no alternative to the leader of perestroika. It's worth arguing about the potential of the congress as well. I don't agree with you there either. Mikhail Sergeyevich actually came in for substantial criticism. Even the results of the presidential elections showed that Gorbachev's rating has gone down recently. He has not yet succeeded in realizing all his potential. I believe that the president's

rights and duties to the country will allow him in the very near future to implement the quite good laws our parliament has already adopted.

[Yefimov] One more question—about the state cooperative concern "ANT." I think our premier failed to refute a single claim made by Deputy Sobchak in congress.

[Alksnis] It's not entirely so simple here, I agree with you. I'll tell you my own opinion. A business concern of this kind is one way of earning currency for the country. Not for yourself, for the country. That's the idea. The form "ANT's" work took is another matter. I support Sobchak on the need to set up a parliamentary commission. Since the case of the concern has had wide repercussions and quite a few questions to the government have arisen, we should do all the "i's" and cross all the "t's."

[Petrov] Retired Col. Igor Nikolayevich Petrov. Surely it would have been possible to elect a new man, so to speak, to the post of Supreme Soviet chairman.

[Alksnis] Incidentally, in the first congress I voted against Lukyanov. I considered him an apparatchik. But a year's work in the congress provided many facts for consideration. I realized, for instance, that Anatoliy Ivanovich is able to defend his line. This is very important in the present situation, after all, a division of power is taking place. It is no accident that, in the first round of the elections, of the nine candidates, Lukyanov obtained more than 50 percent of the vote.

A man like him, a man of character, is particularly necessary. With the institution of the presidential form of government, the Supreme Soviet's has completely changed. The chairman of the parliament is separate from the president—look at the changes in the Constitution. And parliament itself now fulfills the functions of control vis-a-vis the head of state. Especially since Lukyanov has already acquired some experience, we should not forget this either.

[Petrov] Well, what about Lubchenko—is he a weak character?

[Alksnis] No, of course not. I think the future of our parliament lies with Konstantin Dmitriyevich. I think very well of him. Also, the fact that Lubchenko received 377 votes in the elections speaks for itself. Of the other seven candidates, no one even made more than 100. Here we should already be looking to the future and thinking about continuity.

[Loktinov] Reserve Officer Loktinov. I am taking part in the work of the "Democratic Russia" bloc. When the "hot line" announcement said that the paper would publish the conversation with you, I decided to call. This is my question. Or rather, questions. When will the party apparatus actually start consulting with people? It has cut itself off from the people, it sits behind closed doors.

[Alksnis] What is your question, please?

[Loktinov] It is this. The party apparatus is not allowing the Interregional Deputies' Group an "outlet." As for "Soyuz"—that is kids' stuff, and so they often let you on to the platform.

[Alksnis] I don't agree. Why did "Soyuz" have difficulties with the press before the congress? Neither PRAVDA nor IZVESTIYA, to which we appealed, granted us space. We raised a question about this at congress, incidentally.

But I support you on the point that our rulers should not spend their time sitting behind closed doors.

[Sotnikov] It seems to me that at the present time it is impossible to recall a deputy who is not carrying out his program. This is Lieutenant Colonel Sotnikov calling.

[Alksnis] What is your first name?

[Sotnikov] Aleksandr Petrovich....

[Alksnis] You are proposing an interesting topic for discussion. But we do not yet have a law on the recall of a deputy, Aleksandr Petrovich.

[Sotnikov] In that case take my wishes into consideration.

[Alksnis] Certainly. But I think there should be some activity on the part of the voters too. It is always possible to invite a deputy to a meeting, and in the last resort to collect signatures, if people do not agree with a deputy's position. That is how people should act, both in neighborhoods and in military and labor collectives. Incidentally, we have this practice in the Baltic. As for my position, I believe that personal contact is the deputy's bread and butter. That is why I agreed to this telephone dialogue.

[Nagibin] Vladimir Pavlovich Nagibin. Moscow. I want to state my attitude to your position. I respect and support it. About the results of the Congress. In my view, the time for final evaluations has not yet arrived.

[Alksnis] You are right. The results of what was done at Congress will be seen some time in the future. [passage omitted]

[Urban concluding passage] It goes without saying that many questions were put to Alksnis in the two hours. The phone rang incessantly. But anyone who did not manage to "get through" to the people's deputy should not, we think, feel put out. The editorial office plans to set up these conversations periodically. So, until our next meeting on the phone-in. The editorial office congratulates Viktor Imantovich himself on his election as Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet deputy.

Estonian Laws on Government Given First Reading

PM1904135390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under general heading "Sessions in Progress"]

[Text] Tallinn, 18 Apr—Today the participants in the third session of the republic's Supreme Soviet discussed the draft laws "On the Provisional Procedure for the Government of Estonia" and "On Estonian Emblems."

These drafts, like the Supreme Soviet resolution "On the State Status of Estonia" which was adopted 30 March, proceed from the premise that Estonia has been occupied territory since 1940. The transitional period announced 30 March is needed to restore the Estonian republic's constitutional organs of power. Throughout this period, the provisional procedure must replace the republic's basic law, and it is proposed to use national emblems instead of the present state symbols of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The republic's Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution on these issues: Under this resolution, it has been decided to consider this discussion as a first reading.

On this point the session concluded its work.

Estonia Holds Meetings To Support Lithuania

Popular Front Participates

90UN1427B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] The Estonian Popular Front calls on all inhabitants of Estonia to participate in public meetings on 25 and 26 March in support of the Republic of Lithuania. Deputies elected from the Popular Front and "Sajudis" will speak, and the guests will answer questions.

The activities will be staged on Sunday, 25 March at 1300 hours in Pyarnu's Central Square and at 1900 hours in the hall of the Tallinn Technical University and also on Monday, 26 March at 1700 in Ratushnaya Square in Tartu and at 1930 hours in the hall of the Vilyandiskiy District Soviet Executive Committee.

We invite you to hear information first-hand and to express your support!

Without an independent Lithuania there will be no independent Estonia! The most dependable support for the Republic of Lithuania on our part is a Republic of Estonia!

Message to Gorbachev Adopted

90UN1449F Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kaazik: "In Support of the Republic of Lithuania"]

[Text] A series of people's meetings in support of the Republic of Lithuania began in the resort city of Pyarnuon on Sunday, 25 March. The political action was organized by the People's Front of Estonia. Kazimeras Moteka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, spoke at the meeting. He noted that the Lithuanian people are reacting calmly to the actions organized by the central authorities, whose goal is to arouse the people to rash acts.

A message to USSR President M. Gorbachev was adopted, in which it is emphasized that the president has opportunities at his disposal to aid in the just resolution of the question of the Baltic states, which lost their independence in the course of the events of World War II. A similar approach has also taken place in Tallinn. On Monday people's meetings were conducted in Vilyandi and Tartu.

Estonian Deputies Cited on Lithuanian Events

90UN1427A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 3

[Interviews conducted by ETA correspondent A. Birov:
"Heated Discussion Concerning Lithuania"]

[Text] Unfortunately, we are not currently seeing many Lithuanians, or Estonians either, at meetings of the USSR Supreme Soviet Third Session.

The attitude of Estonian deputies and the Estonian deputy parliamentary delegation toward the events in Lithuania is described by Igor Gryazin:

It would be wrong to say that all our deputies have an identical attitude. For example, I know precisely that my attitude and the attitude of Deputy Pupkevich toward the events in Lithuania are quite different. I would therefore like to say for myself and on behalf of like-minded deputies that this is a dual attitude. On the one hand the Lithuanian people have finally gained an opportunity to express their wishes and take the radical step which had been prepared and planned over a long period of time and which had become absolutely necessary in light of the USSR's present economic policy. Here we wholeheartedly congratulated our Lithuanian colleagues. But there is, of course, another aspect also. A certain feeling of disquiet, which is connected primarily with the fact that the first steps toward independence are always difficult. And the most difficult thing in these first two or three weeks has been the uncertainty of the situation. On the one hand the support of many politicians and creative people both with us and abroad, on the other, the bitter resistance and reaction of the centralist bureaucracy. And what worries us particularly in respect of Lithuania is the propaganda aggression against Lithuania which has begun, in which outright lies, the blanket silence on the support for the decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Council on the part of the Lithuanian population, the inadequate interpretation of events on the part of TASS and so forth have been brought into play. This ensues from the fact that all the mass media

are under the control of the government and are monitored by V. Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. All these facts put us on our guard, of course. We ourselves have, after all, been the victims of an information blockade and disinformation. This has a terrible effect on the nerves, but we must get used to it. So on the one hand joy, but on the other, disquiet....

In talking about Lithuania other deputies from Estonia voiced the following opinions:

"Ultimately, they will, for all that, be forced to sit at the negotiating table, and the Baltic will be free. But by this time I fear that relations between our two peoples could have been damaged for decades. Instead of allies, we could have ill-wishers next door to us," Klara Khalik says.

But in Yu. Vooglayd's opinion, there is no cause for panic. The president is making a fuss so that subsequently no one will be able to reproach him with having adopted no measures.

Analyzing the statements and opinions of various deputies both at the USSR Supreme Soviet Third Session and in the mass media, it may be noticed that they are at times diametrically opposed on the question of Lithuania. The spectrum of it encompasses both the extreme right and extreme left and centrist views and beliefs. Democratic, liberal, and radical deputies support and welcome Lithuania's independence, as a rule. The conservative forces driven by the party and command-administrative machinery are categorically "against" with all consequences which ensues from this. The strong of this world are utterly unwilling to lose monopoly power over one of the 15 union republics, the more so because the Baltic republics have historically been a stumbling block in disputes between the leading powers and have played a key part in both European and world politics. And the USSR president's edict of 21 March, "Additional Measures To Safeguard the Rights of Soviet Citizens and Protect the Sovereignty of the USSR on the Territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]" confirms this once again and testifies that heated and lengthy arguments and battles lie ahead. And the Gordian knot will not be cut all at once. Estonian Popular Front Press Office.

Estonian Groups Differ on Referendum Issue

90UN1451A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by ETA correspondent A. Chaplygin: "United Council of Labor Collectives Supports Referendum on Question of Estonian Statehood. Estonian People's Front and Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia Are Against"]

[Text] The People's Front—42 seats; the Union of Labor Collectives—12 seats; and the United Council of Labor Collectives with sympathizers—27 out of 105 seats. That is the way the seats of the three major social movements

in our republic are broken down in the new parliament. On 23 March, representatives of these parliamentary groups assembled for the first time after the elections in order to explain their plans to journalists.

The main political boundary line along which the division of the new parliament will occur at its very first session will be the attitude toward the question of Estonian statehood—all of those present at the meeting agreed with this opinion, which was expressed by Enn Poldroos, leader of the People's Front coalition. This does not mean that the deputies will raise the question of declaring Estonia an independent state at the very first session, as happened in Lithuania. Moreover Ulo Nugis, chairman of the Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia, emphasized that for his part he will do everything possible not to permit haste on such an important question. Both leaders were of the opinion that the restoration of the Estonian Republic should occur, apparently, by the end of this year—after the main results of the negotiations with Moscow are clarified. If the negotiations are successful, political separation from the USSR will occur less painfully. If not—well, the example of Lithuania shows that a tough reaction from Moscow to the aspiration of the Baltic republics for independence could result in no less a reciprocal reaction. "Gorbachev should understand that the less willingly he agrees with the proposals of the Baltics, the more radical the mood of the Baltic peoples will become. Because two years ago he could have agreed to a conference, and this would have satisfied us. Today it is already late, and the confederation version he proposed does not suit us," said Nugis.

The reaction of Vladimir Lebedev, a representative of the parliamentary coalition United Council of Labor Collectives [OSTK], to the question about his attitude toward the law on the secession of republics from the USSR structure, which was adopted on the first reading, was unexpected. He assessed this draft as "too tough, adopted more for Lithuania than for Estonia." Lebedev said that the OSTK parliamentary group will consistently support the holding of a referendum on the question of Estonian statehood, and in doing so will insist that the entire population of Estonia take part in the referendum. As for the northeast of the republic, the opinion of this region should be considered separately. Lebedev did not exclude the possibility that independent national-territorial formations will be created on the basis of the Kokhtla-Yarveskiy and Narvskiy rayons. "I myself do not exclude the fact that I will continue to live in an independent Estonian Republic if, of course, the laws in it are sufficiently democratic," he said.

Ulo Nugis answered that a parliamentary majority will never agree with the idea of a referendum. The question of Estonian statehood, in his opinion, must be decided by a legal legislative body—a State Duma. "The moment that Moscow recognizes Estonia's right to restore legal authority and we begin to elect a State Duma, we will take the second step on the road to the restoration of the Estonian Republic," he said. Nugis came out for a

"zero" version of citizenship, where it is received by all of those who desire it among those living permanently on Estonian territory. However, according to his words, it has not yet been decided whether everyone petitioning for citizenship will be able to participate in elections to the State Duma.

The deputies' answers to questions about future economic policy in Estonia were related directly to the attitude on the problem of independence. Neither Nugis nor Poldroos presented the journalists with a specific economic program for the near future. Nugis emphasized that he was inclined to view the new government as a transitional one, and that he will be content with the work of ministers even in the event that they are able to maintain the status quo in the economy. As for the future, in the words of Nugis, political analysis of Estonian society and the positions of the deputies of the new parliament show that the greatest influence in the republic will be enjoyed by the rightist (liberal and conservative) forces. Economic policy will correspond: maximum freedom of private initiative with a minimum of interference by the state in economic life. It is interesting that complete agreement reigned between Nugis and Lebedev on this question, and as soon as they felt themselves to be administrators the political rivals swore general allegiance to liberal principles.

Estonian Committee Concerned at Politician's Murder

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1700 GMT 19 Apr 90*

[Summary] Members of the Estonian Committee, having been to the home of Harald Meri, who was recently found killed not far from his home town of Turi after his house was set on fire, have expressed their dismay at the way the case has been handled. Mart Laar, member of the board, now reads the text of the official protest issued by the Estonian Committee addressed to the relevant commission of the Supreme Soviet and the republican procurator:

[Laar] "The Estonian Congress mourns the leader of the Jarvamaa Estonian Committee and voices its condolences to the relatives of the victim. At the same time the Estonian Committee cannot help protesting against dragging out the investigation into the circumstances of Harald Meri's murder and the way the case has been mishandled. Not enough attention has been paid by senior investigator Aksel Onk to clarify the political background to Harald Meri's murder. This has been demonstrated also by the criminally negligent attitude to the papers which Harald Meri left, which have just been totally ignored during (?the week).

"The Estonian Committee regards the activity of investigator Onk in the investigation of Harald Meri's murder as incompetent and proposed that he be replaced with another investigator. The Estonian Committee finds that in order to prevent any new possible murders maximum

effort should be made to locate the murderers. This is indeed a crime which endangers the whole stability and security of society.

"The Estonian Committee appeals to all citizens of the Republic of Estonia to assist in the investigation by sending in information not only about the murder of Harald Meri but also about mass repressions in Järvamaa from the days of Soviet occupation."

RSFSR

Leningrad Plenum Critiques CPSU Platform

90UN1208A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Feb 90 pp 2,3

[LenTASS article, under rubric "Joint Plenum of the CPSU Leningrad Obkom and Leningrad Gorkom": "In Favor of the Consolidation and Unity of the Party Ranks: Statements During the Debate"]

[Text] N. I. Shulgina, deputy director of the Leningrad Branch of the Central V. I. Lenin Museum:

Since I have visited primary organizations as a member of the party city committee's auditing commission in connection with the temporary stoppage by a number of party organizations of the payment of 50 percent of the party dues, I am obliged first of all to inform the plenum participants once again of the serious concern felt by Communists and Leningrad residents about the state of affairs in the party and in society and about their dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic policy; the Platform draft that was adopted at the February Plenum of the party's Central Committee (and we all were awaiting the Plenum with great impatience) not only failed to provide any answers to many of the Communists' questions, but also, actually, raised a number of new questions. These include the correlation between the party's name and its ideal; the principle of the party as a union of persons who share the same ideas, on the one hand, and the possibility of the diversity of the platform of opinions while disallowing factions, on the other hand; and the specific methods for providing new content to the principle of democratic centralism. And many other questions.

Therefore, without a doubt, comrades, it is necessary when discussing the platform draft to create a working group of Communists, of specialists in the social scientists, to prevent a recurrence of what happened before the 19th party conference, when the Communists' recommendations concerning the platform were discussed in secret, but, instead, to assure that there is actually a broad, public discussion, with the use of the mass media, so that all the constructive recommendations can be embodied in the modified CPSU platform.

It must be said that communication with a broad circle of Communists today indicates that, despite all the increase in the activity rate and despite the politicalization, the level of Communists' political culture continues

to be definitely uneven, and this is being successfully used by our opponents. And it must be said that it is for good reason that they are tossing around the theses in general of eliminating the institution of professional party workers, and are recommending that people deprive the party of funds, thus annihilating it as an organization. And therefore, comrades, despite all our infatuation with organizational questions (which is why I took this rostrum), I would like to say that, on the threshold of the congress, we must not slacken in our ideological work, but in certain primary organizations that work seems to have been allowed today to proceed under its own momentum. That is inadmissible. It must be said that during times that were difficult for the party, Lenin said that everyone today must become everything—a propagandist, an agitator, and a party organizer. So too it is necessary for us, comrades, to take a very careful approach to the questions of reorganizing the party apparatus.

Incidentally, in the opinion of Communists in many primary organizations, it is completely obvious to us, in connection with the publication of the budget and its public announcement, that insufficient funds are being allocated for party propaganda. When reorganizing the apparatus, we must not weaken the ideological department or the party's ideological institutions, but, rather, must take all steps to strengthen and reinforce them, proceeding from the assumption that a multiparty system is waiting on our doorstep, and proceeding from the assumption—as Boris Veniaminovich mentioned—concerning the work basically by political methods, by methods of persuasion, in which we will have to engage. In this regard I consider to be our great error the fact that we allowed the reduction of the institution of party committee lecturers. From my point of view, that is equivalent to unilateral disarmament in the course of military actions today.

Incidentally, we workers at the V. I. Lenin Museum sense very acutely how important it is today to have frank, honest, direct conversation with people. And I want to say that both the rank-and-file so-called Communists and our administrators nevertheless have a poor knowledge—and we can see this—of Vladimir Ilich, that we have studied him dogmatically, and this has had an effect on the level of preparation of party documents, including the Central Committee Platform. On the eve of the October Revolution, Vladimir Ilich did not allow himself to take such pretentious documents to the people. And apparently it is necessary for us today to be very aware of that.

Incidentally again, despite the attacks made on Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the interest in him as a personality today is higher than it has ever been, and when people come to our museum today they are seeking moral support specifically in Vladimir Ilich Lenin, they are seeking support despite what even our own Soviet authors and our philosophers have been writing about him. I can even say that, despite the fact that many Lenin museums in the country have been experiencing difficulties with the

number of visitors, the number of visitors to our Leningrad branch has even increased today.

I would also like to state that the museum that is located here in Smolnyy is particularly popular. So, inasmuch as I, a museum manager, have forced my way onto this rostrum, please allow me to request the plenum and our leadership, when reorganizing the party apparatus, when releasing accommodations at Smolnyy, to think carefully about the question of transferring here, to this memorial building at Smolnyy, a building that is truly linked with Lenin's life and activity, the Vladimir Ilich Lenin Museum, and to give back to the city the Marble Palace in which we are currently located. That will then make it possible actually to open the doors of Smolnyy to the broadest circle not only of Leningraders, but also of guests in our city.

V. P. Vorfolomeyev, chairman of the Committee for the Protection of the Environment of Leningrad and of Leningrad Oblast:

After entering the pre-election marathon across the national okrug in Leningrad Oblast, I had the opportunity in more than 16 rayons in the oblast to meet every day with several collectives at the rate of 3 or 4 times a day, and therefore the number of those collectives is already approaching almost a hundred. As I spoke with them, I came to the following conclusion, several positions of which I would like to discuss. Currently they are already in the field of vision of every individual, whether he be a party member or a non-party member.

Well, first of all, I felt that we, in our plenum's decree draft that has been prepared, when giving the Platform evaluation that we are discussing, must, for the sake of history, mention and note unambiguously that this Platform was late in arriving. And if it was late in arriving, then we must evaluate in this manner. That's the first thing. And this is the second thing. To our great regret, we did not see the pivotal part of this Platform, namely the perestroika concept. What did the party call us to? What is the party striving for, and along what path is it proceeding? To my mind, we must definitely arrive at the party's 28th Congress with a concept, having worked out in stages the implementation of the concept in all areas: the political perestroika, economic, social, and in other areas. Otherwise you and I shall lose the workers' trust completely.

And now the third thing. Today we see in progress a very acute confrontation within society concerning individual factors that simply have to be prevented. This is very disturbing for everyone who is in favor of the rallies and the marches that will occur on 25 February 1990. Lying at the root of these rallies is the following. Our alternative colleagues are calling for disobedience rallies and marches in support of Gdlyan and Ivanov, in counterbalance to the position that Comrade Ligachev occupies. I support the feeling that we must, in the name of today's plenum, turn to the workers of Leningrad, and having turned to them, I feel that we must record that today in

the plenum resolution. If this confrontation is in progress and we can make the fates of our nations dependent upon that situation, we must demand the immediate retirement of Comrade Ligachev from his position as Politburo member, after which, in a civil procedure, he can attempt to prove his decency and, by way of a civil suit, can bring Gdlyan and Ivanov to legal responsibility. Thus we shall chop through this knot.

And, next, a question that confronts us in a very acute manner is the question of the presidency, and certain comrades feel that the forcing of the principle governing the presidency, which was established at the Plenum of the party's Central Committee and at the session of USSR Supreme Soviet that is in progress, is not else but the forcing of events. Our principle is this: in the name of the Leningrad party organization we must—and this is my proposal—demand that the presidency be determined after a nationwide referendum and with a nationwide vote on an alternative basis.

And my last proposal. We have been saying that we must conduct a conference to hear reports and hold elections before the congress. At this very acute moment it would seem that the persons present at those conferences in the oblast organizations must definitely include the Politburo members, who must give reports to the Communists of those party organizations about their personal contribution to our perestroika. And taking into consideration the peculiarities of the Leningrad region, I feel that General Secretary of the party's Central Committee Comrade Gorbachev must appear before us, and must give an evaluation of the activities of every Politburo member at our conference of the oblast party organizations.

S. V. Osipov, superintendent, UNR-60, Lenotdelstroy Trust

Today at this plenum I would like to express myself in the name of my primary party organization at the Lenotdelstroy Trust concerning certain questions of intraparty life that are troubling all the Communists. We participated in the referendum that was conducted on an assignment from the party's obkom, and we came to the conclusion that that referendum was still too late, and therefore the questions that we raised as long ago as the August conference are being implemented right now. That is, once again we are talking about our lagging behind in all questions.

The question of combining the obkom and gorkom was also raised at the August conference, and once again we have come to it. But what has occurred now at the Central Committee Plenum? The same worthwhile, good thoughts and ideas have arrived late, but today the easiest path is to criticize the Central Committee, the obkom, and the gorkom. In order to do this, there is no need to be very bold. It is this path that various informal associations and groups, and organizations, are taking. It is simpler for them. They do not bear any of the load for the errors or any responsibility. So it is easy from that

point of view to criticize Gorbachev or anyone else from the Central Committee, but it is much more complicated to criticize one's own immediate administrator or chief. In general it is felt that criticism is a strong weapon, but we have not yet learned how to use it. In the smoking room we are frequently frank. We still have difficulty in using criticism to make any concrete proposals.

Shall we take a look at what is occurring currently in our primary party organizations? At first there was complete confusion as a result of the events that had swept over us, then people went into hibernation, and finally they have been vacillating back and forth for a long time. We have been ruined by the customary waiting: what will the raykom, the gorkom, the obkom say? There has also been a sharp drop in discipline among the Communists. Therefore it is necessary to get rid of those Communists who are using dishonorable means to win authority for themselves. When we do that, the respect shown to us ordinary Communists will be greater, and there will be more jobs to do.

Today our party organization is attempting to establish smooth relations with the party committees of the general-contract construction organizations, but the results have been very meager. Nevertheless we want to work in contact with them. But the general construction contractors are walking away from a discussion with us because they cannot create the normal conditions at the construction sites or the subcontract organizations at the projects. The work performed by our party committee must not be confined simply to production, and therefore today its ideological activity is more important than it has ever been.

To conclude my brief statement, I would like to express a number of specific proposals that were given to me by the communists at our organization.

Reports and elections at the level of the primary shop party organizations should be conducted annually, and the elections of the party committee secretary and the administrations should be conducted by direct and secret vote, on an alternative basis. Elections to the party committee and party buro should be on an alternative basis, and questions concerning entry into the party and departure from it should be resolved only at the level of the primary organizations. The party organization itself must decide how many released workers, with what salary, and at what level it wants to have, and can have, proceeding from the total amount of dues left at the organization. And retirees should be granted the right on a voluntary basis to pay their membership dues, to the extent that they can.

And I would also like, in the name of the organization, to direct a specific question to our first secretary of the party's obkom: for whom are we building the rest home for the department of the party's obkom in the city of Pushkin? When, in general, will there be a resolution of the question of those privileges that continue to exist for the obkom?

A. S. Nemtin, first secretary of the CPSU Kolpinskiy Raykom

Putting it frankly, it is difficult to make a statement after the break. But it is even more difficult to speak from this rostrum and to discuss four questions at the same time.

First, the results of the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Its results today do not satisfy many people, and the chief thing that fails to satisfy them is that the Central Committee Plenum did not do the main thing—it did not take any specific steps with regard to questions of the party's ideological unity. I do not have in mind complete like-mindedness, but any political organization must have a common ideological foundation. And the lack of unity is completely natural, since lying at the very basis of the Platform itself is a contradiction, the recognition of private property and the negation of exploitation of man by man.

I think that the obkom and gorkom plenum should express its opinion on this question also.

A large number of different opinions have been expressed here concerning when the reports and elections should be held. I think that today we ought to grant the opportunity to the rayon party organizations and the primary party organizations, on the basis of the local conditions, to resolve this question, so to speak, on the spot.

Next, the creation of the Russian Communist Party. Today there were a large number of very emotional statements. We realize that the creation of the Russian Communist Party, for example, will collect the efforts of all the Communists in RSFSR to resolve those problems that are confronting the republic today. But if we are completely frank, we will see that the creation of the RSFSR Communist Party will be that last impetus that will lead to the complete subdividing of the CPSU on a national basis. Let us be completely and firmly aware of this. And let us trace the events somewhat farther. Today it is only the CPSU that is that connecting link that binds our Soviet Union. I realize that what I am telling you is causing a definite reaction, especially since you are in the majority of those 80 percent of Communists from the Leningrad party organizations who expressed themselves as being in favor of the creation of the Russian Communist Party. But when making such a responsible decision, it is still necessary for you to proceed from the interests of something greater—the interests of the USSR.

Today, during the period of the major reforms in the party, it is important for us not to strive for the popular phrase or slogan. One of these phrases was heard in the statement made by our esteemed Comrade Alferov—and I would like to dwell some more on it—and in yesterday's article in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, where Comrade Blokhin, buro member at the party's gorkom, stated, "the loopholes for apparatus games must be precluded." What loopholes are they talking about? Who is playing these apparatus games? Perhaps Comrade Blokhin will come onto this rostrum and tell us. If they are apparatchiki whom he, as a member of the party's

gorkom buro, had approved for their job assignment, then certainly the claims should be made first of all against Comrade Blokhin himself.

And something else. I want to say a few words about the situation in the city. It is alarming today, and it is most alarming to those people who have least information. Today we are being inundated once again by a period of rallies. This also pertains to Kolpin. The last rally was last Sunday. So it looks like all our future days off until the election have also been, so to speak, scheduled. This is causing another kind of confusion. Why are we not throwing light on these rallies by means of the mass media? Why not let people see Lenin's portrait, with the word "retired" superimposed on it? Why not let them hear people defaming his name and his cause? Why not let the TV viewer see the reaction of those who are speaking at the rally in defense of an arsonist, but, in response to the request to honor the memory of those who executed their duty to the utmost and who died while attempting to extinguish the conflagration, do not even bare their heads? Why not let the secretaries see too—let them see the raykom secretary breaking his way—and that was not said to his credit—through the orderly ranks of the obstacles to reach the microphone. Let people hear the words of people's deputy Ivanov, who states that he is still a party member, but not a Communist. Let them read the leaflet that was disseminated there, a leaflet that brought together into a triple union those who had previously taken such pains to isolate themselves from one another: the Democratic Union, the Voters Association, and the People's Front. Their joint action, their goal is the same one in the leaflet—the falling monument of Lenin.

Then a woman spoke, asking, "But was that a workers' rally?" I will tell you frankly that right now it is too late to ask whether or not something involves the workers. Of the workers—or, rather, while wearing the toga of a worker—one trade-union functionary spoke, and he apparently remembers that he is filling a worker's job twice, when he signs the payroll.

The nation can be deceived by rumors, and to a large extent it has received a lot of disinformation today, but if people see all this with their own eyes, they are not stupid and they will make the correct conclusion.

In conclusion, I would like to say that there have a very large number of various fabrications spreading concerning possible disorders in Leningrad, which has already been mentioned. I am convinced that Leningraders are awaiting a specific answer to this question from the city administrators today, and precisely from our plenum. And not only an answer, but also a guarantee that their security will be assured.

Perhaps I have gone past my allotted time, but I would like to dwell briefly on the statement made by esteemed Zh. I. Alferov. It was unpleasant for me to hear the question that he raised—the question of the competency of the first obkom secretary: is he a chemist, or a

physicist, or something else? When, a day before the obkom plenum to which M. S. Gorbachev came, at 2130 hours, after that question had been discussed at the buro of the party's obkom, Comrade Gorbachev gathered together all the first secretaries of the gorkoms and raykoms in Leningrad Oblast and told them that the buro had recommended Comrade Gidasov to that position, and he asked, "Comrades, what is your opinion?" I will tell you frankly that the very same kind of quiet reigned also in the Checkerboard Hall, and it was a prolonged quiet. Perhaps relying on my rights for having spent that entire day at the Izhorskiy Plant, having spent that day together with Gorbachev, I got up and said that I did not know whether or not my comrades would support me, but I personally did not know Boris Veniaminovich very well—I knew him one-sidedly. I knew him as an economic manager, as the manager of the Tekhnokhim MGO, etc., and if the members of the obkom buro were recommending him, then they too could express their opinion.

The first person to express his opinion was Comrade Zh. I. Alferov, but when he was insincere—then or today—I do not know.

I. P. Lapotnikov, partkom secretary, All-Union Scientific-Research Geological Institute

I cannot say like Filippov that we are party comrades, because several times in today's auditorium I began to feel ashamed and it seemed to be that by no means all the people sitting here want to remain comrades. Actually, our meeting is taking place at an extremely tense and crucial moment in the history of our state. For many party members it has become obvious that the party model that existed for us for many years has become profoundly contradictory to today's realities. And the path toward socialism along which we led society has proven to be a dead end.

The underestimation of that fact and the delay in reorganizing and renewing the CPSU have sharpened the political crisis in society and have caused the intensification of the justified negative attitude toward the entire party. A considerable share of the blame for this is borne by the administrative party committees, primarily the incapable Central Committee, and at the local level the party's Leningrad Obkom and Leningrad Gorkom.

Almost a year ago, the alarm that a crisis was impending was sounded by the primary party organizations. The radical proposals concerning a reform in the fundamentals of the party's activities and its ideology were accepted at meetings in primary organizations, were sent to the superior agencies, and then disappeared like water in sand. During that entire period the primary organizations demanded the conducting of party conferences in Leningrad. But the oblast committee, in my opinion, under invented pretexts, refused to resolve that question, and even made so bold as to accept on the whole the Leningrad Communists' platform at its plenum, thus having probably violated the party Rules. The demand

of the primary and rayon party organizations concerning the convoking of a special party congress was also ignored. The failure to agree with this obkom and gorkom position led to a situation in which, late last year, on the initiative of the primary organizations, a group to ascertain the attitude of the Leningrad Communists to the question of the immediate convoking of a conference was created on the base of the University's party committee. The fact that during the one and a half months of its work the group failed to collect the number of Communists required according to the Rules to begin practical steps to prepare for the conference should not delude us.

The number of rank-and-file party members who spoke out in favor of convoking the conference is, of course, significantly greater than the number recorded in the minutes that are kept at the University's party committee. It is just that, for the time being, the weak horizontal communication among the primary party organizations has not made it possible to complete that work successfully. Unfortunately, the party's oblast committee and many raykoms did not want to fulfill their direct duties in ascertaining the Communists' opinion, or, rather, they deliberately inhibited that process. In the absence of any dynamic actions to restructure the party on the part of the administrative agencies, that role was assumed by the primary party organizations. At the present time there is under way a mass refusal to transfer the party dues to the obkom. More and more party members are leaving the party for what are already ideological reasons, and the ones who are leaving are not the worst party members.

Informal party organizations—or, it might be better to say, party organizations that are not in accordance with the Rules—are being created. Certainly, late last year one observed, for the most part, the completion of the demarcation of the minds in the party into those who are in favor of democratic reforms and those who would want the minimal changes or, even better, a return to the old way.

In January the low-level party organizations proposed a draft of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, which draft evoked the broadest interest over practically the entire territory of the Soviet Union. The draft is attractive in that it takes into consideration many of the proposals made by the primary organizations. The draft of this platform provides a clear answer to the question of what kind of party we shall have tomorrow, and sets down the path for conversion to a new type of party. The draft of the Democratic Platform expresses ideas concerning the precise demarcation from the previous erroneous path, concerning the rejection of the monopoly on truth, the carrying out of work under conditions of competition with other political forces, and the winning of power by proposing to the nation developmental programs that are acceptable to it.

This is a fundamental transformation of the party. And probably not everyone is ready for it. Not everyone is

capable of the new way of thinking. Unfortunately, the party members who are not ready for this constitute a large segment of the party, a segment that has been concentrated, in my opinion, in today's administrative party and Soviet agencies. This gives rise to the fear of losing one's place and also the actions that are incompatible with the position taken by a sensible person.

It is only this fear that can explain the course taken by the February Central Committee Plenum, that crossfire among the Politburo members, and those actions that are currently being taken to supercharge the situation. For example, Gdlyan and Ivanov were mentioned here. The procuracy's illegal actions—that's one. Then, yesterday's expulsion of them from the party at the meeting of the USSR Procuracy—that's two. All this causes the nation's justified indignation. And that indignation is growing.

This is the last part of my statement, and I think that there is no need to make a big finale. In general, I realize that in a few places my words perhaps are falling into a political vacuum, but I would like nevertheless to tell the plenum participants that it is necessary today to display political bravery. It may be that this is one of our last chances to direct the development of events down the normal democratic channel.

For this purpose I propose adopting today a decision to conduct a party conference in mid-March, stipulating for the conducting of that conference the time necessary for the complete discussion of the questions on the agenda.

Second, I propose adopting a provisional principle governing the procedure for electing delegates to the conference that has been proposed. Before the conference, the recommendation should be made to the primary party organizations that they discuss the currently existing platforms at CPSU and that they express their attitude toward them.

I propose adopting a decision concerning the reorganization of the conference-preparation working group that was formed on principles that are not understandable by many party members, and including in it Communists who are working in the group under the University's party committee and who have shown themselves to be truly active party members.

I propose making the working group responsible for preparing proposals with regard to the new structure of the obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms, having in mind the major reduction and reorientation of the committees and their apparatus as a result of the changeover from the functions of management by administrative fiat to political and organizational functions.

I also recommend including the proposals on the conference agenda: it is necessary to discuss there the platforms in the CPSU and the recommendations to the 28th Congress, and to discuss and approve the new structure of the party committees in the oblast, cities, and rayons; and to express one's attitude toward the creation of the

RSFSR Communist Party and to elect a provisional party oblast committee, the basic task of which will be the preparation for the 28th Congress and the organizing of re-elections on a new basis of party committees at the bottom, rayon, and city levels.

I think that these decisions must be made today. Tomorrow they may no longer be needed by anyone.

The next item, comrades, is that there is a truly very complicated time ahead of us. On 4 March there will be an election and the new Soviet will be elected, but there will not be a party group there. Why? Because the party did not send its representatives there. We do not have anyone who has been sent from the party. Communists will be there, and, probably, a very large number of them. But those are Communists either at their own free will, or they are from labor collectives, but not from the party. It will be necessary to do a lot of work to organize them. I warned about this two years ago. I warned about the need back then to think about the formation of factions among the Communists and about restructuring the work of the party group accordingly in the Soviet. Today that time has come, but we do not have a ready platform at this stage. And we are not discussing it today, although our plenum will answer to the Communists as to what kind of mayor our city will have and what kind of ispolkom there will be. But we are not discussing that, and are not even attempting to. We close our eyes and discuss our intraparty questions. And this is what has been achieved by those surrounding us who wanted us to depart from current life and engage in only intraparty questions.

Let us take a question that is close to the enterprise director. The monitoring of economic activity. The first secretary said that he will monitor it. So don't you monitor it! Because there exists a decision of the 19th party conference: economic activity is not to be monitored, and influence is to be exerted only by way of cadres. At the same time let's open our platform. If an administrator is elected, he is no longer approved by the party agency. Here too we are removing from ourselves the responsibility and the right to administer cadres. Therefore everything is not so simple. But for some reason we forget about these questions.

Today the question asked is: why do we pay the party apparatus at the enterprises a bonus? They do not monitor the economic activity. All our managers are elected and in this regard they feel the same way that the rest of the collective does. Certainly there is no need to pay the bonus. Certainly it is time to make that decision. But this is the first stage. It is necessary for us to talk about this today, when we are discussing questions. And as for the Platform, we shall be discussing it at first in the primary organizations. We will be at our oblast conference, etc. But that is no cause for revelry today. The basic attention should be paid to determining how to form the Soviet, how the party group should work there, what in general is the principle of its creation, and how the party

committee is supposed to operate under conditions of the lack of monitoring of economic activity.

And finally, it is, of course, very painful for me when, from my side also, reproaches are directed against the apparatus. But I want everyone to understand this correctly. It is what we all—we and you—have created. We completely answer, as an elected agency, for the work performed by the apparatus. We monitored it. And at the city conference I criticized the apparatus for definite steps in the area of soviet work. However, there was only applause. And now we are being criticized for that. But, comrades, just ponder the fact that a first secretary, a new person, has arrived. Practically speaking, no one in the apparatus has been replaced. The very same apparatus is working. Can the first secretary change the policy under these conditions? I say that he can, but he can do very, very little, because the situation has always been and always will be that when a prime minister arrives, the cabinet changes. But that did not occur with us. And much is being inhibited in our party organization. I am convinced that they are good people, but they are accustomed to working in just one definite style, in one direction. And they are continuing to work that way. So, as long ago as the December plenum, comrades, I issued the appeal to conduct a party congress in early January, to hold our conference, and to elect a new team both places. But no one listened to that.

Therefore I propose once again that we work persistently to bring our party conference closer and to hold it not at the end of April, but in the beginning, on the 6th and 7th. And not on weekdays, but on Sunday in order not to attract a tremendous mass of people from their jobs.

V. A. Tyulkin, party committee secretary, Avangard Association

We have had time to conduct our own session of the party committee so that today I can express not only my own opinion, but also rely on the party organization.

It should definitely be noted that the Plenum was not an ordinary one, and that many questions were considered at it. A number of steps forward have been taken, and they have been mentioned, but at the same time we shall have some kind of sense of discontent, or it might be more correct to say a sense that things have not been completely discussed.

What is it that failed to satisfy us first of all, and what is the crux of the matter?

We were profoundly convinced that the thing that troubles us most is the fact that the Plenum failed to give an evaluation of that critical position in society, in the economy, in the party that is observed as of today, although there definitely was discussion—and very meaningful discussion—at the plenum. This includes the statements made by those certain comrades who today have already been called rightists, and also the same kind of sharp, painful statements made by the leftists. The discussion occurred, but no evaluations were heard.

Meanwhile, both in Mikhail Sergeyevich's report and in the Platform, much is reduced to what? People have said that the scope of the tasks could not be imagined immediately; the complexities that have appeared are such as could never have been foreseen; there is a lot of unfinished work in the outlying areas; the old mechanism has been dismantled but the new one, don't you see, has not yet been created. And accusations are even leveled at those comrades, of whom I am one, who seemingly attempted to form the image of an enemy and to carry out this—shall we call it dilettantish?—search for the culprits.

Please allow me to ask: exactly who, if not the ruling party, is supposed to answer for what is happening? Because we have repeatedly said that we are the ruling party. And we have said that correctly, because as of today all the commanding summits in the economy and in the state are in the hands of the Communists.

But the situation is deteriorating, and it is deteriorating rapidly. Today it is such that the majority of the workers and the ordinary people are living worse, but, most importantly, they have no assurance about their tomorrow. Consequently, the largest mistake occurs in the party: first of all in its leadership, in the fact that we have largely stopped reflecting the interests of the majority of the workers. We are all in favor of perestroika, but we must not carry it out in such a way that people live worse. And yet that line has been continued for more than just a single year, and there has been dashing back and forth from side to side. Consequently, the attempt is sometimes made to mollify us by means of examples such as when our home is being repaired or remodeled, we must reconcile ourselves to inconveniences for a certain period of time. But that would seem to be understandable. However, it must be remembered that before applying the paint and the wallpaper, and also before the wife has approved the work plan and the estimate, or the completion deadlines, we do not begin these repairs on our home. Is that where we have been going, and how we have been going, in recent years? And who in the ruling party will answer for the results?

I think that, nevertheless, the Leningrad party organization should be the first to present its evaluation of the situation in the country and in the economy. I do not know how much work the editorial commission will be able to do today. Unfortunately, that direction has not been observed in the drafts that we have in our hands.

It has already been said today—and we must support that statement—that once again we are acting too late. I have in mind the Central Committee Plenum. But, at the same time, against this background the slight hastiness looks appears to be at least strange. Most of the rank-and-file Communists have not yet had time to become aware of or to read through what kind of person the party chairman should be, or what the institution of presidents is. In general they are unfamiliar with that, and yet the Supreme Soviet is already operating and a Congress of

people's deputies is being planned. There will be meaningful discussion there, and it might refer to specific personalities. But the party and the Communists have not yet determined whether they will recommend someone from the party for that position. And if they will, then whom? Those are the questions being asked in the primary party organizations. And therefore this certainly has to be kept in mind at that Central Committee Plenum that is supposed to occur. It is necessary to convey the idea that, in general, we consider this step to be too hasty.

If extraordinary powers are needed, the state authority is completely capable of resolving that by itself.

It is our profound conviction that a number of questions simply did not find their reflection at the Plenum. What do we have in mind first of all? It should have been precisely and clearly stated that an ideological current has already been noticed in the party, and that may even have taken a definite form. And what is occurring right now is their organizational formulation. So it is obviously necessary in the Platform also to give a characterization of these ideological currents from the point of view of the Central Committee.

I would like to say a few words concerning the statement made not only by Comrade Lapotnikov, but also by others, concerning the Democratic Platform. It must be understood that 80 percent of the ideas and materials contained in it was laboriously developed by us in the primary party organizations, including the ideas and materials in the Leningrad party organization's platform, concerning the undemocratic nature of the assertion that was made by Comrade Lapotnikov. And 20 percent there was taking the next step. I do not say whether it was good or bad, but that step was taken, and it makes its direction different. A watershed between the platforms occurs on the basis of the allowing of private ownership with the possibility of the application of hired labor and the organization of the party according to a "new" type with eroded boundaries, without the principle of democratic centralism, that is, the path that is well known in theory, the path to the social-democratic trend and to the fundamental principle of the construction of the party. This definitely has a right to life, and I shall not judge whether it is good or bad. This is closer to some people, but it is necessary to call things by their true names, so that everyone will understand what we are talking about.

Incidentally, this was stated in Moscow by those comrades who currently are at the head of this movement. They stated that their goal is to split the party, and if possible to grab a big piece of it, especially since we are all adults and we all realize that what we are talking about also includes the material and financial base of today's Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We included many of these ideas in the statement that party committee secretary Comrade Zhitenev plans to give at the Plenum, and we put into his hands a mandate

with the signatures of more than 30 party committee secretaries. However, I think that it is precisely as a result of that mandate that he will not get the floor at the Plenum. We are profoundly convinced that today we must delimit ourselves not only from Stalinism, but also from the figures in the latest history. The rank-and-file Communists want to figure out whether they are in the same party as Aliyev, Grishin, and a number of other comrades. It is necessary to create a commission from representatives from the outlying areas, in order to get that question moving, and so that everyone will know that the party is working on that question.

And now a few words about the draft concerning the RSFSR Communist Party. It would seem that there is nothing to object to, but there are such formulations as "to join the movement, having in mind political measures on the basis of the Central Committee Platform." It is difficult even for me, a party committee secretary, to understand what is intended. It is necessary to speak Russian. It is necessary for the obkom to join the work and assume organizational functions. Secondly, we are in favor of conducting a constituent congress of the RKP [Russian Communist Party] prior to the deadlines set for the 28th CPSU Congress, and, thirdly, we recommend that Comrade Gidasov, as a member of the Russian Buro, use the rostrum of the next Central Committee Plenum and appeal to all the party organizations in Russia.

V. V. Fortunatov, department head, Institute of Railroad Transport Engineers imeni Academician V. N. Obraztsov

The not too bright but stubborn conservatives, together with the broadminded but perpetually wavering pluralists, have led the country and our nation down an economic blind alley and to the brink of civil war. And they have led the party to a state of torpor and demoralization. From the brilliantly colored fabric of perestroika, all we have received so far is a robe for the naked emperor. Wishful thinking, castles in the air, and vague projects end up as a serious political hangover. Having said this, I end the loudly critical part of my statement and change over to proposals.

First. I propose that the elections to the party's obkom, the 28th Congress, and the Central Committee be conducted in the party election okrugs themselves, by secret vote, from among a number of candidates, or or, as it is now fashionable to say, on an alternative basis. The only difference will be in the size of the okrugs. I am conveying my version, my scheme to the presidium, as it is possible to do democratically. We must show that we are able not only to defeat election campaigns, but also to conduct them skillfully. We must show that the Leningrad Communists are in favor of the most rapid democratization of the party from below, rather than in favor of stillborn democratization from the top, which is what I would call the method of administering a teaspoon a year.

Second. I support Burchakov's proposal and I propose sitting down immediately at the negotiations table, at a roundtable with representatives of all the public organizations that want this.

True, it can be assumed that prior to the election our proposal might not be accepted. I think that it would be desirable to propose to the leaders of the leading public associations that they speak at our party conference. I propose that, starting immediately, today, we categorically ban permanent-staff workers—both the responsible ones and the technical ones—who are receiving party salaries from making statements or linking their name with any politicalized formations. It is necessary to maintain contacts with them, to cooperate with them, and to engage in polemics with them, but the permanent-staff workers must work in the party organizations.

Or no one knows where they are working, but the party organizations do not know or see them.

Third. I propose that we add "wheels" to the existing platforms. Without wheels those platforms will not go anywhere. By wheels I mean the following:

—first, it is necessary to announce the detailed, economically substantiated, statistically extended computations and the forecasts for the development of Leningrad and to publish all this in the press. I have already mentioned to various audiences that, in the sense of statistics and information, the Communists have also spoken here—we will be taken as blockheads, if one recalls Shtirlits' famous expression;

—secondly, it seems to me that we need a "Leningrad package" of legislative drafts for the work of the RSFSR legislative agencies, with a consideration of the set of Leningrad problems. The persons who could become the initiators for developing that draft could be Communists—USSR and RSFSR people's deputies. And for the preparation of this package it is especially important to cooperate with the public associations.

Fourth. I propose beginning to organize party work at people's place of residence, where it is only simulated, if we call things by their right names. If the CPSU raykoms are indeed needed for anything, it is only for this purpose.

What proposals do I have? First of all, it seems to me that it would be beneficial to carry out a double accounting of Communists. We have largely failed in the election campaign at people's place of residence because no real party structures for that work were created. At the same time each of our multistory buildings has a sufficient number of Communists for making up a voters' meeting, but those meetings, as a rule, have failed. The Communists could create groups to support the election commissions and the OBKhSS [Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] and KNK [People's Control Committee] surprise inspections, groups to help children's organizations, groups to monitor video enterprises, etc. These groups could become a nucleus for the people's self-government agencies that are extremely necessary today at people's place of residence.

The next proposal, I think, will cause in the press all kinds of comments, but I shall express it anyway. In the current alarming situation it would be desirable to create party "druzhinas" [home guards] at people's place of residence from among Communists who are liable for call-up, and perhaps also Komsomol members, to maintain law and order and to repel all kinds of extremist manifestations. Finally, Communists could demonstrate their solidarity at their place of residence during "subbotniks" [donated-labor work days] that are carried out in an organized manner.

Dear comrades! If we today do not speak up under the slogan "Comrades, let's move ahead!" and if we do not show that we are in the lead, no one will believe us.

Fifth. The platform of the Leningrad party organization has mentioned the elimination of the monopoly principle in managing the press. How much time is needed to resolve the question of creating independent—party, soviet, trade-union, and other—printed organs? This delimitation, it seems to me, can be made by proceeding from today's number of printed publications. Let us decide and state firmly in this plenum's decision that LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA is only a party organ, VECHERNIY LENINGRAD is only a soviet organ, LENINGRADSKIY RABOCHIY is the organ of the association of public associations, SMENA is the organ of all the youth organizations, and DIALOG, for example, is the organ of the Znaniye [Knowledge] Society, primarily of Leningrad social scientists.

Moreover, it seems to me that all the editorial collectives could become cost-accountable associations, like the Printing House imeni Volodarskiy that serves them.

If my idea is in principle delirious, I would like to see counterarguments.

Sixth. I feel that there has been an increase in the party organization's authority as a result of the public announcement of the property that it possesses: palaces, equipment, monetary funds, recreational bases, etc. Obviously there should be a public announcement of the parameters of the property status of the buro members, CPSU obkom secretaries, and CPSU raykom first secretaries, both those who are currently working and also, at least, those who will be elected. What we need here is both glasnost and the truth, without which there will be no trust.

Seventh. I second Comrade Kharchenko in proposing at this plenum the creation of an organizational committee to prepare and conduct a constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party prior to the 28th CPSU Congress. And I am ready, for example, to take active part in the preparation of its documents.

And the last item. I have heard here a confrontational tone with respect to the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU." Yesterday we had a party meeting, or, rather, a meeting of the LIIZhT [Leningrad Institute of Railroad Transportation Engineers] Communists. It was an open meeting. Five hundred persons participated in a survey.

I can see that 37 percent stated that the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform corresponds to their convictions most completely, but 56 percent felt that the Democratic Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress corresponds most completely to their convictions.

I can say what I do not like in that platform. I categorically do not like the fact that it contains a statement in which it is proposed to conduct an alternative congress prior to the 28th Congress. I think that we could speak out against that idea, making critical comments with regard to that idea. But if we maintain that confrontational tone, I think that we shall thus inflict casualties on ourselves.

And finally. In the working group which, so to speak, no one knows from where it gathered or where I was supposed to work, I happened to meet a very large number of Communists. I have looked at today's draft of the decision. My dear comrades, if we accept it in its present form and there are no precise, concrete positions in it with regard to a number of questions, then that means that, once again, we have arrived at the station after the train has left. If today we do not hold demonstrations in front of the obkom with demands "Retire the obkom!", then if we today do not make radical decisions, those demonstrations will occur.

Lieutenant General A. G. Viktorov, troop commander, Red Banner Northwest Border District

The complexity and seriousness of the situation that the party and our entire country are experiencing is being discussed with completely justified alarm everywhere, from the high official rostrums to conversations at the everyday level. It can certainly be said with assurance that what is occurring in the country is, essentially speaking, a struggle for power, an uncompromising and bitter struggle. But what should, in my opinion, alarm us most is the fact that our grandfathers and fathers, as Bolsheviks—and I emphasize, Bolsheviks!—seized the power, and we Communists, their grandsons and children, are giving it back. This should not be allowed in any instance. It is precisely under these conditions that the draft of the 28th CPSU Congress Platform that was adopted by the party's Central Committee is undoubtedly playing a positive, constructive role. Of course, that document is extremely necessary not only for the party, but also for our entire nation. Although we must state frankly that it appeared after a long delay.

In my opinion, the criticism of the party that is being carried out in what I would call such a bitter manner by Communists, including people's deputies, is irresponsible and groundless. That criticism is aimed at undermining the party's authority and honor. In my opinion, we are already seething and our heart aches both for the party and for the nation, whose fates the political intriguers want to control, without feeling shy about using any methods in the struggle for power.

Yes, we can and must live better, but in order to do so we must not do so by bringing our nations into a head-to-head confrontation. I feel that the time has come, but

we have not yet completely missed the right moment. We must immediately begin to restore order in the country. The extremists and instigators of all kinds must stop acting to the detriment of society. The Mafia elements must be identified, and the conditions for the normal life of Soviet citizens must be guaranteed.

I am profoundly convinced that the squandering of the country's natural wealth and raw-material resources, the events in the trans-Caucasus and Dushanbe, the tanks being sold by cooperative members abroad, and the lack of food products and other commodities in the stores are all links in the same chain. All these things are not accidental, but are being done in order to suggest to people the idea that our system is incapable of resolving the country's vitally important questions.

But what else would we army Communists want to see more clearly in the CPSU Platform? Against a background the complicated international situation and the complicated, contradictory processes in the world, this document should reveal more thoroughly the role of the Armed Forces, the State Security Committee [KGB], and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and should express unambiguously, in concrete terms, the attitude of Soviet society to the army, the flesh and blood of the Soviet nation, as the defender of its interests and the guarantor of peaceful creative labor. This is especially necessary in the situation in which military personnel find themselves today.

The distortion by certain mass media of the role played by the Armed Forces in the events in the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia, the dilettantism and the frequently tendentious statements and lack of objectivity on the part of a number of authors in their writing that throws light on the processes that are occurring within the army, the attempt to drive a wedge between the army and the nation, and the campaign that is aimed at discrediting the political agencies—all these are actions that are definitely not inoffensive ones. Behind them stand those persons who find beneficial the destabilization in society, those who are attempting at any price to grab political capital for themselves. In addition to the increased psychological pressure upon the military personnel, the situation has reached the point of the escalation of physical reprisals against persons who are wearing a military uniform, especially the officer complement.

As long ago as 1987 one instance of the murder of an officer was recorded; in 1988, two; but last year, 1989, 59 officers died by the hands of criminals, and that figure does not include those who took part in the elimination of the disorders in Central Asia and the trans-Caucasus. Those are the bitter fruits of the present-day society that has lost its stability. And a factor that played definitely not the last role was the intensification of the disrespect for the Armed Forces, and therefore it is necessary to reflect in the party platform the necessity of educating in society a respectful attitude toward the army and of increasing the prestige of military service.

I cannot fail to mention certain questions in the life of the border troops. There have been many discussions about them in the press. There have been many different discussions of the actions of the border troops on the Soviet-Iranian border in Azerbaijan. The provocation action by extremists from the Azerbaijan People's Front was prepared ahead of time, and it was prepared carefully. Its purpose was to cause bloodshed on the border. Despite the fact that thousands of people from the border area participated in the provocation, the border troops do not react to their provocative actions. People threw rocks at them and spat at them, but they displayed a great amount of restraint and steadfastness, and did not give in to the provocation. This disrupted the plans of the extremists in the People's Front to draw the border troops into the roaring fire of the interethnic conflict. The bloodshed was prevented.

In today's situation we cannot preclude the possibility of mass disorders among the population or the actions of extremist-minded persons on other sectors of the State Border, including the Northwest Sector. Under these conditions the line governing the behavior of the personnel in the border troops, and their actions, as regulated by USSR law, must be aimed at guaranteeing the inviolability of the State Border and the prevention or stopping of conflict situations. The dynamic development of Soviet-Finnish relations at various levels and in various areas, the striving by both sides to find new forms of cooperation, the creation of joint enterprises, and the increase in the activity rate of border trade and tourism are exerting a substantial influence upon the situation in the border rayons and at the border itself. Soviet industrial enterprises, institutions, and cooperatives have been given the opportunity to get in direct contact with foreign companies, and, naturally, the departures across the border have considerably increased.

The border troops support all of this. But we are apprehensive that the proper order with regard to this matter does not exist, or, perhaps I should say that there is no responsibility, no purity of interrelationships, no modesty in organizing those ties. And that is what led to the notorious Vyborg case. I consider to be erroneous in this regard the attempt by individual administrators in Vyborg and at other administrative levels to create in Vyborg and in the rayon a free economic zone. Do our comrades really count on using this to feed and clothe the nation? I think that we are crippling the souls of the people, especially our youth. And the psychological harm can be irreparable. Behind the economy it is necessary to see the main factor—man.

I support the comrades who spoke out in favor of the direct alternative secret election of delegates and the immediate creation of the Russian Communist Party as part of the CPSU.

Clarification

The final paragraph of the statement that was made at the joint plenum by V. G. Dolgov and that was published yesterday in our newspaper should read as follows:

"Previously the obkom maintained a sociological service for its production orders. Now, if that 'sociological

information' is published in the house organ of the party's obkom, you will think willy-nilly that a definite sociological service maintains the obkom as its 'order department.'"

Committee Meets on RSFSR Party Formation

90UN1208B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 3

[LenTASS article: "Session of the Initiative Committee"]

[Text] A regular session of the initiative committee to prepare the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party as part of the CPSU was held in the CPSU Obkom House of Political Enlightenment.

The plan for preparing the congress was discussed and approved. The initiative committee called upon the communists to begin immediately to nominate candidates and elect delegates to the constituent congress of the RKP [RSFSR Communist Party], after forming from the party organizations party okrugs consisting of 5000 communists each.

The basic principles in the concept for the development of socialism were accepted. Plans were made to work out the drafts of other political documents that will be submitted to the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party."

Neftekamsk 'Referendum' Criticizes Bashkir AES

PM0203164290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Aleksandr Zinovyev report from Ufa under the rubric "Hotline": "Right to a Referendum"]

[Text] In Neftekamsk an ecological referendum has been held, in which the participants came out against the construction of the Bashkir Nuclear Power Station [AES].

The people of Neftekamsk have long been calling resolutely for an end to work on constructing the Bashkir AES, since they believe that it is located in unfavorable geological, geographical, and seismic conditions, and moreover only 30 km from the city, so that it could represent a real danger in future. The city party organization shares this position.

Citizens aged 18 or over took part in the referendum held in accordance with a decision of Neftekamsk city soviet executive committee [gorispolkom], and 99 percent of them came out against the construction of the AES.

So, a citywide referendum? I asked V. Dautov, secretary of Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, to comment on this event.

"As a citizen and father of a family, and simply as a person, I too am in favor of an end to the Bashkir AES construction," Vilyar Yumagulovich said. "But I think everything must be done within the law. And therefore I

cannot regard the event organized by Neftekamsk Gorispolkom as a referendum as such. In accordance with the Bashkir ASSR law on public discussion of important questions of state life, the decision to conduct such a discussion is taken by the autonomous republic Supreme Soviet or its presidium.

"In order to carry out the 'referendum' Neftekamsk Gorispolkom made use of electoral precincts [isbiratel'nyye uchastki] set up for the holding of elections to republican and local soviets: Here the citizens put their voting papers into the ballot boxes, with their answer to the question of whether or not there should be an AES. But this incidental use of electoral precincts and voting premises [pomeshcheniya dlya golosovaniya] is not stipulated in election legislation.

"As you can see, with all due respect to the organizers, objective, and results of the event held in Neftekamsk, there are no legitimate grounds for calling it a referendum. It can only be regarded as a sociological poll of the population. The Bashkir ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium gave an explanation to the local organs of power to that effect beforehand."

Tselinograd Oblast Party Plenum Held

LD0603234190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Today in Tselinograd there was a plenum of the oblast party organization. The communists discussed the draft CPSU platform for the 28th Party Congress. Our correspondent (Fayzullah Jakosh) reports.

[(Jakosh)] Everyone is clearly concerned by the fate of the party in connection with the transfer to a multiparty system. More often than not, people spoke about each communist's responsibility for the matter entrusted to him. The platform has awakened initiative. For example, one of the speeches described the decision by one of the party organizations in the town of Tselinograd not to hand over some of the party subscriptions and to use the money to introduce locally the post of unattached [osvobozhdenno] secretary. People attach such great importance to active party work in their collective.

During an interval, I talked to (Mikhail Nikolayevich Vorunov), secretary of the party committee at the Tselinogradselmash [Tselinograd agricultural machinery], which is the largest of the town's machine-building enterprises.

[Begin recording] [(Jakosh)] In my view, today's plenum seemed a run-of-the-mill affair, and the report contained very many assessments of today's situation from the point of view of the party platform, which has started to work, for the 28th congress.

[(Vorunov)] Everything's been entered in the platform. Practically all communists will take part in the life of the party organizations and of the CPSU as a whole. But, as for economic matters, there's nothing concrete there, in

my view. And in the opinion of rank-and-file communists, it is necessary, first of all, to impose order, discipline, and responsibility for the allocated sector of work. We adopt very many decrees, very many decisions and instructions of all kinds. But we ourselves don't carry them out. For five years now, we've been criticizing ourselves and waiting for someone to come along and put everything right for us. No one will.

[Jakosh] That should be more precisely reflected....

[Vorunov], interrupting] More precisely reflected in the platform.

[Jakosh] But what's it actually like?

[Vorunov] A message to the commissions and departments of the CPSU Central Committee, and to the Council of Ministers. As I was saying in my speech, until we get production relations right—after all, we live by producing things: We have whatever we produce—until we get production relations right, as far as honoring contracts, making contractual deliveries, and improving the quality of the goods produced are concerned, we must radically alter the attitude to work in such matters. That must be the political platform. [end recording]

Poll Set To Elect Shcherbitskiy Replacement

*PM1203164990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Unattributed report: "At Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] On the basis of the okrug electoral commission protocol and in accordance with Articles 57, 61, and 62 of the USSR Law "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies," the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies has registered USSR People's Deputy Gennadiy Vasilyevich Kulik, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Agro-Industrial Committee and member of the CPSU, resident of Moscow City and elected from Priozernyy National-Territorial Okrug No. 553, Kalmyk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic].

In connection with the death of USSR People's Deputy V.V. Shcherbitskiy and in accordance with Articles 23 and 62 of the USSR Law "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies," the Central Electoral Commission has scheduled for Sunday 13 May 1990 the election of a USSR people's deputy to take the deceased's place in Verkhnedneprovskiy Territorial Electoral Okrug No. 424, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Russian Electoral Commission Chairman Interviewed

*LD1303092090 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 12 Mar 90*

[Excerpts] In Moscow today a regular sitting of the Central Electoral Commission for the Elections of the

RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies took place in the House of the Unions. It considered the issue of the elections of deputies to Russia's parliament held on 4 March. Our correspondent Vladimir Korablev has asked Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, to comment on their results.

[Kazakov] Today is a remarkable day for our commission. We are summing up the results of the main stage of our election campaign. As everyone knows, 4 March was the culmination of our election campaign. The first round of voting, one could say, took place. It is pleasing that the elections, as a whole, were active. Almost 77 percent of the electorate took part. This is almost 80,000,000 people. Of course, there were occasions when the turn out was not sufficient. Even in one constituency—in the 210th Norilsk constituency—the elections failed to take place because the more than 50 percent of the electorate [the required number] failed to turn up.

[Correspondent] Vasily Ivanovich, in 33 RSFSR constituencies the elections were not multi-candidate. What is the situation in these constituencies?

[Kazakov] Indeed, in few constituencies—about three percent—only one candidate was running. Admittedly, all these candidates have been elected. I wish to note this: sometimes they say that these include largely party and local soviet staff. The fact is that only four out of 24 oblast party committee first secretaries who were running were unopposed in their constituencies. One of them received only 54 votes. Another received 92 percent. [passage omitted]

I will remind you that there are in all 1,068 deputy mandates. One hundred and sixty one people have now been elected. The commission has registered them today, and recognized their power. [passage omitted] Three hundred constituencies had over 10 candidates. Naturally not one of them has been elected since it is difficult to hope that one of the 10 could receive more than 50 percent of votes. [passage omitted] Repeat elections are to be held in 33 constituencies on 22 April. [passage omitted]

RSFSR Fuel Industry Minister Arkhipov Retires

*PM1303105390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Mar 90 Single Edition p 2*

[Unattributed report: "At the RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has released Comrade Vladimir Grigoryevich Arkhipov from his post as minister of the RSFSR fuel industry on his retirement on pension.

Demands for Balkar TV Chief's Dismissal Cited

PM1303145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Ali Kazikhanov under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter: "Distrust Expressed in Administrator"]

[Text] Nalchik—The presidium of the Kabardino-Balkar Obkom [oblast committee] of the trade union of cultural workers has expressed its distrust in Kh. Kaufov, chairman of the Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] and demanded that the autonomous republic's Council of Ministers and the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting relieve him of his post.

A unique document. This has never happened before in Kabardino-Balkaria—that trade unions intervene in cadres policy, in which party organs rule undividedly.

Khachim Kaufov joined the Gosteleradio from the post of party obkom press sector chief over three years ago. After a while his subordinates began to complain to the party, soviet, and trade union organs about the unjustified (and subsequently repealed) reprimands of workers and to demand that the creative collective be protected from an incompetent, rude leader.

The trade union obkom resolution notes that an intolerable moral and psychological climate has been created in the collective and that Kh. Kaufov is persecuting gifted, independent people and threatening them for the slightest disobedience.

Will the cultural trade union succeed in implementing its decision? It is hard to say. Particularly if you consider that complaints against Kh. Kaufov have reached the party obkom and the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. But so far there has been no reply...

Decree on Trade Abuses Produces Immediate Effects

PM1303151590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Ye. Isakova article under the "Details" rubric: "After the Decree"]

[Text] Law enforcement organs have proposed that the USSR Supreme Soviet Interim Committee For the Fight Against Crime step up its responsibility for economic crimes.

The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] reacted immediately. Hardly a month had gone by before the 27 February 1990 RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On Stepping Up Responsibility for Abuses in Trade and Speculation" was adopted.

Whereas previously the maximum punishment for concealing goods from customers was up to three years' imprisonment—and in practice even that measure was

replaced by an administrative penalty—the period of reeducation in a place of detention has now been increased to up to 10 years, and the fine has been increased to up to R5,000.

The reaction of the trading system has been lightning-fast—in the first few days of March (the decree was published 2 March) goods which customers had long forgotten appeared in Moscow stores. Those who had decided to conceal them had made a major miscalculation.

"Just a week after the decree came into force 13 major crimes associated with violations of trading regulations had been uncovered in Moscow," Major General A. Bugayev, deputy chief of the Moscow Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration, said.

Mercury Contaminates Barnaul Water Supplies

PM1303152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent S. Brovashov: "Mercury From the Faucet"]

[Excerpts] Barnaul—Mercury is the only liquid metal in the periodic table. In Barnaul it was so mobile that it started infiltrating... citizens' apartments in the water. Five cases have been recorded since the start of the year.

An emergency mercury center attached to the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] has been in session twice a week. There are many explanations but none has been proven yet. That is why an investigation is under way in all possible directions. Some services are taking water samples and analyzing them, others have started checking the use of instruments and equipment which use mercury, while others—including the militia and the KGB—are working on a malice aforethought theory. But, irrespective of the end result, thanks to this gigantic amount of work, clearly negative situations have been uncovered. [passage omitted]

When the search for causes began, a functioning DP-610 flowmeter containing a small amount of mercury was discovered in a boilerhouse, even though it had been thought that these had been decommissioned a couple of years ago and, consequently, the checks on their technical condition by state services had been stopped. It is not ruled out that others remain to be discovered.

Revived German Autonomy in Lower Volga Protested

LD1303164990 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 12 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today there are a great many things which we lack, and not just products or goods on the shelves of shops; the main thing we lack is tolerance. Not the kind

of tolerance toward which the country's former leaders called us, meaning submissiveness. We lack tolerance toward each other.

Almost 50 years ago, another arbitrary act was committed: The Soviet Germans were deprived of their statehood. Today, the deputies' commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet recommends the restoration of German autonomy on the Volga. Many people understood that this would not be an easy task. [video shows a demonstration in which banners are visible. Some read: "No German autonomy on Russian soil." "No autonomy in the Volga region." "The sovereignty of nations doesn't mean autonomy"]

[V. Ryazanov—identified by caption] They are protesting against the reconstitution of German autonomy in the Lower Volga. Among these people are representatives of neighboring rayons of Saratov and even Volgograd Oblasts. There has been a whole wave of such meetings. [video shows unidentified man speaking to Ryazanov]

[Begin recording] [Ryazanov] How should all these problems of the Germans be tackled?

[Man] Let them come, open up their schools, theaters, newspapers—whatever you like, but on general principles, based on universal law.

[Ryazanov] But not a state?

[Man] Not a state; based on universal law. Build whatever you like—German schools, churches. [end recording]

[Ryazanov] The path of reconstituting the German Autonomous Republic in the Lower Volga is evolutionary, that is, gradual, calculated over years and decades. This is what this is, if one calls a spade a spade.

The village of Konstantinovka near Saratov is another report venue. The first Germans arrived here six months ago. Now, more than 30 live and work here, primarily builders. In the future, this village will be the main base for the (Elita Povolzhye) scientific production association. The prospects are excellent. [video shows men building houses, then correspondent talking to group of men]

[Begin recording] [Ryazanov] Well, what have you decided?

[V.K.Triller, driver, sovkhos of Mirnyy, Karaganda Oblast, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic—identified by caption] Well, I have decided that if there were a guarantee that there really would be autonomy here, then of course I would travel here without hesitation. [end recording]

[Ryazanov] For the Soviet Germans, deprived against their will of their statehood almost half a century ago, the restoration of the German Autonomous Republic on the Volga is not merely an act of historical justice, but also

the rescue of what has, to a great extent, been lost—the language and national culture.

Then what are these anti-autonomy meetings, the non-acceptance by the local population of the changes to come? [video shows more shots of demonstration and banners, including one draped below a speakers' platform which says: "We are in favor of the CPSU platform. Take account of the view of the local population in national questions"]

As is known, a deputies' commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet recommended the restoration of German autonomy on the Volga. A demonstration of the law of force as distinct from the force of the law; a flare-up of great power chauvinism, or the machinations of the local party apparatus as some assert?

Or is it that here, on the Lower Volga, the fundamental interests of representatives of various peoples, hundreds of thousands of people, have clashed? And is it just, resolving the problem of one people—in the case in question of the Soviet Germans—to thus create problems for the others. [video shows interview with people's deputy]

[Begin recording] [A.A.Kiselev, USSR people's deputy—identified by caption] (?One) should answer the question not what will the Germans have when autonomy has been established, but what every person should have who will be (?here) if autonomy is established.

So far this question has not been answered; and until we answer it, all our other movements will, in my view be doomed to failure.

[Ryazanov] And so, dialogue, a democratic dialogue and glasnost; is this what you are appealing to your electors for?

[Kiselev] Of course, of course, and tolerance. In such matters, there should be very very great tolerance. [end recording]

Situation in Voronezh Gorkom, Obkom Viewed

90UN1108A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by Valeriy Stepnov (Voronezh): "Has the Train Left?"]

[Text] "Has the train left?" asked the participants in the plenum of the Voronezh CPSU Gorkom [city committee] who were concerned about the decline of the authority of the party apparatus.

The interval between the last two gorkom plenums set a record for being short—a week. At the preceding one they had discussed the situation in the Transcaucasus and in Voronezh itself. In spite of the geographical distance between the areas, the political connection between them was obvious. Anonymous authors speaking out against declaring a state of emergency in Baku distributed leaflets

containing calls for a city strike, rallies, and civil disobedience, and they threatened party and soviet workers with physical violence.

Workers of the city decided not to strike. But informal organizations held a rally at which they adopted a strict resolution. Most of the attention in it was devoted to the elections in the districts with uncontested races. They were regarded as a challenge to the public and it was suggested that individuals who had been nominated without an opponent withdraw their candidacies, and so forth. The resolution expressed a lack of confidence in G. Kabasin, USSR people's deputy and first secretary of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee].

Although the resolution was never published anywhere its content became widely known. Moreover, passions were inflamed by the persistently spread rumors about Voronezh being changed over to the third supply category and the price increases that were in the offing....

Regardless of how clever the rumors were it was easy to dispel them with reliable information. The realities people encountered every day, the city's neglected municipal services, the heating system which could not stand up under any criticism, the interruptions in the supply of drinking water, the shortage of maternity homes, and spaces in hospitals and polyclinics.

But even the impoverished municipal services did not irritate people as much as the stagnant style of leadership. Because of perestroika people are taking seriously their own significance in the life of the society. Democratic elections of party and soviet leaders are becoming the norm everywhere. In the collectives they first determine opinions, select candidates, discuss them, and look for the most worthy ones. Elections with just one candidate are usually not considered to be elections. In Voronezh people live according to the old policies. Personnel problems are solved behind the scenes by a small group of people. Thus Voronezh residents learned about the changes in the leadership of the ispolkom [executive committee] of the oblast soviet only after the session. The former chairman went on a pension and the obkom secretary I. Ivlev replaced him. The extraordinary session along with the release of the chairman, the recommendation of his replacement, his speech, questions and answers, the voting, and applause took 28 minutes. The election (one is inclined to say appointment) of the new obkom secretary proceeded in the same spirit. He was bureau member V. Shevtsov.

It is quite possible that with democratic elections preference would have been given to these same comrades since there is nothing bad to say about them. But the dissatisfaction remained. The people felt that they had been bypassed because, as in former times, nobody was interested in their opinions.

The oblast party leadership could not get away from the authoritarian style. The universal "yes sir" from all sides in the meeting hall leaves the impression of ossified conservatism which precludes access of fresh forces to

the leadership and therefore rules out any hope of change. The adherence to the old policies was especially noticeable in the obkom plenums. At one of them, which was devoted to the development of the oblast agroindustrial complex, party workers expressed their dissatisfaction with the decisions of the March (1989) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. And when the rector of the agricultural institute, V. Shevchenko, drew attention to the in-depth scientific development of the decisions adopted by the Central Committee and their significance in the realization of the diverse forms of agriculture, they did not want to listen to him and began to "drown him out with applause." The bureau members sitting in the presidium began to laugh.

Thus the obkom let it be known how it feels about perestroika, the development of independence in agriculture, and the delimitation of functions among party, soviet, and economic organs, and, the main thing, the limitation of the power of party committees.

The situation shows the mistakes in the work of the obkom but there is never any criticism of it. At those same plenums, if there is any criticism it is about the "long time taken to resolve the problem of the clay for red brick" or "the delay in the production of hay stackers." Once just one of the speakers noted that the report made by the obkom first secretary was technocratic and the criticism in it was abusive, but he immediately received a crushing rebuke.

The refusal to accept a different opinion and the guarding against criticism certainly do not contribute to the obkom's authority. Rather on the contrary: This makes it more vulnerable. The logic is simple: Since they are afraid of criticism this means they are weak, and since they are weak it is possible to shake them up and throw them down. Now the leitmotif of the rallies that are formally devoted to the elections actually amounts to making a fuss about one subject—the dismissal of party and soviet organs.

A spirit of overthrowing the authorities is disturbing the city. Some people seriously think that if the leadership is changed all the problems will be solved immediately. But where will we get goods and food if we do not produce them. It would seem that the deception is obvious but calls for "Down with them!" are finding support among the city residents. Under these conditions it is not easy to develop the line of the city party organization. Members of the gorkom meeting at the plenum felt obliged to solve this problem but they were counting on the participation of the obkom and the Secretary G. Kabasin personally, since most of the complaints were made against him.

G. Kabasin's speech at the plenum lasted almost two hours. He had prepared for it thoroughly, using a number of references and figures. It seemed that he could have spoken for that long again—there were enough papers left in his file. But the keen attention of the first few minutes were quickly replaced by disenchantment. A hum of indifference made its way through the rows. And

at that moment who would be interested in how much soft pastry the city consumes or how important little pies with liver are. The crucial political problems were drowned in the verbiage. Even in a head-on confrontation with reality the obkom first secretary managed not to notice anything.

The speeches of the participants in the plenum were different. They preferred an honest, friendly conversation. This was perhaps not the first time G. Kabasin had heard harsh judgments of his work style.

"What shall I tell the people tomorrow about your speech, Gennadiy Sergeyevich?" the head of the ideological section of the Levoberezhnyy party raykom [rayon committee], V. Artemov, asked from the podium. "Where is your party assessment of today's situation? Why do you not take into account our information about the growing wave of criticism of the obkom?"

"We have repeatedly asked Kabasin to speak before the people of Voronezh on television," said the secretary of the party committee of the Elektronika scientific production association, G. Grishchuk. "The people want firsthand information about the situation in the oblast and the country. They want to know the first secretary's attitude toward Article 6 of the Constitution and to hear from him political evaluations of the events that are taking place. It is in vain. If he is unwilling to do so little, where is the hope for any more? Seeing the conservative nature of the apparatus, people are drawing conclusions about the conservative nature of the entire party."

The dual nature of the position of party and soviet leaders running in uncontested districts was discussed in an open text at the plenum. But G. Kabasin himself sees nothing wrong with this situation. Since the law is not violated there can be no complaints. He even parried the reproach about his refusal to speak on television by referring to how extraordinarily busy he was and how little time he had.

Yes, the obkom first secretary is a busy man. He works long and hard. He does not spare himself. He has become appreciably grayer during his 3 years as an oblast leader. There have also been positive changes in agriculture. There have been no radical changes which promise a solution to the food problem in the near future. But there are always vegetables, dairy products, eggs, and chickens in the stores. In the cooperative trade bases you can generally find anything you want. It would be unfair not to take note of all this and to write off the efforts made by the obkom and the first secretary.

At the same time it is quite obvious that in agriculture there are no guarantees of stability; everything hinges on the pressure methods of the party committees. Only under strong pressure from the obkom do industrial enterprises of the city construct residential buildings, hay storage facilities, and cheese and sausage shops in rural areas. Orders for equipment for the meat and dairy industry are filled and nonrusting steel and equipment are allotted the same way. If the pressure were removed

today, tomorrow everything would come to a halt. The shakiness of the current extremely modest amount of well being is obvious. Agriculture needs new forms of leasing and farm economy and the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] should be given independence, of which they now have practically none. Party workers are perceiving perestroyka as a command to increase turnover and they are trying as hard as they can but movement continues in the same old rut.

Almost every one of the 18 people who spoke at the plenum criticized the obkom and G. Kabasin personally. At the same time the plenum did not support the resolution adopted at the rally for a vote of no confidence in the obkom first secretary and even refused to evaluate it. Participants in the plenum chose a constructive path. It was suggested that they be properly respectful to all informal organizations, invite them to roundtable meetings, and strive for mutual understanding and joint actions for the common good. Responding to the persistent petitions of the members of informal organizations, a decision was made to publish their election platform in the oblast newspaper KOMMUNA. But next to it was the platform of the city party organization. Let the people read, compare, and draw their own conclusions.

Skipping forward, I must say that soon both platforms were printed. And thus the tension between the members of informal organizations and party organs was removed. The documents turned out to be largely identical. Thus the subject for confrontation disappeared.

N. Samoylov, an electric engine operator, spoke at the plenum. Speaking about the position of the party apparatus in the current alignment of social forces and the decline of its authority, the speaker compared the situation to a departing train. Party workers are in no hurry to get seats on it. Then they suddenly remember, but even having gotten rid of their heavy baggage, they could be too late. To run along the track chasing the train is not very promising. Nobody has ever caught up with a train that has departed. Proof of this is the development of events in Tyumen, Volgograd, Ufa, and Chernigov.... Whether Voronezh is added to this list will depend on the party members themselves.

Supply Problems Force Halt to Projects in Komi

PM1403143990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Viktor Filippov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Unemployed Construction Workers"]

[Text] Syktyvkar—Construction of the airport in the capital of the Komi Autonomous Republic has been frozen. Hundreds of workers and engineers at the "Syktyvkarstroy" Trust have been left without anything to do.

"If the situation does not change, we will have to cut no less than 400 people this year," the trust chairman stated at the Construction and Construction Materials Industry

Workers Union Obkom [oblast committee] presidium. The presidium had met to discuss the situation, which has to be described as a paralysis affecting the republic's construction projects.

There is a shortfall of R30 million in material and technical supply for the annual volume of construction and installation work at the "Komistroy" Association. There are no bricks, cement, or fuel. The construction sites of another association—"Komigrazhdanstroy"—have fallen silent for the same reason. The workers are paid a flat rate during these enforced stoppages, and the rate is very low. Many have been laid off and are looking for work with cooperatives.

The policy of rationing resources has been proved to be bankrupt. The republic, which supplies timber to 15,000 customers, cannot obtain a cubic meter of lumber for its own construction projects from this year's stocks! Fixers from the taiga area are swarming all over the country looking for... timber.

The republic's government and the Komi Main Administration for Material and Technical Supply are trying to instill order with regard to stocks. But they will hardly be able to help the construction workers by using rationing methods. It is time to open another door—decentralizing supply structures and transferring the region's economy to the supervision of local soviets.

Interethnic Relations Surveyed in Chelyabinsk

PM1403152190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 3

[Own correspondent G. Shcherbina report: "Life Without Ethnic Strife"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—A sociological poll has been carried out at Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Zlatoust enterprises and in three rural rayons—Argayashskiy, Nagaybaskiy, and Kunashakskiy Rayons—with a view to clarifying the situation in the sphere of interethnic relations.

The questionnaire was also answered by activists of the ethnic Slavic, Tatar-Bashkir, Jewish, and German national cultural centers. The poll was carried out by the sociology department of the Chelyabinsk section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Urals Branch Institute of Economics.

An analysis of the material obtained has made it possible to draw the main conclusion. In Chelyabinsk Oblast, where representatives of more than 100 nationalities are living, there is no interethnic strife and the overwhelming majority of people live in peace and accord. Many of the people who were polled have friends among representatives of other nationalities and interethnic marriages are quite frequent.

At the same time, conflict situations do arise from time to time, but not all of them end in lasting hostility. They arise mainly in day-to-day situations, in waiting lines at

stores and on public transport. Reactions to dishonorable human behavior sometimes take on a national tinge and the circulation of anecdotes which wound national dignity causes pain.

However, the researchers have come to the conclusion that even such incidents can be successfully avoided by persistently and purposefully raising the general standard of the culture of the oblast's population which numbers more than 3.6 million people. With a view to this, it is necessary to further step up the work of national cultural centers, draw up special programs for education in preschool and teaching establishments, families, cultural and enlightenment institutions, and through the mass media. Respect for the customs, traditions, and culture of other peoples must be instilled from an early age. The basis of all these efforts must be provided by the real solution of vital social problems—the food, housing, and ecological problem and the problem of the provision of goods and services, rather than by proclaiming slogans.

'Sensitive Issues' Raised at Amur Obkom

90UN1018B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent in Blagoveshchensk N. Belyi: "How Can You Invite Them to a Plenum?"]

[Text] One got the impression that the plenum of the Amur Oblast Committee of the party, which discussed the results of the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, started twice.

The report by First Secretary L. Sharin set the tone for an even conversation without peaks. The speeches in the debate did not move the audience from its lethargic state either. Customary reports on one's own work were heard for the most part.

However, the ending of the plenum turned out to be unusual. Instead of making a traditional closing statement, the speaker had to respond to notes. Sensitive issues were raised. For example, why didn't the oblast committee discipline the leaders who had wrongfully received hundreds of imported video systems? L. Sharin explained that the issue of these video systems had been raised by the "Civic Initiative organization." This was its maneuver on the eve of an important political campaign, the elections. Supposedly, a list of video system owners will be published after the elections. He noted that rumors about the construction of a number of hydropower stations on the Amur, planned nuclear explosions, and excessive wage increases for the apparatus are unfounded...

Altay Kray First Secretary Resigns*90UN1018A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 1*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent in Barnaul S. Kuzmin: "Without Rallies and Processions"]

[Text] A personnel issue was resolved at perhaps the shortest plenum in the history of Altay Kray's CPSU committee. The plenum unanimously resolved to grant the request of F.V. Popov, first secretary of the kray committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee, and USSR people's deputy, to be relieved from his post.

V. Ovchinnikov, USSR people's deputy, worker at the Altay aggregates plant, was among those invited to the plenum:

"The resignation of the first secretary was voluntary in form but forced in substance. Had this not happened today, the rallies and meetings of informals already planned for the coming week would have been held to demand this resignation."

The first "warning" for F.V. Popov was sounded at the last kray party conference when 300 out of 800 delegates gave him a vote of no confidence. A year ago, an appeal by an action group to refrain from voting for him as a people's deputy was published in some rayon newspapers.

The events came to a head inexorably. The plenum resolved to postpone the election of the first secretary until the kray conference.

N. Nikolayev, second secretary of the Kray VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Committee, added: "Still, Filipp Vasilyevich had enough courage to admit that his resignation was not caused solely by his age and health condition. In his petition, he stated clearly: 'At present, it is difficult for me to switch to a new wavelength and come to correct political decisions in a situation so complex...'"

It is possible that the decision of the plenum will avert the mounting manifestations of the public. However, the authority of the party organization will still depend on how radical its subsequent steps are going to be.

Moscow Joint Ventures Association Formed*LD1503221190 Moscow TASS in English 1741 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—The Moscow Association of Joint Ventures was formed today. Its purpose is to help develop effective forms and tendencies of economic cooperation and investment activity and to help widen cooperation in production and joint enterprise.

Some 120 joint ventures, their subsidiaries and international organizations attended the founding congress, representing one-sixth of all joint ventures registered in the Moscow region so far.

Vladimir Tikhomirov, director-general of the Soviet-Bulgarian joint venture "New Information Technologies," was elected president of the new organization.

He noted that joint ventures bring new elements to Soviet economy, which is becoming more open. In addition, joint ventures help incorporate Soviet economy into the world economic system.

But joint ventures have to work in rather complex conditions, as many financial problems have not yet been solved and the legal ground for their activity is virtually non-existent, Tikhomirov said. The Moscow Association of Joint Ventures believes it is its purpose to eliminate these difficulties.

The temporary regulations of the association were endorsed at the constituent meeting and the association's leading bodies were elected on this basis.

Regional associations of joint ventures already function in the Ukraine, in Estonia and in Leningrad.

New Bashkirian Weekly Begins Publication*LD1603151890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 16 Mar 90*

[Summary] The first edition of a new weekly publication, VESTNIK SOVETA MINISTROV BASHKIRSKOY ASSR [Herald of the Bashkirian ASSR Council of Ministers], comes out today [16 March]. The publication is to carry information about the work of the local soviets and the government of Bashkiria.

Actions of Amur Obkom First Secretary Criticized*90UN1121A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 7 Mar 90 p 12*

[Article by Valeriy Sharov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent in the Far East: "Number One"]

[Text] It was the first year of perestroika and the residents of Amur Oblast welcomed a new first secretary of the party obkom [oblast party committee], being sincerely happy over good, genuine changes coming about with the appointment of a man from Moscow after almost a quarter of a century of despotism under the previous manager. Leonid Vasilyevich Sharin immediately appeared to be a leader of a new type: He went to the shops and markets himself, and dressed them down when this was called for. He traveled to the farms of the oblast and studied the problems of rural areas. He even lived in a hotel for a while, and they said he would sit down at the table with the employees just like that, slicing cucumbers and bread for supper himself. He defined his new role as follows: "...I believe that in my capacity as first secretary, I am not prone to being obsessed with personal power; I have no ambitions and I am capable of admitting my mistakes.... A person has always been judged by his deeds rather than by his ability to talk." This is exactly what he proclaimed on the pages

of the oblast newspaper. To a question from a journalist about "his innermost wish in this reference," he responded: "To live so that I will not have to blush later."

A supply official from a gold-prospecting team who knew him well said about Sharin: "There is no argument; he is a remarkable leader. He is decisive and strong-willed. He is capable of courageous actions...."

Now let us talk about his actions.

In less than a year, Blagoveshchensk, the oblast center, was shocked: The main section of the central Lenin Street running through the square in front of the party obkom was closed to traffic. The rumor spread that this was done on the orders of number one (supposedly, this is where the windows of his office are, and he had it closed so it would not interfere with his work). If the fact that many citizens had to spend almost twice as much time in transit had not been bad enough, a higher volume of traffic on a neighboring street greatly affected traffic safety. One motor pool of buses alone consumed an extra 42 tons of gasoline a year due to needless detours. The drivers wrote a collective letter to the TV program "Searchlight of Perestroyka." However, this letter signed by almost 500 people ended up...right in the local party organs rather than on the popular program.

In the city, they quoted the first secretary of the obkom as saying: "They will open it over my dead body" which greatly cooled the enthusiastic zeal of the proponents of the new authorities and strengthened the conviction of those who laid the act of street closing at Sharin's door. When the sensitive issue arose again at a meeting with the representatives of culture and creative-arts intelligentsia of the city, Leonid Vasilyevich honestly shared his reasoning with those assembled: "They closed Red Square and nothing happened.... I asked my personal driver: What if we close the street? The driver replied to this: It is all right, it's normal."

Two years of struggle by the public of Blagoveshchensk were needed, and the central press had to make a statement in order for the first secretary to move his office to the opposite side of the building. Only after that was Lenin Street opened to traffic again. However, can this single episode testify to the degeneration of a democrat? Besides, was there degeneration to begin with?

Few people knew that at a time when, according to rumors, the first secretary of the obkom was eating his suppers with common citizens without ceremony, the small and far from rich city was straining itself in search of funds for the worthy decoration of the apartment from which the previous number one left for Moscow and into which yet another number one was moving from the capital.

The doors, brick work in the bathroom, toilet bowl, window latches, transom bolts, and even electric outlets and switches were replaced. All told, the repairs consisted of 204 operations. Ranking functionaries were

repeatedly dispatched on long expeditions to various corners of the country to procure tiles and wallpaper. As a former employee of the obkom service department told me, the tiles were brought in from Primorskiy Kray, and the wallpaper samples from the Primorye area and Khabarovsk. However, they were not right. Then they had it delivered from the vicinity of Moscow and the Baltic area. The episode of a special bathtub for the first secretary became the high point of the repair spectacle. Initially, they found one of the needed size and depth at a balneological hospital at one of the mineral springs 600 kilometers away from the city, but it was not the right one. Then they found what they needed at the resorts of Khabarovsk Kray, and a special bus with the seats removed and with specially placed mattresses for the fragile ceramic cargo traveled more than 1,000 kilometers.

Here I am, writing this and hearing the rebukes hurled at me: "He is picking on such a person concerning all the trifles! He is undermining the authority of the party!"

I do understand that living in a slum does not become the first secretary of the obkom; however, the issue is no trifle after all. Repairing L. Sharin's apartment cost just under R13,000.... However, let us be more precise: The secretary's dwelling may be called an apartment only as a matter of convention. Actually it is a separate addition to a privileged house. There is a fence two meters tall and a wall of dense fir trees around it. However, even given all of this there would not be an issue had the money been invested by Leonid Vasilyevich himself or his predecessor (as, they say, the law calls for) or even by the party obkom which gets to administer this floor space. Instead, it was taken from the item of the city budget which provides funds for repairing old houses, replacing plumbing which has broken down, and so on. The inhabitants of the "wooden housing stock" which accounts for close to one-half of the city of Blagoveshchensk and the old women wandering from one office to another know quite well what is involved in securing a couple hundred rubles for repairing a leaking roof or replacing rotten floors.

This is what the action was in September 1988 at the freight yard of the Blagoveshchensk railway station; freight yard clerk L. Krylova became its unwitting participant and witness. Suddenly ranking supervisors appeared there—an assistant of the first secretary and an instructor of the transportation department of the party obkom. They needed to ship to Moscow urgently the Zhiguli car which L. Sharin had purchased for his son. Immediately all services went into action: The brand-new car was loaded onto a flatcar with the use of a tractor owned by the station, a metal garage was welded together around it, and, after the necessary paperwork was done, the car was shipped to the capital. Lyudmila Mikhaylovna watched with mixed feelings how the car of the first secretary was encased in metal instead of a wooden crate—in violation of an order by the minister, how machinery not available to simple mortals was used, and

how the bosses of the obkom Volga left the yard, naturally having failed to pay either for the welding or the use of the tractor. At this point, the old woman recalled how not so long ago "one handicapped person with his feet amputated languished here trying to ship his wheelchair and later, poor thing, crept home across the tracks in his carriage on wheels." She recalled this and, in her own words, "finally understood that this party is not for commoners...." Having understood this, she resolved to leave the CPSU.

This is not just a human drama, but, I would venture, a political one as well, and not only because the Leninskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] granted L. Krylova's request sight unseen, so to speak, automatically, without taking interest in the reasons for her decision, but also because a person who had belonged to the party for 30 years decided to abandon it.

Now that we have come, as they are fond of saying, "deep down to the person" and appreciated the drama of an individual against the background of grandiose changes underway in our country, it is time to move on to the social drama.

No matter how hidden and subsumed in discourses about "the bloc and unity" it is, the issue of power, the real strings of managing life in a kray or oblast converged, in essence, in the hands of one person, the first secretary. No issue of any degree of significance, be it cadre, economic, or social, was resolved without his participation. However, the name of number one certainly remained detached from the affairs involving him personally. This is the case with our episode as well: L. Sharin did not ship the Zhiguli to his son himself; he did not travel to get the tiles and wallpaper himself, and he did not drive the special bus bringing in the special bathtub. Even in the case of the closed street he had to admit his complicity only when the events ended up being described in the all-union press.

Incidentally, attempts at explaining such arbitrariness away by consulting the personal driver indicate that the first secretary sincerely believed his actions were correct; this is to say that we are dealing with a personal drama which needs to be appreciated. In this instance, the personal and the public are also directly connected. I cannot help thinking that our character has some kind of distorting glasses over his eyes (whether he put them on himself or those around him obliged) which show the world to him completely different from what it really is.

The first thing L. Sharin did upon his arrival in Amur Oblast was to resolve the glasnost issue (in a perestroika manner!). He gathered all the journalists and asked them directly: Please, write more courageously about the events in the oblast and in Blagoveshchensk and offer criticism without timidity and regardless of rank. The editor of the oblast youth newspaper AMURSKIY KOMSOMOLET, Olga Bogach, was the first to respond to this appeal. First, she criticized the rayon Komsomol

[All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] conference and subsequently, despite having been seriously reprimanded on account of this by the Komsomol and party leaders of the oblast, she rebuked the chairman of the city executive committee for not paying attention to the people. This is how it began... "In the editorial office of the youth newspaper, elements alien to us have dug in", "banditry on the pages of a newspaper," and so on was heard every now and then from the party obkom. A number of articles in defense of O. Bogach in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA followed. A commission of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee which examined the "youth newspaper situation" in the oblast recognized the publications of the journalist to be objective and justified, but the persecution did not stop.

"I do not understand what is happening. I would very much like you to understand me and believe me. After all, in this situation, when I am on the brink of committing suicide, it is so important for me to be understood...."—this is what O. Bogach wrote in desperation before this episode came to a head in January 1988 to a ranking functionary of the CPSU Central Committee whose lecture she had heard not so long ago at the Higher Komsomol School of the VLKSM Central Committee and whom she had told on this occasion about all the troubles of her fate as a journalist.

Due to some subjective reasons, the letter was not mailed, so it is unknown whether she would have been understood there or not. Here, in the oblast, they understood her in their own manner.

The first secretary promised the editor of the newspaper: "We will get rid of you like we did Yeltsin!" And his words soon came true. Fortunately, Olga did not go over the terrible "brink." However, being an experienced journalist and editor, she found herself a job as... an instructor at the oblast committee of DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Aid to the Army, Navy, and Air Force], and then only through an employment agency.

Olga Bogach must have really gotten under the skin of the powers that be if the oblast leadership considered it dangerous to give her, a former editor, even the lowliest job in the press. "Glasnost... For Official Use Only"—this was the headline under which an article by the TASS correspondent in Amur Oblast, A. Krivchenko, appeared in March 1988 in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Rising to the defense of his persecuted colleague, A. Krivchenko also relayed the shameful episode of the closure of Lenin Street and the letter of the drivers intercepted by the party apparatus.

"We are not going to get along"—stated L. Sharin to the correspondent of the main information agency of the USSR.

The journalist was not at a loss for words: "Are you really the one paying my salary?"

An invitation to the Amur Obkom of the CPSU for those who "pay the salary of the correspondent" followed soon. The first secretary issued the following ultimatum to a deputy general director of TASS: "The agency's current correspondent in Amur Oblast should be recalled from Blagoveshchensk and replaced with another person...." He hinted that otherwise the consequences could be unpredictable. TASS did not comply.

We should note that the situation of glasnost in the oblast became particularly grave during the USSR people's deputy election campaign last year. The atmosphere in which the nomination of the obkom first secretary proceeded was the main factor. Three central newspapers told the readers of the entire country about the glaring outrages which had surfaced in the course of attempts by the apparatus to leave one highly placed candidate only on the list of candidates at any price. L. Sharin was nominated in several remote taiga regions, and the newspapers reported how the party bureau of the Bureyskiy Raykom attempted to ban the holding of a plenum of the Komsomol raykom for nominating an alternative candidate and how meetings were banned in collectives which desired to nominate their trustworthy fellow local resident.

This is when one more journalist, STROITELNAYA GAZETA correspondent N. Belyy, caught it. Following a critical article on the topic in question, his name was stricken from the roster of a delegation traveling to neighboring China for business negotiations. It was struck off "by number one personally" several hours before his departure when he had a passport for foreign travel in his pocket, as an aide to the chairman of the Oblast executive committee told him.

It goes without saying that the candidate favored from above was the only one registered.

Indeed, "you are the master of your own destiny." Last spring, a serious struggle for the seats of deputies unfolded in the Far East, especially in the districts where the first secretaries of the oblast and kray committees ran. The Kamchatka secretary made it through the first round but lost in the runoff. His colleague in Magadan Oblast, apparently having calculated the outcome of the battle, withdrew as early as the district meeting for which he gained much respect among his fellow citizens and considerable political capital. In Sakhalin the first secretary engaged a journalist from a local newspaper in a clean fight and also lost. It was the same in Primorskiy Kray and Khabarovsk. Out of the entire Far East, only one first secretary, Leonid Sharin, became a USSR people's deputy. Much has already been said about the reasons for the mass defeat of party leaders. However, the unparalleled victory of L. Sharin (over 70 percent of the voters were "in favor!") merits some comment.

At present, we may say with certainty that had our character run in Blagoveshchensk his defeat would have been a foregone conclusion. During the pre-election campaign, a laconic leaflet appeared in the city: "Yes to

perestroika, no to Sharin!" However, as is known, the secretary ran in the taiga regions where there were servicemen among the voters and where information on the deeds of our character hardly arrives. However, on the eve of the elections the organ of the CPSU Amur Obkom presented the readers with an interview with L. Sharin which took up as many as three out of four pages. The interview was accompanied by a pictorial consisting of 10 pictures where the candidate was presented in his adolescence, youth, and mature age. The newspaper waxed lyrical: "Here is an amateur picture from the postwar years; a group of guys wearing the padded jackets of their fathers and old fur hats; the one in the middle is he, Leonid Sharin... a basketball player going for the basket of the opposition. This is also he, Leonid Sharin... a ladle spraying hot metal in a factory shop. He is among the workers...." One would really want to paint an icon.

Having found out what article I was working on, a journalist whom I know had difficulty believing: "What? About whom? You must be crazy! Do you know who you are up against? After all, number one has soared to these heights: member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, member of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the CPSU Bureau for Russia. Besides, in general...."

Well, perhaps, "in general...." However, I did not even want to reach that deep. It was not my intention to analyze the economic operations of the oblast in order to determine whether the secretary and deputy is equal to their scale and significance. All the more so, I did not plan, God forbid, to evaluate the effectiveness of party work "under the leadership and with the participation of...." I am talking about something different, completely different... about number one being such not only in terms of his official position. To be sure, even now you can "fulfill the plan at any price" or leave others penniless in the name of "taking care of the state." However, is number one allowed to neglect ethics and justice even in trifling matters? Can't he see how frail his prestige turns out to be as soon as he forgets these simple, eternal categories? Is it not because of such people that the authority of the entire party declines which particularly hurts the thousands and millions of communists who live in keeping with their conscience?

It is up to those who have entrusted the people's deputy with this prestigious title, his electorate, to judge his moral image. However, like all Soviet people, they have a right to know as much as possible about those in whose hands the fate of the country is at present, to know what they are capable of and what can be expected of them. No person, be he number one, two, or three, should feel that he is infallible by definition and is beyond the zone of scrutiny and criticism. This is a safeguard of truly people's power, a guarantee against the recurrence of stagnation or a dictatorship. Those who are in the limelight need to evaluate their every step and deed "so that they will not have to blush later," as Leonid Vasilyevich himself said. Those were fine words!

Socioeconomic Problems of Karelia Noted

90UN1157A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Anikiyev, lieutenant general of internal services and RSFSR first deputy minister of internal affairs; first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction: "Karelia Is Dreaming... Why Are the Problems of the Region Being Resolved So Slowly"]

[Text] Let us introduce the author of this article: Anatoliy Vasilyevich Anikiyev, lieutenant general of internal services and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] first deputy minister of internal affairs. He was born into the family of a plant carpenter in Belomorsk City in the Karelian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] in 1939. His father died in 1944.

He graduated from the aviation technological institute and is a candidate of economic sciences. After being directed into the organs of internal affairs he has now spent 13 years applying his experience and knowledge to the cause of maintaining law and order. He served in Afghanistan for almost four years. He is married and has a daughter and a grandson, Ivan, aged 18 months....

I make no secret of the fact that I am still deeply impressed by my trip to the motherland, to the villages and the countryside of Lokhukhskiy, Kemskiy, Belomorsk, Segezhskiy, and Pudozhskiy Rayons in Karelia. As a native of these places I knew that life there is not easy. But the reality turned out to be even more miserable. The residual approach to people's urgent needs has led to a situation in which the living standard for a considerable proportion of the republic's population is about 1.5 to 2 times lower than in other, relatively prosperous parts of the RSFSR.

The popular song says, "For a long time Karelia has been dreaming...." And it goes on, "...the sharp-pointed fir trees like eyelashes above the blue eyes of the lakes." But everything that the song describes may soon disappear forever.

The ill-considered felling of trees continues. In order to restore this barbarity it is necessary to reduce the losses, make processing more complete, make use of small and low-grade trees, and switch to Finnish technologies, which are virtually waste-free. Today about 20 percent of timber is wasted at the timber works, and another 30 percent at the sawmills. If we used everything the amount of timber felled could be reduced by a factor of 1.5 to 2. Meanwhile it is still possible to get a "cut tree" for next to nothing.

Our economic system is essentially built on constraints that are not economic. The lion's share of resources are taken from the producers. The sawmill in the settlement of Shalskiy in Pudozhskiy Rayon produces about R9 million of profit but is allowed to keep only about R840,000. So how can we talk about modernizing of production and solving very acute social and everyday tasks....

At meetings with my fellow countrymen, everywhere they asked this question: "Why is it that people work hard for decades at the timber works, in a mine, or at a port, and cannot even obtain a regular apartment?" How does it look to the emaciated women from the Segezha paper and pulp combine who for 15 or 20 years have been huddled with their children in communal housing and hostels? And the worst thing is that there are no real prospects for them....

Expansion of the combine using construction structures from the "Karelstroy" supplier is still only being planned. Modernization of the "Zhelezobeton" association is proceeding only with difficulty. Given the present rates at which worn out equipment is being replaced it will take 45 years. It is easy to imagine what we will look like in the year 2035 if we take into account the inevitable progress in the construction industry in the world during that time.

No conditions have been created for the development of housing construction on a cooperative basis. In 1988, of the 23 construction cooperatives not one built any housing. As far as individual construction is concerned, the volume of this kind of construction is 22 times lower than provided for in the "Zhilye-2000" program. And the fact that it is possible under these severe conditions to build fine, good-quality housing can be seen from the settlement of Pyaozerskiy which was built by the Finns. But today, only 30 to 40 percent of housing in Karelia is equipped with a water supply, sewage, or central heating; this is only half the average for Russia.

In contrast to neighboring Finland, Karelia cannot supply itself with food. For example, the average per capita production in Kostomuksha is two kilograms of potatoes and vegetables, three kilograms of meat, and 10 liters of milk annually. However, strengthening of the main producer of agricultural output—the sovkhozes [state farms]—is moving extremely slowly, and the development of private subsidiary enterprises is even worse. What is needed is real incentive for the individual sector, but to judge from everything, they are not even thinking about this. No matter whom one might meet, people say with bitterness and puzzlement: We are prepared to rear cattle and handle farms but they will give us no plots of land, they will not help us acquire materials and fodders, and they will not sell us young animals.

There are 62,000 rivers and lakes in the republic, and the White Sea with its considerable fish resources. But even with all this the food industry is producing a mere 1.5 standard cans of fish products per capita per month, but even these are not sold. As PRAVDA has written, the trade network receives seven grams of fish per person per day.

The "blue eyes" of many of Karelia's lakes are already encrusted with a film of chemical waste and they gaze unseeing into a smoke-filled sky. Over the past five years the emission of noxious substances into the atmosphere has increased 50 percent in Belomorsk and Kemskiy Rayons, has doubled in Lokhukhskiy Rayon, and has

grown by a factor of 3.6 in Pudozhskiy Rayon. In Serezha it amounts to 1,138 kilograms for every inhabitant, while in Kostomuksha it is more than two tons.

In summing up it is logical to ask this: For what and for whom do construction, industry, and agriculture exist? For what are people working? Who needs this kind of catastrophic gulf between man and the results of his labor?

The last two or three decades has "separated" us sharply in terms of professional interests, the departmental apparatus, duties, and powers. And now in almost any case it is possible to say quite indifferently: "That is not my business." And the diffident and incredibly patient worker does not even know which door to knock on in order to have something done about his disordered state, to find someone with whom to share his concerns. Is it the raykom? The executive committee? The militia? He knocks on the door and they explain to him that he should go elsewhere.... There they do the same thing....

Perestroika has helped us to recognize a great deal, but almost everything remains as it was. Why? Because the most dangerous and persistent consequences of the era that is now called the period of stagnation are, in my opinion, the habit of inaction, the fear of giving clear-cut political assessments of events that take place, the inability to count the consequences of decisions that are made, and the deadly tendency to half-measures, which ultimately produce nothing but only worsen the situation. We have always loved to demonstrate our activity, but mainly in words. We are very susceptible to any kind of reorganization, particularly when leaders are changed, but within the framework of some cosmetic repairs, a repainting of the facade, changing the sign. "Essentially nothing changes"—this is the unwritten rule that we follow willy-nilly or through conviction, but almost everywhere, almost everyone.

Strange as it may be, we also largely follow this rule even now, even though radical changes have been proclaimed in the economy and the political system. But proclamation is one thing; it will take time for concrete action.

At meetings with my fellow countrymen the thing that struck me most was the unassuming nature of the requests: There is no boiler house, no bath house, no medical center, a new school would be nice, there are no goods for our coupons, they have cut a bus route.... This inaction by the authorities can be explained only by incompetence or the failure of their representatives. I am convinced that the solutions to many specific questions are now fully within the capabilities of the local soviets. If, of course, they recognize their own growing responsibility, and if they have people who have not stopped caring about their own well being.

However, Karelia will not resolve its socioeconomic problems by itself. National measures are needed, appropriate laws, combinations of resources, coordination of the efforts of the labor collectives. Difficult as it may be we must return to consideration of the question of leveling in terms of privileges for the northern rayons of

Karelia and a number of other oblasts to bring them on a par with the Far North, and we must establish additional northern payments for persons living in those rayons, simultaneously with the start of their labor activity, and distribution in pensions and the use of differentials according to price levels.

Otherwise we have a paradox: Prices eat up the additional payments. It is obvious that Karelia, and not only Karelia, needs state subsidies. A difficult question, but it cannot be passed over in silence, the more so since, even given the need for it, such a step cannot be regarded as long term. Otherwise there can be no question of economic independence or self-financing.

It is as if the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" remains hanging in the air, as if no solid financial base underpins it. The provision in the draft law "On the General Principles of Local Self-Management and the Local Economies in the USSR" on full transfer of income tax from workers and employees to the local budgets is undoubtedly an important step in this direction. However, in this draft a large group of settlement and rural soviets that have almost no assets to exercise their power have remained "outside the picture," as it were. Neither all-union nor republic legislation should permit this kind of unjustified curtailment in the sphere of self-management precisely where they are interwoven with the everyday vital interests of the people.

RSFSR Trade Union Congress Opens 21 Mar

LD2103133790 Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT
21 Mar 90

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—The founding congress of Russia's trade unions opened at the Kremlin today. Its participants will discuss the creation of single and independent trade union center in this Soviet republic, population 150 million.

The founding of this center reflects the development of socio-political and economic processes in the USSR. The country is moving towards a new type of union treaty, real sovereignty and the republics' economic independence.

In these conditions, the protection of working people's interests takes on increased urgency. In the Russian Federation the situation is especially acute, because in contrast to other union republics, it did not have a trade union organisation of its own.

The congress brought together 1,500 delegates, representing 32 sectoral trade unions and 77 regional associations and councils operating on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet presidium Vitaly Vorotnikov and Prime Minister of the Republic Aleksandr Vlasov are attending the congress.

At the morning session Igor Klochkov, chairman of the congress' organizing committee and chairman of the central council of the USSR trade unions, will give a report "On the Goals and Principles of the Organizational Unification and Activity of Trade Unions in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]."

Vlasov is expected to deliver a speech "On the Socio-Economic Problems of the Russian Federation and the Republic's Transition to Self-Governing and Self-Financing."

Trade Union Official Discusses Mission, Tasks

LD2103134190 Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—To promote the revival of Russia as a truly independent republic, to ensure the protection of the interests of all working people living on its territory is the main task of independent Russian trade unions, said Igor Klochkov, deputy chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). He addressed the founding congress of Russian trade unions, which have 77 million members or 54 per cent of the total number of Soviet trade unionists, in the Kremlin today.

The new republican trade union should be based on federalism—a union of primary organisations, both professional and regional.

The federation must be independent of any political, state and economic bodies.

The federation of independent trade unions in the Russian federation, Klochkov said, does not mean national isolationism. This move opens new possibilities for the Russian Federation as regards active cooperation and close interaction with the trade unions of other republics on a nationwide and bilateral basis. Klochkov spoke out against any manifestations of regional isolationism, nationalism and chauvinism.

Speaking about the methods to be used by Russian trade unions, the speaker said that in addition to all other forms of struggle for the interests of working people, they will use the right to strike, in accordance with the labour dispute law.

However, it should be "a measure of last resort," Klochkov added.

The speaker described the use of strikes for political goals as "absolutely unacceptable for trade unions."

Klochkov's vision of the future nationwide organization is that of a confederation of sectoral and regional structures of union republics. He also called for the holding of the 19th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions this year.

Republic Supreme Soviet Election Progress Noted

LD2103173690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Elections to republican supreme soviets have been completed in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Belorussia, and the Ukraine.

The process of putting forward candidatures for the posts of deputies has begun in Armenia. The elections are scheduled to take place on 20 May. It is thought that there will be a fierce, competitive contest in a majority of constituencies.

In the neighboring republic of Georgia, the National Front has called for the election campaign to be halted, for the republic's Constitution to be changed, and for a new law on elections to be adopted; it is the National Front's view that only after this has been done should elections on a multiparty basis be held.

RSFSR Writers Union Plenum Ends With Appeal

LD2103175190 Moscow TASS in English 2240 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—A two-day plenary meeting of the Board of the Russian Federation Union of Writers ended here on Tuesday.

The writer has no right to stand aside now that the future of his motherland and his people are at stake—that was the keynote of the meeting.

Representatives of national literatures of the republic dwelt on heightened economic and moral problems in the Russian Federation.

The participants in the plenum passed the address "to the peoples of Russia." This is a call for the revival of Russia, its areas, regions and autonomous republics.

The plenum discussed the draft new statute of the All-Russian Union of Writers—this is how the writers' organisation is planned to be called. The men of letters want their organization to be independent and affiliated with a federal union of writers on an agreed upon basis.

Following the discussion in the press and writers' organizations, the draft statute will be submitted for the 7th Congress of Writers of the Russian Federation, planned to be held next December.

The participants in the plenum sent a message to President Mikhail Gorbachev, stressing that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn should be reinstated in Soviet citizenship without delay.

RSFSR Secession Called Russia's Salvation

90UN1129B Riga ATMODA in Russian No 7,
12 Feb 90 p 8

[Commentary by Boris Rodoman, candidate of geographic sciences, Moscow, 27 January 1990: "Will the RSFSR Secede From the USSR?"]

[Text] One of my friends, indignant one minute at the ingratitude, the next at the impatience of the "Balts" who are mixing up all the cards of perestroyka, cried: "Then the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] should secede from the USSR!" Of course my colleague was joking. By taking the point to the extreme he wanted to show how inappropriate it was, in his opinion, to raise the question of some republic seceding from the USSR and how ridiculous it was to suppose that the RSFSR could also exercise its constitutional right to leave the Inviolable Union. But I thought, "And why not?"

If the USSR is a union only on paper and is in fact a unitary state, if it is that same united and indivisible Russia which acts as guardian to 150 "national minorities" who have "voluntarily reunited" with it, then this Russia, if it is in its right mind, could not secede from itself. But if we have a genuine union and the RSFSR is just such a sovereign republic as the other 14, then I repeat, why not?

The fact that the RSFSR is three times as large in area and twice as large in population as all the rest of the republics put together cemented our superpower together in the era of totalitarian dictatorship and lack of glasnost. But today, as people begin to reconsider, it is a bomb at the foundation of the Soviet federation. The more the national self-consciousness of the peoples grows, the more keenly the disparity between the formal equality of the republics and their territorial inequality is felt.

The special position of the RSFSR can be evaluated two ways. On one hand, as Russian hegemony: The highest echelon of power consists of representatives who are for the most part of Russian background and of residents of the RSFSR, particularly Muscovites; the rest of the republics appear restricted and even forgotten. On the other hand, the political decline of Russia is apparent: In the other republics the government may be closer to the land and the people and may know them better and depend on them more, which is necessary for democracy. Russia, meanwhile, maintains a terrible contrast which destroys culture, a spiritual alienation between the capitol and the provinces, the colonial character of the Asian portion and the Far East. Who gains from such a territorial structure? I believe that very few do, although these latter are extremely influential people: the top of the Union apparatus, the generals, and a few "organs."

The territorial hegemony of the RSFSR and the combination in Moscow of two levels of capitols makes the USSR for all practical purposes a unitary state with

weakly autonomized outlying districts. The principle of sovereignty and equality for the republics demands that the RSFSR have the same type of administrative organs that the rest of the union republics have. From a formal point of view this would be correct, but with the existing territorial disproportion there would occur a duplication of the ruling apparatus of the USSR, one more feeding trough for the bureaucrats and a double yoke for long-suffering Russia.

The RSFSR calls itself a federated republic as the result of a historical misunderstanding: The presence in the union republic of a great number of isolated autonomous republics and oblasts alongside a great mass of non-autonomous territories does not turn a republic into a federation. But there is a possibility of making the Soviet federation two-tiered and the RSFSR a genuinely federated republic. Let us suppose that Tataria, Bashkiria, Yakutia, and many other autonomies, as well as Karelia (again), become union republics. Then the territory remaining to the RSFSR can be divided into 10-20 major economic and administrative regions or krais at a level of independence similar to that of American states—using the economic division into districts that was worked out long ago by Soviet geographers.

The Ukraine could also be a federated republic in view of its substantial size and its historical and geographical heterogeneity. The historical provinces of the Ukraine—Volyn, Podolia, Eastern Galicia, Transcarpathia, and others—could become krais or lands, but not on a Siberian or East European scale as with the FRG and Austria. In this instance a federation is necessary for regulating not interethnic but interregional relations inside a territory settled by a single predominating indigenous ethnic group as an antidote for excessive bureaucratic centralism. As for the whole territory of today's Soviet Union, I am skeptical about the possibility of preserving it without force even in the form of a renewed federation.

Aside from the USSR, there is one other multiethnic federation of the Soviet type in the world—Yugoslavia (SFRY). In both the USSR and the SFRY there are autonomous oblasts or krais in the union republics; the capital of one of the republics is the capital of the federation; and one of the republics in fact holds a privileged position. And what is the result? Political crisis. It means that the political and administrative division that took shape in the era of Stalinism does not promote friendship of the peoples. But in the USSR, the inequality of the national territories is far greater than in the SFRY.

Now matter how much the sovereignty of the union republics were to increase within the framework of the USSR, the geographic superiority of Russia would nonetheless remain and would press and burst open the superpower from within. A renewed federation with Russia at its head, with the capitol in Moscow or Leningrad, could only be a twice-modernized, twice-repainted, twice-renamed Russian empire preserving the

subordinate position of non-Russian ethnic groups and territories, and many people will not agree to that.

It is not the evil intent or the stupidity of the tsars or the Bolsheviks but rather implacable geography itself that will not permit Russia to be a common member of a federation (or a union state). A bear cannot live in one little room with small animals without crushing them. One elephant and several ponies cannot pull a carriage yoked to the same harness.

The idea of renewing the federation has two facets. For moderate political movements in non-Russian republics it is the hope of increasing their de facto independence without special shocks and conflicts with Moscow. For the ruling conservative apparat in Moscow, it is the hope of preserving its power. Under these conditions the notion of a renewal of the federation can be easily distorted and emasculated as has happened with many reformist laws. The renewal of the federation may turn out to be a last straw at which the drowning advocates of preserving a colonial empire are clutching. Confederation seems to be a wise resolution of interethnic territorial problems—not a single union state, but a great number of sovereign states which are members of the United Nations and are tied by treaty relations.

A Confederation of East Europe and Northern Asia (CEENA) instead of the USSR? Maybe. But not necessarily within the former borders. A "united national economic complex"—although it is really a common economic quagmire—allegedly prompts us (or forces us) to coexist in a single Union. We should climb out of it in friendly fashion, all together, but various levels of development, the varied psychologies of the peoples, and the accumulated animosities all get in the way. In that case we need to get ourselves out of it separately or in small groups at different sides of the swamp so that we can stand on our feet that much sooner and pull out the others or provide an example for them so that those who are drowning do not pull their rescuers under. Centrifugal forces are now operating in respect to spiritual and cultural matters. As the events of recent years have shown, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have wanted to join a united Europe, northern Azerbaijan wants to unite with southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan can avail itself of linguistic, regional, and cultural proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The time has come to acknowledge reality. The Soviet Government in Moscow is a Russian government, and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo is a Russian bureau. The Soviet Army is a Russian army; conscripts from republics enveloped by national liberation movements only hamper it. It would be good to officially turn the government of the USSR into a government of Russia and simply renounce the administration of the other republics from Moscow.

No one is about to associate, let us say, Finland with Iran. In Moscow they also should not artificially connect Estonia with Turkmenistan and publish laws that are

empty and weak and split the differences of the two nations. The republics themselves will find their place in the world community. Instead of writing out prescriptions for countries and peoples, would it not be better to take care of one's own health—physical, spiritual, moral, and ecological? "Physician, heal thyself!" We must rid ourselves of an imperial paranoia, combining megalomania with persecution mania.

I cannot agree that there is a danger that a chain reaction from the break-up of the USSR will somehow threaten the Russian people and Russia as a state. The reverse is more likely. Having freed itself from its collapsed colonial shell, the Orthodox Russian Slavic nucleus of our state will become more durable. Of course there will be a still greater polarization of society with respect to the question of nationalities, and chauvinist attitudes will grow stronger, but the democratic forces who also speak for a united Russia, cleansed of colonies, vassals, and satellites will also come into their own. The people in Russia are rousing themselves and wondering, "What will happen to us?" (the title of a journalistic collection issued by the publishing house "Sovremennik" in 1989; a second edition is being prepared for printing). In the final analysis the shock will revolutionize Russia and come to its aid. Having freed itself from the excessive burden of administering huge and unfamiliar territories, Moscow will be able to occupy itself in earnest with its environs and, first and foremost, pull the Non-Black-Earth Russian village from the muck and save it from final extinction.

So what will happen if the RSFSR suddenly secedes from the USSR? Probably on the very next day many of the other republics will declare that they wish to preserve the Union. I believe that as a minimum the Ukraine and Belorussia will do this, perhaps a few others too, as well as yesterday's autonomous republics that have become union republics. Then we might haggle with them and set our conditions, but this will not be a dictate from the Center as before, but rather the draft of a union treaty. In this manner we can more quickly arrive at the renewal of a multinational federation that is desired by moderate reformists, if it is needed in general. The sudden secession of Russia from the Soviet Union would be shock therapy for it.

It is possible to argue about the future of the USSR, but the existence of Russia is not threatened by anyone or anything. Even after any changes in the territorial and political structure, it will remain a great country, extending over 10 time zones, and it will still take a whole week for the express train "Russia" to run from Moscow to Vladivostok. Is not that enough for you, comrade advocates of a superpower?

Recently M.S. Gorbachev is reproached more and more often for falling behind the very perestroika that he proclaimed. Today there is a chance to catch up to it a bit. I would advise M.S. Gorbachev to support constructive forces, form a new party, and propose his candidacy for the position of president of Russia. I believe that in

the event of success, history would forgive M.S. Gorbachev his previous mistakes in national policy, crown him with the title of Liberator of the Peoples and Savior of Russia, and put him on the same plane with Kuzma Minin and Dmitriy Pozharskiy, because the liberation of the Homeland from the role of interethnic policeman is every bit as important as its deliverance from a foreign yoke. In the opposite event, it seems to me, sooner or later some other leader will step forward like Kemal Ataturk, who became leader of the Republic of Turkey after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, to carry out such an inescapable, historic mission.

In one year the horses of history went from a trot to a gallop. That which yesterday seemed an insane idea, subversive sedition, an anecdotal paradox, today seems a wise solution. Can Russia secede from the USSR? It not only can, but it must. In this lies the salvation of Russia!

Status of Leningrad Green 'Party' Questioned

PM2203124490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 p 1

[Our correspondent I. Potekhina report: "First Step"]

[Text] Three days ago they solemnly declared: "We are the first alternative party in Leningrad, or rather in Russia, the first party to have been registered officially."

I do not have any information for the whole republic. But it is quite true that in our city the "Green Party" launched the multiparty era. Its founding congress was held in February. And in mid-March Moskovskiy Rayon soviet executive committee had approved—after excising certain lines that it thought were excessively bold—the program and statutes of the new voluntary social organization.

As yet it numbers only 11 people. On last year's predictions, they can count on the support of 6,000 Leningraders.

Perhaps because we had been waiting too long for this moment, instead of pleased excitement, the fact of formal recognition of the new party is prompting a great many questions.

But is it actually a party? You will not find a definition of the term "party" in any legal document. That being so, everyone can interpret it in his own way. And a fine-sounding title can conceal either a real political organization or an association of cactus enthusiasts.

And were the "Greens" perhaps in too much of a hurry officially to declare that they were first? The Congress of USSR People's Deputies, although it made amendments to the Constitution, has not yet adopted a law on the registration of parties. Such an act can only be based today on the 1932 resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of People's Commissars on social organizations. If—contrary to expectations—a law on the registration of parties is adopted, the

"Greens" will probably have to register again. And so, incidentally, will our youth league.

I do not want to cast aspersions in any way on the newly formed organization. The "Greens" have already done much in Leningrad that would entitle them to claim the status of a party. Most importantly, they have reached a level of maturity such that they have realized that ecological problems cannot be resolved solely by tackling ecological problems. This path enables you to achieve local successes on specific projects, but does not change the situation as a whole. Therefore the orientation of the "Green Party" not toward ecology, but toward ecocialism gives us grounds to take it quite seriously.

N. Osetian Party Chief Elected Soviet Chairman

PM2203125190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Election of Chairman"]

[Text] Ordzhonikidze, 21 Mar—At the first session of the North Osetian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet held today, A.Kh. Galazov, first secretary of the North Osetian CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, was elected chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet.

The session appointed S.V. Khetagurov chairman of the republic Council of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet instructed the Supreme Soviet presidium and the Council of Ministers to continue carrying out their duties until the memberships of these organs are replaced.

The deputies adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the situation in Lithuania. It expresses the hope that the working people of Lithuania will display a reasonable and well-considered attitude in the decisions they adopt, direct their efforts toward the consolidation of all the republic's healthy forces, and strengthen the federation of the Soviet Union on the new principles, whereby the sovereignty of every union and autonomous republic will be strictly observed.

RSFSR Runoff Election Results Reported

PM2203132790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by A. Gayazov: "Elections in Russia"]

[Text] The corps of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies has been formed almost in full. According to the results of the runoff which ended 18 March, Russia has now named a further 909 people's representatives.

As is well known, somewhat earlier, after the 4 March elections, 120 deputies were registered. Thus, over the 1,068 seats in the Russian parliament over 1,000 will acquire owners.

V. Kazakov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for the election of RSFSR people's deputies, reported that of the 913 electoral okrugs where the runoff was held in four the elections were deemed invalid because less than half the voters took part in them.

Moscow's Communists View Upcoming Elections

PM2203151790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Preparing for Party Congress"]

[Text] Questions of convening the next Moscow City CPSU organization conference and the procedure and dates for holding the report-and-election campaign in the capital's party organizations were considered at a Moscow City CPSU Committee [gorkom] Plenum 21 March.

Opening it, Yu.A. Prokofyev, gorkom first secretary, stressed that in conditions of the radical reconstruction of the political system of Soviet society not only the CPSU's vanguard role but also its very future depend on the success of perestroika and the party's renewal.

The plenum participants decided to convene the 28th City Party Conference 1-2 June and hold it, like the rayon conferences, in two stages. Its delegates will be elected by direct, secret, and contested elections in party okrugs formed within rayon party organizations. Servicemen-communists at the Moscow Garrison are to elect delegates at a garrison party conference. The election of delegates is scheduled to be completed by and large by 10 May, in order to enable them to take an active part in the preparations for the city conference of the CPSU.

The Moscow Gorkom plenum confirmed its standpoint on granting primary party organizations and CPSU raykoms [rayon party committees] the right to set the dates for report-and-election meetings and conferences in the light of local conditions. The adopted resolution stresses the need to collectively elaborate proposals on fundamental questions of party organizations' activity, the democratization of intraparty life, and the assertion of the power of the party masses. Special attention was drawn to the need to involve in party work communists who are devoted to the cause of perestroika, who enjoy the support of party organizations, who are versed in party political work methods, and who are capable of implementing in practice the course of the party's democratization. Full use for this must be made of the provisions of the draft new CPSU Statutes.

After ratifying the powers of the city electoral commission for elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the city party conference, the plenum participants elected a representative of the capital's communists for the committee preparing a Russian party conference.

Support was given to the appeal from a group of secretaries of the city's party committees to Russia's communists, urging them to step up their involvement in the preparation of a Russian party conference.

The plenum supported the steps taken by the country's leadership to resolve questions associated with the situation in Lithuania by constitutional means and expressed solidarity with the Lithuanian communists who uphold CPSU positions.

L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the plenum's work.

Leningrad Referendum on RSFSR Party

90UN1155A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "First Referendum"]

[Text] So, referendums are becoming a fact of life in Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast. The first of them will be held in the oblast party organization. It will deal with problems of preparing for the Leningrad party organization conference and of founding the Russian Communist Party. This was decided at the combined session of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom and Gorkom [oblast and city party committee] bureaus after the suggestion made by the members of the obkom task force for the preparation of the oblast conference.

The referendum will be held from 12 through 19 February of this year and all CPSU members and candidates for members registered in the Leningrad city and oblast party organizations will take part in it. Each of them will receive a ballot with four questions in it:

1. Would you agree to create a single party committee instead of the CPSU Obkom and the Leningrad Gorkom?
2. Do you support the suggestion to directly elect the delegates to the Leningrad CPSU organization conference by party districts and with multiple candidates?
3. Do you think it necessary to elect the members of the new CPSU obkom and of the auditing commission at the conferences of the city and rayon party organizations, with multiple candidates nominated by the primary organizations without any limitations, unlike the previous practice of electing them at the oblast conference?
4. Do you think it reasonable to create a republic party organization in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]?

The voting at the referendum will be direct and done by secret ballot in the immediate primary organizations. To give his opinion, the CPSU member or candidate member would just need to cross out a "yes" or "no" box at the end of each question.

The results of the voting will be counted by the party committees, bureaus, or secretaries of the CPSU primary

organizations, gorkom and raykom [rayon party committee] bureaus. For the whole of the Leningrad party organization it will be done by the CPSU obkom secretariat.

So the referendum has started. What will be the results of it?

Leningrad Meeting Opposes Nationalism

90UN1155B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by E. Bogoslovskaya and S. Chesnokov: "A Call For Self-Control"]

[Text] "We will not allow our people to be divided into the clean and the unclean, into true Russians and untrue Russians. Your nationality cannot be defined by your blood, or genes, or by the entry in your passport; but it is expressed through your self-consciousness, your feeling of being one with your people. Whoever our ancestors were—Slavs, or Finns, Muslim or Jew, Christian or Buddhist—today all of us are Russians, the people of Russia, united by the language, by the culture, by mutual joys, and by mutual troubles."

These were the words of P. Filippov, candidate for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy from district No. 116. With these words he opened yesterday's meeting in the square by the Sports and Entertainment Complex. The orientation of the meeting was expressed in its motto: "Against ethnic feuds, for humaneness and democracy."

The idea of the meeting has been around for quite some time. And now this very idea gathered thousands of Leningraders in this square, on this day of penetrating cold and wind. Even children were there, their frozen little hands clasping home-made slogans: "No to Nationalism!", "No to Fascism!", "Nazis—Get Out of Leningrad!". That was the way the students of school No. 332 demonstrated their attitude to the "nationalistic problems."

One could not but welcome the unity felt at the meeting. But one could also remember the voices cautioning against the meeting. Their intentions seemed good enough: Ethnic relations seem to be sleeping dogs which are better off when left alone. But here are the words of N. Arzhannikov, a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy from district No. 131:

"Trouble comes if it is not opposed. Yes, there is a small group of people in Leningrad who are convinced racists—they can literally be counted on the fingers of one hand. However, everybody is so frantic about it. Why? The problem is that these people do not get appropriately rebuffed at the official level. Their speeches are treated as examples of pluralism. But we should pronounce a decisive "No!" Otherwise, a real "Fergana" of our own can start. We cannot allow this. Even though there were rather few reasons to start criminal proceedings against the Leningrad "nationalists," that should be sufficient

for an official warning from the authorities. But even this step has not been taken yet."

Many of those who spoke at the meeting emphasized the need to eliminate even the smallest possibility that Leningrad, with representatives of over a hundred nationalities living in it, might become another link in the chain of tragedies.

"This chain of conflicts," said actress E. Drapeko, a candidate for Leningrad city council deputy from district No. 8, "started in December of 1986 in Kazakhstan. After that there came Sumgait, Fergana, Tbilisi, Baku, Dushanbe. The tension in faraway areas of the country is growing. We, in Leningrad, thought that the flames of ethnic feuds would not burn us, that anything of that kind was plainly impossible in our great, our humane city. Certain persons are stirring up emotions, but I think that every representative of the nationality whose extremists are running out of control should consider himself responsible for everything that is happening. Nobody can stand aside now because all of us have to answer for his own and for our mutual destiny."

"Each of us sings his own songs to his children. I sing Russian songs to my daughter, somebody sings Jewish ones, somebody else—Armenian. But the people live in communal apartments, they ride in the same overcrowded busses, they stand together in the same lines. We have the same problems. Our city is dying, we need billions of rubles to save it. We should be thinking about where to find the money. We can improve our and our children's lives only by holding hands together. I am asking you to think about it before the coming elections. Let the losers in the elections be those who support nationalistic tendencies."

Yu. Nesterov, a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy from district No. 109, spoke about the "Russian encounters" that are supposed to be held in our city. In his speech he reminded his listeners about the well-known play by Figueiredo, "The Fox and the Grapes," in which Aesop gives advice to Xanthes. The latter had bet that he could drink a sea. Aesop told him to first separate the sea water from the water of the rivers and streams flowing into it. The same advice can be given to those who fight for the genetically clear Russian culture: Try to separate the ocean of the great Russian culture from the culture of its rivers and streams—the blackamoor Pushkin, the Jew Levitan, the cultures of all other nationalities. It is impossible to do. Therefore, let us have festivals of our native, Russian, international, world culture.

Yu. Nesterov warned about one more, very important thing.

"I hear calls—'Obkom [oblast party committee] into retirement!' Some people speak against the monopoly of any one party and at the same time want the obkom to retire as if they hope that replacing a 'bad' obkom with a 'good' one can solve it all. This is not logical."

"I want to draw the people's attention to the fact that if we choose correctly then, on 4 March, the best people will gain seats in the Leningrad city council. But if we start solving the problem now, before the elections, by means of meetings, demonstrations, broken windows, and disorders the outcome may be unpredictable."

The meeting adopted a resolution which ends as follows:

"At all times reaction has been fighting democracy as it stirs up the dark flames of ethnic feuding. We will not choose this road. It is the road to an abyss.

"The democratic forces of Leningrad suggest a different way. It is a radical renewal of the soviets, an accurate and efficient work of the new people's deputies aimed to revive our beloved city, our republic, and our country. Leningraders will not be intimidated. Not a single seat for the compromised officials! Not a single seat for the adherents of the "national-patriotic" ideas! All together—we will win!"

Leningrad Party Publishes Budget Figures

90UN1155C Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 1

[Information of the Leningrad Obkom business administration: "The Time For Glasnost"]

[Text] The Leningrad Oblast party organization has 594,000 members and candidates for members registered. It covers all of its expenses entirely from membership dues.

All in all the oblast party organization has 6,200 employees. That number includes the party officials, teachers of higher party schools, clerical staff, operating staff, drivers, and janitors. Out of this number 3,155 are senior officials: 177 of them work in the CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee], 100 in the Leningrad CPSU Gorkom [city party committee], 1,120 in the gorkoms and raykoms [rayon party committees], 1,758 in primary party organizations.

In 1989 they received R51.5 million in membership dues and spent R33.6 million. The expenditures include spending R14.0 million for the upkeep of party organs, out of which R5.4 million were paid in salaries to the primary organization employees; 5.7 million were paid to the staffs of the CPSU raykoms, gorkoms, and the obkom; the gorkoms and raykoms paid R320,000 in financial aid to retired communists. They spent R1.4 million on party propaganda, R4.3 million were spent for supplies and the introduction of computers. The operation of the higher party school and oblast courses cost R3.4 million; R0.6 million were paid to maintain the history of the Party Institute, the party archives, and the V.I. Lenin and S.M. Kirov museums. Construction and repairs in the buildings of party organs and organizations cost 8.5 million; 1.4 million were used for the everyday needs of the primary organizations.

The sum of R1.2 million was reserved for 1990 expenses. That sum includes 0.7 million of savings in salary funds and R0.5 million assigned to purchase clerical supplies and computers.

In 1989 the sum of R16.7 million in membership dues was allocated to the CPSU budget.

After the financial report is approved the salary funds savings will be handed over to the gorkoms and raykoms for the needs of primary organizations. That will include extra pay to the part-time secretaries of the primary and plant shop party organizations.

The share from the profits of the CPSU Obkom publishing house reached R31.9 million in 1989. Out of that money 6.8 million were spent to construct a new newspaper building and R25.1 million were reassigned to the CPSU budget.

For the 28th Party Congress the Leningrad CPSU Obkom has prepared a whole range of constructive suggestions on how to spend party money in a more rational way. Among other things they suggest a transfer to the standard rate-based method of budget design; a reorganization of the party staff structure; an increase of the budget share for primary party organizations; elimination of the mandatory payment of membership dues by the retired; further development of financial autonomy in the non-executive subservices of the party; provisions for the necessary glasnost for the design and expenditures of the party budget.

RSFSR Finance Ministry Issues Bonds

90A0241A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 6

[Unattributed report: "In the RSFSR Ministry of Finance"]

[text] With the permission of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers, the RSFSR Ministry of Finance is issuing an RSFSR state domestic five percent bond for 1990 for investments on a voluntary basis by state, cooperative, and other public enterprises and organizations and credit institutions. The bond can be purchased using cash assets remaining at the disposal of enterprises and organizations. Income from it will be included in the total amount of profit (income) for enterprises and organizations owning the bonds. When the bonds are circulated their owners will be paid the face value of what they have acquired.

Other conditions pertaining to the issue of the RSFSR state five percent domestic bond are published below.

Conditions of the Issue of the 1990 RSFSR State Five Percent Bond

1. The 1990 RSFSR state five percent domestic bond is issued for 16 years, from 1 January 1990 to 1 January 2006 in denominations of R100,000, R25,000, R10,000, and R5,000.

The bond is issued in individual sets of R500 million in each group. Each group consists of 1,000 bonds worth R100,000, 8,000 worth R25,000, 10,000 worth R10,000, and 20,000 worth R5,000.

2. Income from bonds is paid by the banking institutions by written order on bond coupons once annually at the rate of five percent of the face value of the bond. Payment cannot be made for coupons without bonds. Periods for payments are from 1 January of each year, starting with 1 January 1991.

3. Amounts due on bonds are paid by banking institutions from 1 January 1996 for 10 years in equal amounts annually.

4. Bonds redeemed by banking institutions during the period 1996-2005 will be determined by annual lists for repayment produced in December of each year starting in 1995. Bonds not included in the lists for repayment will be repaid from 1 January 2006.

5. When bonds are redeemed the banking institutions will pay owners the face value of the bonds.

6. Bonds that have attained their redemption values will be redeemed at face value plus the coupons for the year in which the bond is to be redeemed. No payment will be made for coupons for final years.

7. Bonds and their coupons due for repayment may be presented before the year 2007; at the end of that time bonds and coupons not presented for payment will lose their validity and no payment will be made.

8. Bonds may be sold by banking institutions. When bonds are sold they will be registered.

9. When bonds are sold a bank charge is imposed at different rates depending on the period in which they are acquired and which is determined for the year by the RSFSR Ministry of Finance in agreement with the USSR Gosbank RSFSR Bank.

10. Owners of bonds may offer them through banking institutions to other state, cooperative, or other public enterprises and organizations, and also to loan institutions.

Election Fraud in Moscow Oblast Alleged

90UN1220A Moscow TRUD in Russian
14 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by V. Knyazev, special correspondent to TRUD from Chekhov, Moscow Oblast: "More Harm Than Good"]

[Text] More than a week has passed since the first round of March elections and the passions it stirred up are not dying down on the sovkhoz [state farm] imeni Chekhov. No way! To the voters' surprise, the voting was declared invalid. What happened there is being embellished by rumors and conjectures and among the local population it is causing suspicion of the official communication of the city election commission. So what happened?

"It all started with the record that came to us from the election precinct located in the village of Veskino," says the deputy chairman of the city election commission, T. Ivanova. "Even with the naked eye one could see the numerous erasures on it. This, naturally, made us suspicious. We called in the chairman of the precinct commission, G. Smirnova. We opened the packet of ballots in her presence. Thirteen of them were also erased. And all of them were in favor of the second secretary of the party gorkom [city committee], N. Andronyuk. It was clear that an eraser had been assiduously applied to the "against" written in pencil next to his name and the name of his opponent had been crossed out in ink.

Let us note that this made the difference for Andronyuk. All members of the commission signed the document concerning the violation of the law on elections and declared the ballots invalid. A. Kazerzin, secretary of the party committee of the sovkhoz imeni Chekhov, categorically objected to this. He asserted that there had been no falsification and all this was just the fault-finding of the city election commission.

Now the Chekhov city procuracy is handling this incident. One would like to believe that it will not only answer the question of whether the record and the ballots were actually falsified, but also, in the event that it confirms the conclusions of the election commission, that it will try to establish who did this and who stood to gain from it.

It would seem that this would be the end of it. But even today, without waiting for the conclusion from the procuracy, several questions are arising. Why, for example, was it not the document of the city election commission that served as the justification for the intervention of law enforcement agencies in the results of the voting but the written statement of one of the candidate deputies? And for some reason which I have not been able to learn the document is being kept in one of the offices of the Chekhov gorispolkom [city executive committee]. But what if, say, the candidate deputy had been less persistent and did not want to make a fuss about this incident? Does this mean the procurator would not have had an occasion to establish the truth? Is there not hidden here an attempt to cover up an ugly fact and to divert the responsibility from possible guilty parties?

There is also another question: Did the Chekhov incident not shed light on at least one of the weak points of the new law on elections? For according to it, those who claim a deputy mandate no longer have the right to run in the same electoral district. And what is the justification? For in all probability they themselves were not to blame for what happened, but their rights are automatically encroached upon. The rights of the voters are also encroached upon—these are the people they want as candidate deputies but the law does not allow them to be nominated again. Why?

And, finally, the last thing. The practice of the new kinds of elections, alas, has shown that if one wishes to,

through falsification of the results of the voting, it is possible to compromise a candidate one does not like. And I think that herein lies another weakness of the law. It should not provide even the slightest loophole for various kinds of manipulations.

Cooperation With 'Informals' Discussed

90UN1220B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by S. Yerisova: "How Can the Soviets Find a Common Language With the Informals"]

[Text] Nobody is likely to have any doubts anymore that official organs of authority alone, at any level of social management, are inadequate for the normal life of the society. And the citizens are actively joining together into various social structures in order to solve particular and common problems. Relations between activists and official organs vary—from constructive cooperation to irreconcilable antagonism.

The voters are undoubtedly interested in having the "informals" and "formals" work together, as it were, on the same team.

It was in order to clarify the views of the future people's deputies that we invited them to the meeting "Soviets and Informal Organizations."

V. ZHARIKHIN, RSFSR candidate for people's deputy:

My attitude toward the informals is complicated. Judge for yourselves.... On the one hand I am a released party worker—the deputy secretary of the party committee of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials and a member of the control and inspection commission of the raykom [rayon committee]. As you can see, I am a formal through and through. At the same time I am one of the organizers and a member of the "People's Initiative" voters' club in Voroshilovskiy Rayon. At one of the meetings the residents of the Strogino microrayon nominated me to be a candidate people's deputy as an informal. We are now incorrectly divided into formals and informals. It is difficult to draw a clear line where one ends and the other begins.

N. TOMASHEVICH, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

The main thing in my program is advancement toward democracy. And the informal associations are the first signs of this. Voters' clubs are one of the forms of democracy. I am a member of such a club in my microrayon. It includes two initiative groups which are involved in creating a self-management committee. The basic thesis of my program is taking public opinion into account. Public opinion will be ascertained and taken into account and not a single decision will be made by the authorities will be empty or contrived.

V. DENISOV, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

Informal initiatives and the corresponding associations are the leading condition for democratic renewal of the

society. Relations between the soviets and the informals should be based on this. In a rule-of-law state precise norms should be set for informal social activity: constitutionality, respect for the society, the inadmissibility of stirring up national dissension and insulting the feelings of believers, and so forth. I think the USSR Supreme Soviet should accelerate the development and adoption of the corresponding law. It is bad when the people do not know the informal organizations. Of course there are reasons for this: the lack of clearcut programs and the diffusion in the concepts of the leaders.

S. ZOLOTSEV, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

I wish to tell a story.... This happened in the 35th year of Soviet power. An old man and his grandson came from a small town to the store to buy shoes. The old man was 70 years old and he had lived half of these years since the revolution. And here in the store a thief got his hand in his pocket. And what do you think? The old man, calling for help, shouted: "Police! Police!" Why am I telling you all this. In each of us, even those of us who had lived only 20 years before 1985, sits the policeman of those years: Stalinist, Khrushchevian, Brezhnevian—the same ferocious formal. During the past 1.5-2 years I have dealt with many informal movements and I have come to the conclusion that any of our informals could very quickly become confirmed formals. Perhaps only the ruling party is striving to become informal these days. What should the people's deputy be like? The answer is given in the name itself—people's! He should be oriented only toward his own civic sense.

G. BODRENKOVA, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet and the rayon soviet:

I am a party member and I have never been an informal before. But in August the CPSU Central Committee published a decree on reports and elections. It says there that communists should go to the people in their rayons and engage in preelection work. And so I came to voters' club No. 1. I began to work with the people and look into their needs. And I ended up a candidate people's deputy. But having become an informal in this way I felt that as a candidate for people's deputy I had become undesirable to our local authorities. Why does this confrontation take place?

In order to implement one of the points of my program—bringing order into the accounting for and distribution of housing—I suggest creating another informal organization—the "Association of People on the Waiting List in the Rayon."

YE. KARPUKHINA, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

I do not like the word "informal." It exists in order to oppose one part of the population to the other. "Informal" sounds something like half-forbidden. Hence the

desire to become "formal" as soon as possible. What for? In order to gain a real opportunity for active work. I am an economist and I am convinced that the existing Moscow soviet is not in a position to solve Moscow's social problems. It can do nothing without help from the informals.

V. KAPRANOV, candidate for people's deputy of the rayon soviet:

I was nominated as a candidate for the soviet by the Lianozovo-2 Committee for Social Self-Management. My election platform, in addition to questions the development and layout of the rayon, included a point about enlisting various independent formations in the social, organizational, and political life of the society.

It seems to me that the social self-management committees are the closest to the soviets. Our committee includes representatives of such informal organizations as "Voters' Club" and "Shield." Unfortunately, there are no youth on the committee. They are the ones with whom I should like most to work.

M. KUZMIN, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

A great deal of attention is now being devoted to self-management committees. I think these social organs should consist exclusively of deputies and active residents of the microrayons. There is no need for them to include representatives of executive (formal) power.

V. SOBOLEV, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow Soviet:

I think the preelection program is concrete work. What is basic in my platform? The status of Moscow as the capital of the USSR and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], expansion of the rights and authority of the Moscow soviet and the rayon soviets, economic independence of the rayons, and a changeover to economic accountability. Further, there are housing construction, the ecology, and other social problems. I am deeply convinced that a deputy must listen and hear well what all of his constituents have to say—formals and informals. Excluding "politickers" who call for extremism, chauvinism, and fascism. In this connection I think that since deputies with various persuasions will be elected to the Moscow soviet, the elected ones should consolidate.

B. ILIZAROV, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

The organization I head is an informal one. It is called the "People's Archive." We collect documents from informal political and other organizations. When we speak about political informal organizations we are essentially speaking about a multiparty system and our relationship to it. It is known that a multiparty system is the basis of democracy, and I shall do everything in my power to make sure that the next elections proceed on a multiparty basis. How can this be done? And what will

the soviets be like on a multiparty basis? Perhaps we should proceed this way: The party should give up some of its power at all levels and enlist in the multiparty system that is being generated with equal rights along with everyone else.

S. CHICHIGIN, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

In my view, informal organizations are not an alternative to the CPSU. They are a result of it, improved possibilities for it.... In the informal movement I do not accept the idea that as a rule they do not listen to their opponents and, imitating existing power structures, they create the same apparatus forms of management.

If one is to speak about what should prevail in the activity of a people's deputy, in my view he should be both an organizer and a politician. He should not express his own opinion in the soviets but bring the will of the voters there.

G. BELOGLAZOVA, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

I fully support the political platform of any candidate from informal associations who is in favor of consolidation of the healthy, constructive forces of the society. I think we should respect the political views of the competitors, regardless of the front, association, or grouping to which they belong. It is just that, unfortunately, the people who come to power in informal movements are ones who categorically should not have it.

V. KISELEV, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

"Informals".... This word evokes negative emotions in many people. But it is known that throughout time historical movement forward has always been associated with the informals: the Decembrists, the revolutionary democrats, and the Bolsheviks themselves—they all began as informals. We officers of the Soviet Army, communists, and proponents of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" are also among them. The Army, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are three powerful state institutions that have colossal power. And I do not think that any party should be able to achieve its goals through the Armed Forces—only the soviets should be able to do that.

V. YERSHEVICH, candidate for people's deputy of the RSFSR:

The first lines of my preelection program read: freedom of the individual, freedom of conscience, the regeneration of man and civic duty. Some people will say: These are eloquent words which bind you to nothing. Yet if the basic points of the universal human rights declaration were reflected in our constitution, much—including problems related to the informal organizations—would be removed from the agenda.

We have separation of church and state. Does this mean that it is completely excluded from our social life? I think that in everything one must look for the good, that which unites people.

A. YEVESTIGNEYEV, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

I am a member of the coordination committee of the union "Shield." Our goal is to make sure that restructuring does not end up meaning exchange of gunfire. Although, as we can see, in some places we have not been able to avoid tragedy. Our union already has many members, and we do not consider ourselves an informal organization. The main principles of my preelection platform are: The interests of the voters should be above everything else, the deputy's work is his main and only job, complete independence from the CPSU and the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], and Moscow should be for the Muscovites and not for the departments.

A. EKSLER, candidate for people's deputy from Moscow:

I like the name "informal." I subscribe to the platform of the "Democratic Russia" block. And along with the other candidates from this block, I am participating as much as I can in the creation of an analogous Moscow document.

In my opinion, the slogan "All power to the soviets" sounds demagogic now. It is not viable. Moreover, I think it is dangerous. We are again forgetting about a necessary principle of any democracy—the separation of power: legislative, executive, judicial. Next it will necessarily follow: "All power to the party!" It does not make any difference which one.... And from there it is not very far to unlimited power of the leader of one party or grouping or another.

A. PRIGARIN, candidate for people's deputy of the RSFSR:

I am a member of the coordinating councils of the federation of Marxist party clubs and the Moscow party club "Communists for perestroika." Naturally, my platform practically coincides with the platform of these organizations. We are against socialism without democracy and against democracy without socialism. We declare our adherence to communist ideals and think that our future is in socialism. In the social area we are in favor of consistent achievement of social equality and in keeping with this ideal we are against the growth of property differentiation. Consequently, in the economic area we are against any forms of exploitation of man by man. That is, we are against private ownership with the use of hired labor. We see a fundamental difference between the principle of social equality and wage leveling. Wage leveling is manifested in that the workers begin to receive as much as the engineers but in that those who do nothing receive the same as honest workers. The talented leader is on the same level with the

untalented one. In the political area in our country there should be all the bourgeois democracy plus socialist.

S. PASHKOV, candidate for people's deputy of the rayon soviet:

I am now a member of the "Memorial" society. I think we actually have a multiparty system. One can judge how serious and strong the informal movements are from how they influence the fate of our compatriots in the Baltic republics and the Transcaucasus. I see my task as this: implementing the Democratic Platform of the MDG by actively utilizing the political legacy of A.D. Sakharov. All political parties and organizations must have the same legal conditions for their work. The ispolkoms must register any rayon social organizations whose activity does not contradict the Constitution.

YE. MAKSIMOVA, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow Soviet:

I am an educator and I think that the school should change from a mechanism for the perpetuation of stagnation into a creative laboratory for the future society. The creation of such a school is impossible without a radical renewal of the entire society. But a renewal of the society is also impossible without a humanitarian transformation of the school. It is naive to think that the administrative system in the form of the public education organs can complete such a transformation. In recent years the administrative basis in them has become stronger and stronger in spite of the process of democratization that is taking place in the country. This is why we are in favor of abolishing the state monopoly in the education system in favor of developing a social basis in it.

S. SHEBOLDAYEV, candidate for people's deputy of the RSFSR and the Moscow soviet:

I agree with those who say that the slogan "Power to the soviets!" is no longer appropriate in the current situation. What kind of soviets are they if they are elected from above. And this, unfortunately, is the case. Up to this point we have no posters of the candidates nominated to the rayon soviets of people's deputies. And this means that the elections—this important part of democracy—which can form the soviets and can solve the problems of the voters have been let slide.

A. DMITRIYEV, candidate for people's deputy of Moscow soviet:

I am an ardent formal and I do not belong to the "Democratic Platform." I think the country is on the verge of a changeover to a dictatorship. Therefore the new Moscow soviet must immediately conduct registration of all organizations that have declared themselves to be parties or political organizations. There is one restriction: the existence in the program points of any hint of a violent change in the constitutional system.

If we want nationwide agreement we must stop allowing leaders of the Moscow soviet to belong to any party, regardless of which one they may have belonged to when elected.

Deputies of the Moscow soviet have the right to form party factions. But the deputy is sovereign in decision-making. The deputy must be above party membership. Only then is dialog possible.

V. KIRICHENKO, candidate for deputy of the RSFSR:

Everybody considers himself to be a democrat. And at the same time many people now—including certain deputies of the Supreme Soviet—are slandering the Communist Party. They blame it for all the country's problems. And yet the party includes 20 million people. And these are thoughtful, honest, decent workers. Such are the majority. There are, of course, those who are responsible for Stalinism and for stagnation, and those who are to blame for holding back perestroika. But we do not always speak about them—concretely and specifically. We blame the entire party. What kind of democracy is this? As concerns informal organizations, I consider the majority of them to be rational and good forces, the foundations of democracy.

V. STANCHAK, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

I am in favor of a multiparty system based on separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power. I am in favor of separating local party organizations from all state structures. I am in favor of regeneration of the spirituality of the people on the basis of a union with the Russian Orthodox Church.

N. KUTUZOVA, candidate for people's deputy of the Moscow soviet:

I consider ecological problems to be the most crucial and difficult for the capital. I consider it my duty to achieve a halt of the construction of the Severnaya TETs [thermal electric power plant]. I shall fight for reconstruction of enterprises that pollute the environment. The new deputy corps must proceed more constructively toward dialog with the informal organizations.

MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA saw its task as presenting the candidate people's deputies to the voters as completely as possible and thus helping the Muscovites to make the correct personal choice at voting time.

Independent Trade Union Federation Founded

LD2203181590 Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT
22 Mar 90

[By TASS special correspondents]

[Text] Moscow March 22 TASS—A Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia was founded today at a congress of trade unions of the Soviet Union's largest republic. The decision received an overwhelming

majority of votes among the 1,500 delegates at the founding Congress of Russian Trade Unions, which met for the second day in the Kremlin.

The creation of the Russian trade union reflects the growing process of strengthening the sovereignty of republics in the country. Unlike other union republics, the trade unions of the Russian Federation, with a membership of 77 million people (54 per cent of the total number of Soviet trade unionists), did not have their own organisation.

The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia will unite more than 380,000 primary trade union organisations on a voluntary basis in sectoral and regional structures.

On Friday, the congress will elect the new trade union's leadership.

Party Members Dominate New Russian Parliament

LD2303132890 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT
23 Mar 90

[By TASS Correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow March 23 TASS—Over 80 per cent of deputies elected to the new Russian parliament are party members and over 90 per cent have higher education qualifications, according to preliminary polling results.

Of the 1,068 seats in the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, 1,028 have already been filled. Repeat elections in the remaining 40 constituencies will be held in late April or early May, a Central Electoral Commission spokesman told TASS.

Some 23 per cent of those elected are industrial personnel—from bench workers and team leaders up to factory directors, 12 per cent are farmers, 5.5 per cent are in law enforcement, and eight per cent are medical workers and sport officials.

Young people under 30 account for just four per cent of the deputies.

Dagestan Election Deemed Invalid

PM2303145590 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "At Central Electoral Commission"]

[Text] An on-the-spot check conducted by the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies has established the facts of a gross violation of the RSFSR Law "On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies" during the voting to elect the RSFSR people's deputy for Kalininskiy Territorial Electoral District No. 809.

In a resolution dated 19 March 1990 the Central Electoral Commission deemed the elections in the said district invalid.

At the same time the Central Electoral Commission proposed that the Dagestan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium and local soviets form a new district electoral commission and, where necessary, new precinct electoral commissions.

V. Voshchinin, head of the juridical group of the secretariat of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies, told a TASS correspondent that it came to light as the result of a careful check that a considerable number of returns from precinct electoral commissions contained erasures and corrections. In certain precincts there was no information about the total number of voters in the precinct. The information about the number of ballot papers has been deemed invalid. In addition, in four electoral precincts the lists of voters contained no notes on the issuing of ballot papers, while ballot papers of nonregulation form were discovered in individual precincts in three rayons. Instances of agitation on voting day and of several ballot papers being issued to the same hands were noted.

In accordance with Article 53 of the Law on Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies, repeat elections of the RSFSR people's deputy for Kalininskiy Territorial Electoral District No. 809 of the Dagestan ASSR have been scheduled for 13 May 1990.

RSFSR First Round Election Results Given

90UN1183A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Mar 90 Single Edition p 3

["Report on the results of 4 March 1990 voting in elections of people's deputies of local soviets of people's deputies of the RSFSR"]

[Text] (These data are published from materials obtained from the presidiums of the supreme soviets of autonomous republics, from the executive committees of kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies, and from the Moscow and Leningrad city soviets of people's deputies).

On 4 March 1990 in the territory of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), elections of people's deputies took place for 28,758 local soviets, including six kray, 49 oblast, five autonomous oblast, 10 autonomous okrug, 1,703 rayon, 1,025 city, 358 rayon-in-city, 2,183 settlement, and 23,421 village soviets of people's deputies.

On RSFSR territory 26,877 electoral districts were formed to conduct the elections of people's deputies of the local soviets, including 10,618 multi-seat districts. In 1,861 settlement and village soviets, voting was conducted from a general listing of candidates to the post of people's deputy for the appropriate soviet.

Of 102.4 million citizens eligible to vote, 78.2 million, or 76.4 percent, participated in the voting. The elections

were considered valid in 720,761 electoral districts, where 661,536 people's deputies of local soviets, or 83.9 percent of the total number of deputy seats, were elected. The elected people's deputies are comprised of 35.9 percent women, 15.4 percent people under 30 years of age, 48.6 percent CPSU members and candidate members, 6.7 percent VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members, 35.2 percent deputies of local soviets for the preceding term, and 96.6 percent work in the territory of the appropriate soviet and 96.4 percent live in that territory. The composition of people's deputies includes 25 percent workers and 21.0 percent kolkhoz [collective farm] workers. Workers in industry, construction, transportation, communications, and agriculture, people from the scientific and cultural community, from the fields of education and health care, student youth, the military, housewives, and members of the clergy are among those elected.

Among the people's deputies elected to the highest organs of state authority of the autonomous republics, women comprise 9.8 percent, workers—9.9 percent, kolkhoz workers—7.4 percent, persons under 30 years of age—3.5 percent, CPSU members and candidate members—90 percent, VLKSM members—1.2 percent, and previous-term deputies of the supreme soviets of the autonomous republics—24.5 percent.

On the basis of Article 52 of the RSFSR Law "On the Elections of People's Deputies of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the RSFSR," elections in 6,645 electoral districts were declared invalid or void. In 113,754 electoral districts, candidates to people's deputy were not elected as deputies due to their failure to receive more than half the votes cast by the electorate.

In accordance with the law, electoral commissions will be conducting run-off elections over the course of two weeks in 42,818 electoral districts, and repeat elections over the course of two months in 77,581 electoral districts. Following this, final results of the elections of people's deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the RSFSR will be published.

[Signed] The Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

Yeltsin on Leningrad Culture Center Plan

90UN1207A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 2

[Report of an interview with B.N. Yeltsin, by A. Soboleva: "The People of Leningrad Are Just Lucky!"]

[Text] Every time we publish materials about the planned construction of the Culture, Information, and Recreation Center in Lakhta our newspaper office is literally flooded with letters. And none of them is written in a peaceful manner—some of them are categorically against the center, others are definitely for it.

But there was one reader's letter that did not belong to either of these groups. But you can judge for yourself:

"Why can't you understand that any positive materials on the center that appear in your paper do not seem convincing for a very simple reason? Some people just do not want to believe the authorities; they treat the representatives of a foreign firm with more than mere skepticism; due to their own incompetence, probably, they do not agree with the scientists; they see journalists as the mouthpieces of somebody else's policy."

"Why don't you seek an opinion on the problem from someone like B.N. Yeltsin? He is a professional—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Construction and Architecture. I am sure that his opinion will be quite objective and it should be convincing enough for me personally and many other people of our city for us to decide whether the construction of such a center is advisable."

[signed] V. Kazarinov, a native Leningrader.

The proposal was unexpected and not very simple to carry out, but it was interesting. I did not get a chance to meet with B.N. Yeltsin when he was in our city recently, but I knew that he had heard a short presentation on the center during his visit to the Leningrad Chief Administration of Architecture. I telephoned him to ask for a meeting in Moscow so that I could interview him on this problem. This request was granted.

Here I am at 27 Kalininskiy Avenue, in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Construction and Architecture. I am in the office of its chairman, B.N. Yeltsin. I brought with me a writing pad and the Leningraders' "opinion" about the Lakhta Center—two of the most typical letters chosen from the huge amount of mail to our editor. My conversation with B.N. Yeltsin started by reading those letters.

Here is the first letter:

"What kind of crooks and dimwits you must be to promote the center! Those who advocate it are thieves of all types, bribe lovers who aim to grab something for themselves even if it means selling the intellectual center of the country. Only an idiot can believe that the hard currency will be spent on the needs of the city—it will all be used up by those in power, it will drop through our bottomless pockets, and the city will remain needy and dirty. Stop promoting the center! Yours contemptuously."

[signed] A.M. Ivanova

Here is the second letter:

"Pseudo-patriots had put the plans for Lisiy Nos on ice and now they want to leave us in the cold again. Under the pretext of protecting patriotic interests they defend their own selfish ones. But there is a simple explanation to this. My sister owns a dacha in Lisiy Nos. All of a sudden she realized that she could lose her regular profits from renting rooms. She could not care less about all the Leningraders, their children and grandchildren who could have enjoyed themselves so much if the center had been there. And that is the essence of all the protests. Slogans of the type 'We are being invaded!' and 'No to the sale of our land!' are

primitive and, unfortunately, are not properly rebuffed by the newspaper. In no case can we allow the burial of Lakhta. But the danger is there."

[signed] B.S. Vorobyev

[Soboleva] Boris Nikolayevich, I considered it my duty to show to you openly what Leningraders are writing to us about the center. Now you know an opinion on it other than that of the Leningrad Chief Administration of Architecture. What do you think about the subject?

[Yeltsin] The opinion of the people of Leningrad is very important to me and that might also be because of my special feelings for Leningrad and its residents. But we will talk about this a bit later. What probably is important to say now is to mention that the idea for the center cannot be treated as something that fell upon Leningrad out of the blue. A center of that type and other such projects are far from being something new; they have already been tested in practice and, what is more important, they have justified their existence. Look, for instance, at Yalta and Dagomys—what wonderful resort complexes were built there by foreign firms!

At the same time a part of the city was improved, they built residential housing and kindergartens there. They also resolved the problem of employment for the local population (services personnel). American firms promised to build a thousand apartments for us. A contract has been signed with Japan to build a tourist center in Vladivostok. All these are not gifts, nor a kind of aid to an underdeveloped country, but they are economic relations profitable to us as well as to the capitalists.

[Soboleva] What can you say about similar contacts now, after your recent trip to Japan?

[Yeltsin] The Japanese minister of construction suggested to me during our meeting that we consider a plan for mutual construction of an ultramodern highway from Japan to West Europe, through the entire territory of the USSR. The investments will be entirely Japanese and the exploitation of the highway could be mutual. Is this a profitable offer? I think so. It was suggested several times that Japan help us to build some modern tourist resorts. They displayed an interest in our proposal to involve Japanese construction firms in the building of modern residential developments and in the reconstruction of our cities.

[Soboleva] Do you mean that at present it is unreasonable to rely only on our own forces and possibilities (we know what they are now), or on the unfortunate opinion, still in use, that we can deal with the city problems without the foreign firms?

[Yeltsin] I do, definitely. The world is on its way to economic unity. We have to accept the objective and the inevitable character of the process if, of course, we do not want to remain in the backyard of the civilization.

[Soboleva] What do you think Leningrad and its people will get from the realization of this project?

[Yeltsin] First, the city and its inhabitants will acquire a powerful center of culture, information, and recreation. The hard currency that the city receives from it will definitely help to resolve many of the city problems. The Leningraders should be told openly that it will be used to repair and build roads, to build health care projects, etc. I am convinced that the center will help to eliminate or, rather, alleviate some of the ecological problems.

The very location of the center on the shore of the Gulf of Finland will allow us to invite, if necessary, the foreign firms which will become the major investors in the project. They could use the newest technology to purify the Neva inlet cut off by the dam. It is of utmost importance that all this would be done without spending the money from the city budget and without involving your local construction organizations. Their forces will be directed at carrying out the residential program, at creating their own facilities, and at developing the construction enterprises. I think the Leningraders will definitely agree with me that the project should necessarily include, and not lose for anything, the special Leningrad character—the Leningrad personality known and respected by everyone.

In a word, all that is typical of this beautiful and courageous city should be there. For this reason it is important to bring into the project talented Leningrad architects, designers, and scientists—the widest range of specialists, speaking in general.

[Soboleva] Many of our readers are convinced that the city authorities have agreed to the project because they do not mind selling off Leningrad land.

[Yeltsin] There is no foundation for such thoughts which surely could appear only because of insufficient information. The land did and will belong to Leningrad. Its only owner is the local soviet and only the soviet can decide what to do with it. If the Leningraders will agree to have such a center built, then our committee will be prepared to discuss the project and to provide professional examination of any problems that might arise. The committee will also guarantee that the hard currency profits resulting from the use of the center will remain in the Leningrad budget so that they can be used for the current needs of the city and its people.

[Soboleva] But it is so hard to convince those who are against the project!

[Yeltsin] Maybe you do not know how to? I talked to the managers of the Leningrad Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] planning commission and the Leningrad Chief Administration of Architecture and as an expert I can understand all of their reasoning. It is wonderful that the leaders of the city are trying not to lose the lucky chance; I share their wish to create such a center for the people and I understand how hard it is to achieve any progress in such a matter. The people of Leningrad are just lucky! But still, maybe you need some other methods to influence the minds and hearts?

Some knowledgeable experts should go together with you, journalists, and talk to the working people at the enterprises and provide for them all the information on the center and answer all their troubling questions about the "sale" of the land and about the hard currency. Why not resort to such a forgotten way of communication as a public gathering—invite the people of Leningrad to the parks or subway entrances and explain to them honestly and openly the things they do not understand. It is especially appropriate in a case like this when there is nothing to hide—all the information is the advantage of the center and in the defense of the idea.

[Soboleva] Some of our readers propose to hold a referendum on this problem.

[Yeltsin] Possibly you do need a referendum. But what is most important at first it is to prepare the people for it by supplying them with the complete information and by answering all of their questions. And for that, as I said already, meeting with the people at their working places or at public gatherings can be of great help.

[Soboleva] Boris Nikolayevich, what, in your opinion, would have been the attitude of the Muscovites if Canada had offered to build a similar center for them?

[Yeltsin] They would have agreed even without a referendum. However, we already have such an idea. And the place that has been chosen is not just anywhere but it is a most sacred place for all the people of Moscow—right next to Red Square. It is there that we want to build a powerful center of culture, attractive for everyone. It will have museums, concert and exhibition halls, and cafes. Of course, there are problems but they are of a different nature. But the main thing is that it is you, in Leningrad, who got lucky. The Muscovites do not as yet have a partner like Cyrus Eaton's firm.

[Soboleva] Here is my last question. You promised to tell why you have some special feelings towards Leningrad and its people.

[Yeltsin] Even the lack of time would not prevent me from answering this question. There are many reasons for me to adore the beautiful and courageous city of Leningrad and its people. But some of them are rather personal.

During the break after my second year at the institute I decided to see the country and to go to Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev, Simferopol, Sukhumi, Batumi, and Volgograd—in other words, to go almost on a round-the-world trip in our country. There was no one to give the money for the trip and my student's allowance was quite insignificant. I worked unloading railroad cars and coal cars and sorting out vegetables and earned some money to start with. I researched the itinerary and started on my way. I traveled third class, or on railroad car roofs; I starved, policemen pulled me off trains. During the forced stops on my journey I would earn some more money and then continue on my way. There was a money order following me somewhere but I could

not catch up with it for anything. However, it was a wonderful trip because I studied every city!

To make a long story short, one day I arrived in Leningrad. I went to the first store, showed my student ID card, asked for a loaf of bread and some bologna and promised to pay later. Without a word they gave me more food than I dared to ask for. Since that time I had many more occasions to see how considerate, kind and compassionate, in some special Leningrad way, are the people of your city. And that old story has a place of its own in my memory. I did repay the debt after I managed to cash my money order.

[Soboleva] Thank you very much for the interview and for the kind words about Leningrad and its people.

[Yeltsin] I wish you every success!

From the editor: After the story was ready for print, we received an appeal of the committee for the defense of Leningrad land referring to the construction of the center of culture, information and recreation in Lakhta. The appeal categorically protests the "invasion of capitalist firms" and the attempts "to lease the Leningrad land to foreign capital." We think that this interview will provide a well-reasoned response to the given questions.

Lukyanov Cited on Small Ethnic Community Problems

LD2403223190 Moscow TASS in English 2149 GMT
24 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS—Urgent issues of the socio-economic situation of the small ethnic communities inhabiting the Soviet northern regions—Siberia and the Far East—of the improvement of the ecological state of their permanent habitats and the creation of require conditions [as received] for the preservation of their national cultural heritage and traditional crafts were discussed by Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoly Lukyanov with a group of delegates to the forthcoming congress of small ethnic communities of the Soviet northern regions on Saturday.

They also discussed pressing issues relating to the perfection of the status of national-territorial formations.

Lukyanov stressed that one of the aspect of renewal of the Soviet Federation consists in strengthening attention towards the needs and concerns of small nationalities which are fully-fledged members of the multinational family of Soviet peoples. A constructive role in solving these problems will be played by the implementation of the comprehensive program of the development of the economy and culture of respective regions and the forthcoming establishment and practical activity of the association of small ethnic communities of the northern regions.

Buryat Obkom Expresses Confidence; Releases Belyakov

LD2503045890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 24 Mar 90

[Text] Demands for the resignation of the buro were refused at a plenum of Buryat Oblast party committee [obkom] and confidence in the buro was expressed. In connection with his appointment to the post of chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic State Committee on National Issues, Comrade Belyakov was relieved of his duties as obkom first secretary. The plenum proposed that the city and rayon committees and the primary party organizations discuss candidates for the office of first secretary of the Buryat CPSU Obkom.

Stavropol Abolishes Rayon Party Committees

LD2503060590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 24 Mar 90

[Text] The Stavropol Kray CPSU Committee has decided to abolish rayon party committees in Stavropol. There were three such committees. This was determined by the administrative territorial division of the kray center that had developed over the years. Now it has been deemed expedient for the functions of the rayon party level to be concentrated in the town committee of the CPSU and for the latter to be strengthened with the most authoritative and qualified workers from the abolished rayon committees. The decision adopted on improving the structure of the town party organization is based on a study of the views of the communists and all the working people of Stavropol. It is noted that division to the rayon level had led to poor liaison and a duplication in the work of the party apparatus. The kray CPSU committee proposed to the presidium of the kray soviet of people's deputies that it examine the expediency of the administrative territorial division down to rayon level which exists in Stavropol and all the issues connected with this regarding the work of local soviet and economic bodies.

RSFSR TV Founding Congress Statement

LD2503105190 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT
25 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS—"Russia's trade unions will be as ever an integral part of the uniform trade union movement of the USSR," says a statement by the founding congress of the trade unions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic], publishing in the TRUD newspaper today.

Advocating the sovereignty and economic independence of the Russian Federation and all other constituent republics, Russia's trade unions, at the same time, work for consolidating the USSR as the important guarantor of the peaceful labor and free development of all ethnic groups.

"We favor real civil and political rights and social protection of each Soviet person, irrespective of his or

her nationality, place of residence or religious beliefs. We oppose any attempts to split the ranks of the working people and to pit working people of various ethnic groups against each other," the statement points out.

It expresses anxiety that national or regional separatism and sectoral isolation, the dangerous manifestations of which are noticeable even today, may cause the country's trade union movement to crumble.

TRUD also publishes today an appeal by the founding congress of Russia's trade unions to the forthcoming first congress of people's deputies of the Russian Federation.

It expresses readiness to cooperate with Russia's parliament and the trade union movement's desire to be a partner as well as a constructive opponent of the government.

TRUD also publishes a statement by Russia's trade unions in connection with developments in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], calling upon the working people of the republic to exert every effort to help find a calm and considered solution to the emergent problems.

Gosplan Reply Disappoints Tyumen Official

PM2603140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Yuriy Perepletkin report under the rubric "Direct Link": "Not Satisfied With Answer"]

[Text] Tyumen—Siberians received an answer from the country's State Planning Committee [Gosplan] to their appeal to the center in connection with the growing social pressure in labor collectives and among the oblast's population.

If all their proposals are summarized, three most important factors can be singled out. First, it was proposed that 1 million tonnes of Siberian petroleum (this essentially amounts to only a day's work in the local oilfields) be sold abroad for the purpose of obtaining with foreign currency 100,000 tonnes of meat, so removing the severe shortage of foodstuffs. The second point: Attention was drawn to the fact that the low standard of material and technical supply for mining enterprises places in doubt the fulfillment of the state order for petroleum and gas. And the third point: The plenum participants asked for the construction subdivisions brought in earlier, which are building houses and social, cultural, and consumer facilities here, to remain in the region.

A document published in the local press signed by V. Durasov, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan, gives either a negative or vague response to all the points. In his commentary next to it, V. Kitayev, chairman of the provisional oblast CPSU committee bureau, claims: "The answer is built on general considerations which do not bind anyone to anything. In order to solve the problems which have emerged more vigorous measures by labor collectives, the oblast's economic leaders, and soviets are

needed. The provisional Tyumen Oblast CPSU Committee Bureau is waiting for a clear and concise answer to its questions from the Soviet Government."

Prokofyev Interviewed on Multiparty System

90UN1218A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU City Committee, by A. Kamenev; date and place not given: "Enough Trial and Error. It is Time to Predict and Stay Ahead of Events"]

[Text] Until quite recently the very term "multiparty spirit" was used with respect to "what they have over there." But here we have already written in the draft program of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress: "The democratization of our society is accompanied by the appearance of new sociopolitical associations of citizens. The development of society does not rule out the possibility of creating parties as well." And further on: "The CPSU does not claim to have a monopoly and is prepared for political dialog and cooperation with anyone who is working to renew the socialist society." How does a multiparty system fit into the prospects for our political life? This is the subject of our next "Political Dialog" in which we are speaking with the first secretary of the Moscow CPSU City Committee, Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev.

[Kamenev] In the three or so months you have spent in the position of first secretary of the MGK [Moscow City Committee] of the CPSU you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, have given many interviews. You will admit that this much activity is not typical for a party worker. What has brought it about?

[Prokofyev] You would not ask that question of our well-known economists, writers, or cultural figures whose publications are always to be found in the newspapers and magazines and who frequently appear on television—they defend and promote their positions, and quite actively at that. I too am deliberately making contacts with the press. After all, it is not a normal situation: People know the faces of the leaders of other movements but far from every communist knows what his party leader is thinking about or what he looks like. And it is simply unforgivable for a political worker not to take into account the fact that the press brings a good deal to public opinion and does a lot to form public opinion. I think that communists should know my assessment of certain processes and phenomena as well. And frequently this is not just my own personal viewpoint—it is the position of the gorkom [city party committee], and Muscovites should know what this is.

[Kamenev] The spectrum of political life today is diverse and contradictory. We do not have a law on parties and social organizations yet but we are essentially living under the conditions of a multiparty system. The Democratic Platform in the CPSU, the Social-Democratic

Association, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, and the Constitutional Democrats have made themselves known.... Are we not late in recognizing them?

[Prokofyev] Moscow has been living under the conditions of a multiparty system since last year's election campaign. I would divide the process taking place in the society into two stages. The first is the process of democratization which proceeded from top to bottom from April 1985 until the beginning of the preparations for the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Those three years managed to turn the people's consciousness around, they urged the people on to rapid politicization, and they generated a powerful movement from below. But it was not promptly evaluated. I think this is why we received such disquieting results in the elections of USSR people's deputies. Actually, that was when the various political movements were formed. And that was quite predictable but we did not take it into account.

Incidentally, since the beginning of perestroika in general we have not accounted for all the possible variants of its development. Hardly anyone could doubt the need for it but nobody engaged seriously in predicting its development. And yet while we have begun democratic processes and while we are rejecting the command-bureaucratic system, the appearance of other parties and other movements should have been anticipated as well. It will not work to go forward by the trial-and-error method. One always needs a program of action. Neither a rejection of the monopoly on power nor a transfer of power to the soviets will occur of its own accord. Well-designed, reliable mechanisms are needed for the realization of these processes. There are laws of social development and there is real historical experience—we must rely on them and not just hope that everything will be different in our country. We create all of our crises ourselves.

[Kamenev] And almost all the mistakes were always explained by the notion that we are pioneers, that there are no analogs in the world. And although predictions far from always come true and the word "if" is not an argument in a political dialog, would it not be possible somehow to predict the development of events and situations?

[Prokofyev] It is not the simplest of tasks. First of all because the party gorkom does not even have the staff that could do the analytical work and make long-range predictions. We are just now trying to form it. I envision it all like this:

In Moscow there are about 1,500 various informal organizations, movements, and societies. Approximately (?50) of them are clearly politicized and 32 organizations are in a position to exert a more and more essential influence on the formation of public opinion. The ones that stand out most sharply against the background of the city's political life are the Moscow Tribunal, the Democratic Perestroika Club, and the former Moscow Party Club, which is now the Democratic Platform in the

CPSU. These are the groups where the most intellectually prepared forces have gathered. Then one should name such mass associations as the Moscow People's Front, Memorial, and the Russian People's Front. Here too—while not attached to this wing but approximately equal in significance—are the United Workers Front (OFT), the Association of Communism....

Now the Russia and Fatherland associations have also appeared. I would not call these mass organizations parties; they are more like movements. Attentively observing them, I see that so far there is no social base for transforming them into parties. They have slogans and certain positions. Let us be frank: Regardless of how much the CPSU may be criticized, the most active part of the society are communists. And as long as the unity of the CPSU is maintained, it does not seem likely to me that opposing forces equal to it will be formed. The creation of the Social Democratic Association has been declared. How many people does it unite? A thousand? Five? Twenty? For a country as large as ours I do not think this is yet a factor that can exert an essential influence.

It is a different matter that various positions and views are now being manifested within the CPSU itself. To a significant degree they are brought about by the fact that for a long time we have not had a political platform. It is just being developed. We have not had the model, the clear and attractive goals and tasks around which it would be possible to consolidate the society. And it is quite natural that this led to a stratification in the party. Specialists from the Moscow Higher Party School count eight currents in the CPSU but I think this is too detailed a classification. I would single out three: the radicals who want to transform the party into a social democratic one, and then the centrist faction, and then the conservatives. I think that as a result of the 28th Congress there will inevitably be a separation. The conservative forces will hardly be able to create their own party since, in my view, they do not have a broad social base among the population or among communists either. Most likely the centrist part will become stronger—some will proceed having adopted the party platform with all their hearts and others will ascent simply because they do not want to abandon the party. But the radical part might break off if it does not find solutions to its problems in the program adopted by the congress. Then a new political party might be created—and if its goals are different, competition and even confrontation are inevitable. But I think, and I emphasize this once again, that the main forces will remain within the Communist Party.

[Kamenev] Is this division within the party really necessary? Does the existence of various positions, currents and, finally, factions within the CPSU stand in contradiction to the new political thinking?

[Prokofyev] I read the thoughts of one American political scientist who states directly that previously he considered it impossible for a single-party system to exist in the Soviet Union. Now he considers this possible and

justifies this notion by the fact that a new political structure is being created in the soviets and the party periodically comes into opposition with it—these are already two political forces, and the possibility of having factions in the CPSU could preserve the single-party system. I do not know which is better: factions or entire formations or, rather, formations around certain ideas. A great deal depends on the goals the factions set for themselves. If we achieve a consolidation of forces and do not indulge personal political ambitions it will be possible for factions to exist. But if personal political aspirations are placed first then it seems to me that a split in the CPSU is inevitable.

The process of democratization of the party will depend not so much on the possibility of creating factions as on the normal possibilities of holding discussions and referendums on the most important party issues and on the existence of platforms. Politics is an art of the possible, not of ultimatums.

Take, for example, the Democratic Platform. It was recently made public first in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and then in PRAVDA. Read it carefully—about 80 percent of it coincides with the main points of the draft of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee. And I think that if the leaders of the Democratic Platform wanted to, we could work together and achieve a real democratic party without splitting up the CPSU. In these and other platforms there is much that is held in common and is unifying.

[Kamenev] But there are also plenty of differences. And is this not why nowadays one very frequently hears the idea of the need for a roundtable at which we could seat the leaders of the CPSU and of the most significant social movements; say, the Democratic Platform and the Block of Patriotic Forces? How do you feel about this idea?

[Prokofyev] I do not understand that idea, although I am a proponent not of rallies but of actual roundtable discussions. And we began the discussion in the city party organization with the fact that leaders and representatives of various informal groups and movements had gathered at the roundtable. But when the people's deputies raise the issue of a roundtable it makes me wonder: They represent the highest organ of state power and demand negotiations with the country's leadership. They have a podium and the opportunity to promote their views and present constructive programs and draft laws. I would understand if the question were raised by the Democratic Union or the Pamyat society. But when the people's deputies suggest sitting down at the negotiating table with other people's deputies—that I do not understand.

[Kamenev] Excuse me, but I think political and party problems are still on the agenda. And the discussion is being proposed not with the leaders of the country but of the party—the Central Committee and the Politburo.

[Prokofyev] I do not agree with this either, and this is why. What are they supposed to discuss? The party is a

political force that conducts its own policy and it should exert pressure on the elected state organs. The Council of Ministers. Please, go ahead and implement your ideas and promote them. Many comrades have the opportunity to speak at plenums of the party Central Committee just as, incidentally, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin did when he proposed that the declaration of the Democratic Platform be in the Platform of the Central Committee.

A roundtable is needed if people are not a part of the government or the leading organs. But representatives of these associations are mostly members of the same party.

[Kamenev] Soon it will be two years since we began the reform of the political structure. Next we proclaimed the party's rejection of functions not properly within its domain. But you will agree that things are going slowly, at a snail's pace. Will the idea of a multiparty system not hurry things along?

[Prokofyev] There is that. Here they have cut the apparatus, reduced the number of departments, but the functions remain. And only now, gradually and slowly, is the party changing over to political work methods. We should form a completely new level of soviets and they should do the work, and then the party will get away from these problems. I am convinced that this will happen within a half year after the 28th Congress. For those functions which the party retains we shall have sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, and economists—high-class professionals. The multiparty system will require this.

[Kamenev] How do the processes that are taking place affect the qualitative composition of the CPSU?

[Prokofyev] While in 1988 about 1,000 people left our party, last year the figure was already 11,000. And at the same time 12,000 entered the CPSU. This year the outflow is increasing and will apparently be approximately twice as great as last year. This is related to the fact that in past years we have accepted people into the party purely on the basis of questionnaires—in order to maintain a social balance and not according to convictions. Now older people are leaving—those who find it difficult to maintain ties with the party at the level of the housing operation office party organization, and there are also those who cannot reconcile themselves to a loss of ideals, who have given up on life. But there are also people who are leaving out of political convictions. I would divide these into three groups: those who are dissatisfied with the slow rates of perestroika; those who do not want it at all; and those who simply do not agree with the communist idea. Incidentally, they could constitute the bases of new parties.

[Kamenev] We have already said, Yuriy Anatolyevich, that two main blocks have formed today—the Democratic Platform and the Block of Patriotic Forces. The wings are fairly antagonistic both in their programs and in their actions. I understand that this is an improper question but could you give us your description of both

of them and tell us the one to which you would give preference and which one, in your view, is more constructive?

[Prokofyev] I try not to give preference to anyone and to work with all social movements and organizations that stand on a socialist platform. Both left-wing radicalism and right-wing conservatism are equally devoted to our party. And I think both sides must move closer to the center. Of course one cannot—and I do not intend to—join ranks with the reactionary party of Pamyat or the Democratic Union—this is all clear. But if one is to speak of mass popular movements, we try to maintain contact with all of them without giving preference to anyone. But the contacts may be arranged only on a constructive basis.

[Kamenev] The political decisions being made now entail consequences that are still not completely clear. For example, the organizational structure of the CPSU. Or the status of the secretariat of the party committee. Today it actually comes second after the director. And when will other parties appear? In brief, are there even any attempts being made to "look beyond the horizon"—at the future?

[Kamenev] We are not yet looking very far forward but, obviously, we must be prepared for everything. And here we should talk about more than just the problems with the introduction of the multiparty system. Even with the change in Article 8 of the Constitution it will be necessary to revise, for instance, such a fundamental principle as control over the activity of the administration. This is quite simple. At the same time there must be changes in the political organs in the army, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs—they are now led by party organizations. In any army in the world there are organs that handle educational work among military servicemen that are not dependent on the party.

I do not think that we ourselves expected such significant transformations related to the change in the article of the Constitution alone, and the introduction of a multiparty system will make them even deeper. The party organizations at the enterprises and in the institutions will most likely remain—each party will apparently create its own cell but none will have priority over any other. We must have a realistic understanding of the changing role of the party in our society. To be honest, we have not fully understood this so far and, alas, we are trying to latch on to the old.

[Kamenev] And then there will be, for example, the question of property. What will happen then?

[Prokofyev] What do you mean? A social democratic party will be created along with its own property. Everything the CPSU has today was created not with state money but with party money—dues from communists and income from the party press. It will be another matter if there is a split at the congress. Incidentally, certain leaders of the Democratic Platform are moving in that direction—not to create their own party but to

stay in the CPSU and split it and at the same time acquire some of its property.

In the city committee we have legally registered our ownership. And the premises of the raykoms, gorkom, and the sociopolitical center are our property since not a kopeck of state money went into them. And it is time to think about economic and commercial activity so we will have funds for propaganda and agitation. With a multiparty system it would be necessary to pay for time on television and to more actively take advantage of the mass media, which must also be maintained.

[Kamenev] Such a development of events is not envisioned in the draft platform of the Central Committee.

[Prokofyev] Unfortunately, I have spoken of this at plenums of the gorkom and the party Central Committee. A political platform is a good thing, of course. To a considerable degree it accumulates all the viewpoints and opinions of the communists. This is indeed the case—even with all the different attitudes toward the draft. But we must look forward. And when they were discussing the draft of the new regulations in the Central Committee I said that we do not need simply changes, even if they are very radical in terms of the current situation, but we need completely new regulations for a new party that operates under the conditions of pluralism of political views and a multiparty system so it can take into account the prospects for the development of events. But in all this work the brain potential of communists and scholars is being utilized far from adequately.

[Kamenev] And you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, do you consider yourself an optimist or a pessimist?

[Prokofyev] I? I consider myself a realist. Because in the present situation to be an optimist is simply unforgivable—it is so difficult and serious. Unfortunately, not everyone takes this into account and we are always getting burned. And any excessive leaning to the left or to the right is dangerous. What is the peculiarity of the situation in our country? Any society rests on two structures—political and economic. But something must hold the society together. We are now reconstructing the political structure—the soviets have not actually been formed yet and, as you can see, the party is giving up the real power. And events are developing. Take the economic structure. The command-administrative system has been destroyed and the plan-market system, as it is called, or the market system with state regulation has not yet been created. Usually such experiments do not end very successfully. It is a very difficult situation and to be an optimist and exaggerate what has been achieved is simply unforgivable for a politician. But you cannot be a pessimist either, for then you do not have the right to be a politician. Therefore I am a realist. I must try to evaluate realistically what has been achieved and the difficulties that exist and search for constructive ways of overcoming them.

[Kamenev] And you are not frightened by the possibility of getting sidetracked because of the increased role and

authority of the soviet? After all, then the first secretary will no longer play first fiddle.

[Prokofyev] But he will be playing a different role. And his influence will no longer be through the authority of his position but through the force of the points of the program he defends. We are not yet speaking about political methods of leadership. The functions of the party committee will be quite different and it is clear that they will certainly not be executive. And the personnel policy will be different. For if one city service or another is headed by a person who cannot bring order into his section, the competing party will immediately take advantage of this—they will say: What can you expect if they cannot keep their house in order? Therefore we shall have to influence the leaders who are members of our party and are working in the Moscow soviet.

[Kamenev] Let us return, however, to the draft of the Central Committee platform. Understandably, so far it is merely the limit below which one cannot drop. There is the opinion that it merely articulates the current position and condition of the party and the state, and that it should have done that a year ago....

[Prokofyev] A year ago we would not have had to speak about defending the party. I am sure that it will be subjected to a very serious reworking and deepening. And it cannot be any other way. The plan is fairly loose. It is simply declarative with respect to a number of items. It does not look to the future but simply registers the moment in which we find ourselves today. But what should the party be under the conditions of a multiparty system and a political struggle? The draft proceeds from the notion that the party is monolithic. It also contains fundamental principles, it is not an altogether hopeless document. And there is still time before the congress. The draft platform is now being worked on and analyzed in the party organizations. It is no accident that we have published the Democratic Platform, the platform of the rayon party organizations. It is necessary to gather together all of our intelligence, to select the most progressive, the most promising, and on the basis of this complete the draft of the platform. We must take it to the Central Committee plenum and then, before conducting elections of deputies to the party congress, about a month and a half before it begins its work, we must form committees and commissions from the delegates and turn this draft over to them so that before the congress they can work on it seriously and whip it into shape. Otherwise I cannot imagine how 5,000 people during the course of a week will be able to discuss it in detail, make corrections, and reach agreement on individual wordings and entire points. We need more extensive preliminary work during which the position of the delegates will be shown and the document will look better. So I think we now have a large amount of work ahead of us.

[Kamenev] And a great deal depends on it. Thank you for the conversation.

Russian Nationalists Go Unchallenged in Vologda

PM2703074990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Victor Filippov report: "Former Colonel Unrivaled?"]

[Text] Vologda—The sanctioned rally organized Sunday by the Vologda department of the Russian National Patriotic Center ended with a march under a black ensign and black, yellow, and white banners.

Admittedly, there were few people on the march. An absolute majority of the rally participants left the "Burevestnik" stadium in a quandary or disappointed. I was also disappointed—because the impulse of the young people who had convened the rally did not meet with a serious response from those who are more experienced and wise.

The guys in the black uniforms called for Russia's spiritual, national, and economic rebirth, and for knowledge of its history, and collected donations for the restoration of Christ the Savior Church in Moscow and for the construction of a monument to the poet Nikolay Rubtsov in Vologda. But it was crazy (I can't find any other word for it) to hear from them arguments that to achieve the declared aims you have to drive out the "watchdogs of perestroika" (meaning well-known academics and publicists) and "put an end to Zionism in Russia." Incidentally, such a mishmash in the heads of guys who have just started adult life does not surprise me. Among the guys' "confessors" is retired Colonel V. Popov, who at every opportunity makes speeches "about Zionists who are poisoning the Russian people with the aid of psychotropic means."

The former colonel was also master of ceremonies at this rally as well. And he had no worthy opponents. In spite of the fact that Vologda is a city with a VUZ [higher educational institution], that there are plenty of scientists and social scientists here, and among party workers candidates of science are not a rarity. But the professional educators preferred the back rows of the rally participants to the rostrum, evidently following the example of L. Yacheyistovaya, chief of the ideological department of the oblast party committee, who was in the back row.

At the beginning of April the rally organizers intend to hold an organizational meeting of the Russian club "Fatherland." I am afraid that there too former Colonel V. Popov's preaching will be unrivaled.

Vorotnikov Views RSFSR Election Outcome

PM2703090190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, by PRAVDA correspondents O. Losoto and A. Chernyak; place and date

not identified; first paragraph is an introduction: "Russia's Corps of Deputies. V.I. Vorotnikov Replies to PRAVDA's Questions"]

[Text] A major event occurred in the Russian Federation's life when the elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], autonomous republics, and local soviets were held. Official results have yet to be published but there is already a lot of talk about them, and the most diverse assumptions are being made. PRAVDA's correspondents asked Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to comment on what are still preliminary data.

[PRAVDA] Vitaliy Ivanovich, what could be said today about the elections which were held?

[Vorotnikov] One can only talk about preliminary results. Not because we do not know how the voters voted, but because repeat elections are due to be held in almost one-tenth of okrugs for the election of autonomous republic and local soviet people's deputies. A further 39 RSFSR people's deputies also have to be elected. But the main work has already been done—the bulk of the corps of people's deputies has taken shape. In conformity with the law, the list of deputies must be published not later than 10 days following the elections, so that we have to wait only a little longer.

Let us now turn to the election results. More than 702,000 persons were elected deputies to local soviets, and 66 percent of them will be deputies for the first time. Women account for 35 percent of deputies, and persons under 30 years of age for 15 percent. Some 49 percent of deputies are communists. There are 25 percent workers and 20 percent kolkhoz [collective farm] members. Leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations account for about 13 percent. The deputies include representatives of all Russia's nations and peoples.

When comparing these data with the data produced by the 1987 elections, it must be noted that there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of new deputies and a sharp decline in the number of women and young deputies. There are six percent more party members among the deputies. The proportion of workers has dropped while that of kolkhoz members has risen somewhat.

[PRAVDA] And what is the composition of RSFSR people's deputies?

[Vorotnikov] The 4 March elections and the 18 March runoffs resulted in the election of 1,029 out of 1,068 RSFSR people's deputies, 866 of whom were elected in territorial and 163 in national-territorial okrugs. The largest groups of deputies are made up of workers in industry, construction industry, transportation, and agriculture (35 percent) and of party and soviet officials (24 percent). About 17 percent work in science, education, and the mass media. Quite a few enterprise leaders,

sovkhoz [state farm] directors, kolkhoz chairmen, team leaders, and specialists were elected, but workers account for only five percent. There are not many women—again approximately five percent. More than 10 percent of deputies are under 35 years of age. Nineteen of the 25 party obkom [oblast committee] and kraykom [kray committee] first secretaries who ran for election as RSFSR people's deputies were elected, and so were 41 of the 60 chairmen of autonomous republic Councils of Ministers and of oblispolkoms [oblast soviet executive committee] and krayispolkoms [kray soviet executive committee] who ran for election. Let me note that these results are better than those in the election for USSR people's deputies. The proportion of communists among deputies has increased to 86 percent. In the light of these facts, any attempts to perceive the election results as a failure for the party are groundless.

[PRAVDA] The corps of deputies will contain noticeably fewer representatives of the working class....

[Vorotnikov] Yes, this is one extremely negative outcome of the elections, and it cannot fail to generate the most serious concern. After all, there are oblasts which did not elect a single worker as RSFSR people's deputy! Only one was elected in Moscow, and another one in Leningrad. Why did this happen? Some workers, feeling that they lacked the requisite political experience, withdrew their own candidacies. It is absurd, however, to think that there are no capable parliamentarians among the workers; look at the way they work at USSR Supreme Soviet sessions! But the declining number of deputies from among the workers primarily testifies that party and soviet organs failed to give worker candidates the necessary support. The press did not help a lot, either. I think that everyone must learn serious lessons from this.

[PRAVDA] The runoffs also demonstrated an unusually low activeness among voters....

[Vorotnikov] Indeed, the first stage of the election was much more active. It seemed as if this activeness should have increased—after all, everything was being decided in the second round—yet only 70 percent of voters went to the polling stations on 18 March. Why? I think that there is no one single reason to explain this. Here we have the effect of a certain apathy toward political affairs caused by dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation, as well as the effect of calls by some groups to boycott the elections. We must also take into account the fact that there was a sharp change in the choice of candidates at the second stage, and voters who had supported different candidates in the first round were not always interested in the remaining "pairs." But the main point, in my view, is the fact that soviet organs, electoral commissions, and party organizations did not display sufficient activeness to enliven voters' interest in the elections and, furthermore, the election campaign was left to just drift along in places.

[PRAVDA] There have been suggestions that voters are somehow prompted into activity by the circumstances of

confrontation between two forces—those who are conventionally known as radicals today, and those who supposedly make up the conservative camp.

[Vorotnikov] It seems to me that this is not quite an accurate picture of the situation. Indeed, there were attempts by certain circles to present matters as if the country's future were at stake in the elections, that society would find itself on the brink of collapse unless their platform was supported. I mean primarily those who extol themselves as democrats but perceive the country's future in its retreat from socialism. And the conservative groups opposing them also whipped up passions.

But neither group took into account the real mood of people who, on the whole, are well aware that the issue today concerns not new schemes and plans but the need to organize smooth work in all sectors of perestroika. The continuation of the process of democratization, the economic reform, the financial system's recovery, the improvement of the ecological situation, the struggle against crime—none of these requires either dramatic slogans or a solution to the question of "who will defeat whom." Ultimately, those who were banking on this were to be disappointed. The overwhelming majority of voters supported men of action, they supported the party.

[PRAVDA] There are rumors that the so-called opposition—supporters of the interregional group of deputies, the "Memorial," and suchlike—has won a major victory in the elections of RSFSR people's deputies.

[Vorotnikov] As far as I know, these forces strove to present a "united front" and proclaimed the creation of the "Democratic Russia" bloc. But those whom they backed won a total of some 20-23 percent of seats, mainly at the expense of deputies from several large cities, primarily Moscow and Leningrad.

[PRAVDA] And what effect could this have on the work of the republic's Congress and Supreme Soviet?

[Vorotnikov] First of all, it is necessary to bear in mind the difference between election campaign statements and a deputy's practical work. It can be assumed that common sense and the realities surrounding us will force some of them to amend their positions. So it would be premature right now to engage in trying to weigh up the "disposition of forces" or the issues which would produce confrontation or cooperation....

I proceed from the premise that every deputy, obeying the voters' will, should strive to play a constructive part in the activity of the supreme organs of power. If this does materialize, there will be smooth and fruitful work which will promote Russia's prosperity.

[PRAVDA] Obviously, the two-stage voting system demands some sort of special election campaign strategy.

[Vorotnikov] We will have to seriously analyze the course of elections in our own and in other republics.

After all, in many regards they were organized differently from last year's elections of USSR people's deputies. In compliance with voters' wishes, the okrug election campaign meetings which acted as a kind of sieve for candidates were abolished. This time virtually every nominee was listed on the ballot paper, supposedly to allow voters to work things out for themselves. Voters frequently found themselves in a very complex position, having to make their choice from among 10-20 candidates and guided only by their photographs and brief biographical sketches. Voters had to choose the best from among people whom, in most cases, they either knew vaguely or did not know at all. This is hardly likely to promote an efficient composition of the organs of power. No other country provides such easy access to the political stage as ours: There is a tough selection process everywhere else. As a matter of fact, members of a delegation from the U.S. Federal Election Commission who visited our country recently were quite amazed that representatives of the same party or of the same public organization were standing against each other.

[PRAVDA] What lessons can be learned from the election results for the future?

[Vorotnikov] What I have said makes it clear that it is necessary to really ponder the question of how good our electoral process is. Having summed up the accumulated experience, Russian deputies should introduce the necessary amendments to the law now in force, even though it was elaborated very thoroughly, on the basis of discussion by the people.

Specifically, in my view, it is important to more precisely define the conditions and forms of candidates' participation in the election campaign struggle. It is necessary to provide them with equal opportunities for access to the mass media. It goes against the spirit of democratic elections when you have some candidates engaging in demagoguery and making fantastic promises—all for the sake of gaining voter support. There are also some simply dishonest and gross methods of election campaigning. It is an alarming fact that there were quite a few deviations from the accepted procedure for the preparation and holding of elections.

[PRAVDA] When will deputies begin to carry out their duties?

[Vorotnikov] It can be said that many people's deputies have already started work, without waiting for official confirmation of their powers. The first sessions of newly composed rayon and oblast soviets either have been held or are being held in some of the republic's regions. Naturally, their attention is focused on organizational questions.

Their paramount tasks include the solution of urgent problems of economic life, the imposition of order in production and the social sphere. Of course, nobody will be starting from scratch. Much has already been done in this regard. The population supports with gratification the firm measures aimed at improving the sociopolitical

situation, at strengthening discipline and order in the country. The first USSR presidential decrees have been welcomed with approval. This is the background against which deputies will begin their work.

[PRAVDA] When will the first Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies be held, and what preparations are being made for it?

[Vorotnikov] According to the republic's constitution, the congress must be convened not later than two months following the elections. The bulk of deputies—almost 90 percent of the total, a figure which makes it possible to convene a legally constituted congress—were elected 18 March, so we should start counting from that date. This means that the congress ought to be convened not later than 18 May.

Bearing in mind the experience of holding the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies, it is assumed that all the preparatory work will be undertaken by a special commission made up of elected deputies. It ought to comprise representatives of all autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts, of every autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug, as well as Moscow and Leningrad.

It is important that the preparatory commission should begin its work as soon as possible, in the first days of April. It will have a lot of work to do. It will have to prepare draft working documents for the congress, put together proposals for the agenda and the provisional standing orders of the congress and the Supreme Soviet, and consider procedures for holding elections for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions and committees.

I would like to conclude by saying the following. With all the importance attaching to the latest elections, which were a major step forward along the path of perestroika and development of the processes of democratization and glasnost, we must perceive them only as a starting point in the major work to boost the economy and culture, to strengthen the sovereign rights and effect the moral revival of the RSFSR. This is the deputies' duty, and there is no doubt that the present corps of deputies is capable of solving the complex tasks facing it.

Sverdlovsk Power Struggle Analyzed

PM2803131090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
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[Article by special correspondent Valeriy Vyzhutovich; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA page one trailer: "The Struggle for Power: Thoughts Outside the Front Entrance"]

[Text] Having recognized, through the mouth of the USSR president, the need "to urgently adopt laws and decisions aimed at demonopolization of the economy," we also recognized the urgency of the demonopolization of politics. This is already present in the Constitution, in the new version of Article 6. For the first time in its

entire history the CPSU is in the same category as "others," although it heads that category.

So is party diktat at an end? It will take time before we can firmly answer "yes." The power struggle is on. The forces of inertia are great and the conservative section of the apparatus is not giving ground. IZVESTIYA special correspondent Valeriy Vyzhutovich describes these processes in Sverdlovsk, processes which reflect the situation in the country.

[Vyzhutovich begins] Sverdlovsk—We were born and raised in waiting lines. But one waiting line that was formerly inconceivable has formed and taken on a separate identity only today. In it there stand delegates from the various democratic movements in which our political life is so encouragingly and disturbingly rich. It is an invisible line—and now more and more frequently a flesh-and-blood line—outside the front entrances of buildings guarded by the militia in the main city squares. The question "What is on offer?" would be inappropriate here. The commodity for which a rally of many thousands of people is prepared to stand waiting in blistering heat or freezing cold is something that, by an age-old law of life, is never on offer; you take it.

What happened in Sverdlovsk on 29 December last year has already been in the newspapers, including IZVESTIYA. A detailed and thoughtful account of what happened after that and what may, perhaps, soon follow is needed. This can only be understood in the context of the events just before the New Year, although there were and still are people in Sverdlovsk who stubbornly refuse to acknowledge the connection. But in vain: The waiting lines, like slow fuses, stretch toward the front entrances primarily from the store counters. The connection is direct and obvious.

Let me remind you: From very early in the morning on 29 December, a huge waiting line began to form outside the "Tsentrallyy" food store for wine and vodka. They waited about five hours, and by lunchtime they stopped waiting. A growing murmur spread through the crowd, a hoarse bass voice sounded a note of alarm: "To me, guys!"—and from that moment a spontaneous mechanism for turning a line into a rally came into operation. A few volunteers, responding to the call, lay on the streetcar tracks. In 15 minutes, all traffic had come to a standstill on Lenin Avenue. The crowd spilled out onto the roadway and, swaying, surged into 1905 Square in the direction of the party gorkom [city committee] and the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee].

More than 5,000 people stood below the windows of the city authorities. It was frosty and windy. A bus that had been driven into the square for the New Year entertainment of citizens was relaying festive tunes, but soon the crowd seized the microphone.... "Food requisition detachments" mobilized by the waiting line were poking around in storerooms and at trade bases, bringing out into the light, from the gathering gloom, vodka, wine, candies, coffee, and sausages, but no one came out of the

front entrance. The square was breathless with anticipation. They were not waiting for vodka. In those moments of general sobering-up, all of a sudden another shortage could be clearly felt, perhaps the most important—the shortage of power.

The city's top officials came out to the people. The muffled hum of the square was overlaid with the worn-out old record about disruptions to meat deliveries from Krasnodar, the need to build new hog units and fattening units in the oblast, the immediate strengthening of discipline and imposition of order....

A small delegation of USSR people's deputies and leaders of local democratic movements was sent to the gorkom for talks. Half an hour later they announced that the "29 December" social committee had been set up. Its task—to establish a dialogue between the city's leadership and the citizens. It was agreed to meet in a calm atmosphere by mid-January. But four days before the agreed date, the apparatus, preempting the meeting, held something of the nature of a party and economic aktiv meeting at the Political Enlightenment Institute. There was a report and debates on it, new targets were set, and profound concern was displayed, until German Karolin, one of the leaders of the "29 December" Committee, said from the platform:

"People do not trust you! And the loss of confidence is a sign of a power crisis. Where does that lead? Only to one thing. It is time to set up parallel administrative organs in the city."

The auditorium began to buzz....

Politics, provided it is reasonable politics, has its own "safety mechanism." One of the rules is that a power system that is in a broken-down condition should first be subjected to careful dismantling, and only then replaced. The classical laughter that accompanies mankind's distancing himself from his past must without fail, just in case, be accompanied by a certain unhurriedness and circumspection. Destroying is not building, and that is why a bulldozer is always more "radical" than a lifting crane. But today either we gather our will and patience and dismantle our leaning social structure in order to erect something really worthy according to new blueprints, or else our home will collapse, undermined from right and left, and there will be innumerable casualties. If we leave everything untouched, as if in a museum, in the name of loyalty to "ideals" and "principles," it will still collapse. Yes, the course to be preferred is after all, most probably, that of calm dismantling.

But—impatience.... Never mind the Sverdlovsk democrats with their idea of parallel administrative organs—in Donetsk the miners, threatening a political strike, demand the total abolition of gorkoms and raykoms [rayon party committees] and the election of a new obkom [oblast party committee]. Whatever our attitude toward this demand, one thing is absolutely indisputable: A change of power must take place only by peaceful means.

Must it? Yes, the time has come. Having recognized, through the mouth of the USSR president, the need "urgently to adopt laws and decisions aimed at demonopolization of the economy," we also recognized the urgency of the demonopolization of politics. This is already present in the Constitution, in the new version of Article 6. For the first time in its entire history the CPSU is in the same category as "others," although it heads that category. So is party diktat at an end? It will take time before we can firmly answer "yes." A year, less, more—no one knows.

The monopoly system is alive and well in politics, it sits on presidiums, it "carpets" people, it reprimands them, it issues directives. It is the identical twin of its fellow—the monopoly system in the economy. The same habits. Like an industrial giant that has no competition, it struggles not for the results of its own labor, but for freedom and independence from results, and it always succeeds in this. When its output (resolutions, decisions, instructions) is not in demand, it imposes it on everyone by coercion, without answering for the consequences. During many years of the absence of a free "market" for ideas, it did whatever it liked, and we were totally deprived of political choice, because here too the prevailing principle was—"take whatever is on offer." And although "all our life is a struggle," we never had a political struggle.

Now that even schoolchildren are discovering their own political sympathies and the demarcation of social forces is deepening, becoming ever clearer and more rigid, before our very eyes and with our participation something is coming to birth that formerly seemed, and was, inconceivable, and is unimaginable to some people even today—a struggle for power.

The Sverdlovsk situation did not develop overnight. It began to emerge exactly a year ago, when the city and oblast party leaders suffered a crushing defeat at the elections of USSR people's deputies. At that time it still seemed decent to explain what had happened in terms of the "intrigues" of extremists and the rampant "slander" in the press, but Sverdlovsk Gorkom, to give it its due, preferred to look for other reasons. The gorkom's summer plenum was unprecedented in terms of the heat of criticism, while the proposal to convene an extraordinary oblast party conference contained a clear hint of a lack of confidence in the obkom.

The hint was taken. Obkom First Secretary L. Bobykin submitted the question of confidence to the bureau and received a unanimous "go-ahead," which he soon reported to the plenum.

"After that, the obkom's prestige went into a terminal decline," V. Kadochnikov, first secretary of Sverdlovsk Gorkom, told me. "Its conservative membership would not take control of the situation, yet we had warned them...."

"Vladimir Dmitriyevich," I said, "strictly between ourselves, and with your hand on your heart: Are you engaged in a struggle for power?"

"Not at all," he replied. "The oblast portfolio is very heavy, I would not recommend it to anyone...."

He is 47, fit, energetic, indefatigable, and has recently been elected an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy....

Fine, let us come back to L. Bobykin. The Uralmash party conference expressed a lack of confidence in him. But the point of the conference was not merely to demand the obkom first secretary's resignation. The range of questions raised was so broad that it went far beyond the bounds of the oblast.

"The Uralmash Plant party conference resolves: To deem the situation that has arisen in the CPSU and the country an emergency.

"The party conference demands that the CPSU Central Committee Plenum adopt the following emergency measures:

"Suspend the operation of the norms of the CPSU Statutes defining the procedure for elections of party leadership organs, as well as decisions adopted earlier that retard the development of intraparty democracy....

"Convene an extraordinary CPSU congress within two months.... Carry out elections of delegates to the extraordinary CPSU congress on a democratic basis, directly from the grass-roots party organizations....

"The CPSU Central Committee should give every communist the opportunity to obtain full information on the December (1989) plenums and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee.

"The Uralmash Plant Party Organization, while in general advocating compliance with the CPSU Statutes, considers it possible, having assessed the results of the Central Committee February plenum, to depart from the fulfillment of statutory requirements by suspending the collection of party membership dues."

Twelve days later the obkom plenum accepted L. Bobykin's resignation. The duties of head of the oblast party organization were entrusted to Second Secretary V. Manyukhin.

Uralmash reacted with a resolution:

"Having discussed the results of the Fifth Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom Plenum, the Uralmash Plant party conference... deems erroneous the decision to release Comrade L.F. Bobykin, at his request, from the duties of obkom first secretary without hearing a report from him and giving a political assessment of his activity, and expresses a lack of confidence in Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom.

"The conference deems it expedient:

"To hear the CPSU obkom's report at the oblast party conference and give a political assessment of the activity

of the obkom and the obkom bureau members (including Comrade L.F. Bobykin) in leading the oblast party organization.

"To elect the party obkom at the oblast party conference on 5-6 April. To put forward alternative candidates from among the obkom members for the post of first and second secretaries of the obkom...."

Have you noticed? Party documents are nowadays often more gripping and entertaining than any thriller. Because a political struggle is under way within the party. There are conflicts of philosophies, characters, actions—what rich material for the chronicler! The apparatus is now also divided, there are many people there who command respect, but in general people have less and less confidence in it. What can you do, old scores are being settled, in return for the camps, the kolkhozes, the special stores—apparently our dear departed leaders could conceive of nothing better.

The crisis of confidence in the authorities is perhaps the most serious of the crises gripping the country. The All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion conducted a poll: "In your opinion, which organizations now most actively express the people's interests and enjoy the greatest confidence among the population?" Three groups emerged. The people decisively refuse to place confidence in the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], law enforcement organs, ministries, and trade unions. They have less, rather than more, confidence in the party, religious organizations, and local soviets. The greatest confidence is placed in the informal associations, Supreme Soviets, and the press.

Sociological studies reflect the political situation—diarchy: The highest legislative organ is already in operation and the republican and local soviets, which have just been democratically elected, are embarking on their work, but the real power is still in the hands of the party and state apparatus.

The questionnaire included this question: "Over the past year we have all witnessed heated political debates. In your view, do these debates reflect a developing power struggle between the supporters of perestroika and the adherents of the old edict methods of leadership, or is it rather a case of rivalry among like-minded people who differ only in their approaches to resolving problems?" "A power struggle is in progress," 40 percent of those polled replied. "Rivalry among like-minded people," 23 percent said. And 37 percent did not know. Fine, but "how would you assess the influence of people like you on political life?" "Weak," 56 percent openly acknowledged, while 11 percent considered it adequate, and only 2 percent stated that their influence is very weighty. Some 31 percent of participants in the poll did not answer the question.

Such figures indicate only one thing: The keen sense of having no rights that is experienced by the Soviet citizen

almost constantly and universally is the result of mass powerlessness, if power is taken to mean not the sum of benefits that go with the job, but the opportunity to influence the course of history genuinely and in a practical way, which elevates man. We are approaching this goal through the renewed soviets, and we are beginning to learn how to achieve it.

..."Interesting folk," one senior comrade said to me, referring to the Sverdlovsk democrats. "But you know, I soon rumbled them. They are power-hungry!"

A terrible revelation. The oppositionists' secret plans are revealed, the undercurrent of self-interest behind the rallies and meetings is at last uncovered.

How primitive our ideas of democracy still are sometimes! The fact that in a civilized society a power struggle is the norm, not an anomaly, is quite impossible for some people to grasp. If you do not support the leadership that currently thrives, that means you yourself are hungry for office. Can this arrogance be tolerated? There is certainly something funny about the devout ingenuousness with which the nomenklatura dismisses the claims of "outsiders" to a "portfolio." Representatives of the leadership elite act like reigning big shots to whom power is granted and should be granted without a struggle—by right of royal succession. And indeed: If you were second secretary you become first secretary, if you were deputy chairman you become chairman....

But what of the suspects? When I met with any of them, first they were indignant, then came a resolute protest: "No way, it never crossed my mind!"

I do not know whether or not my interlocutors were being devious. But the haste with which every one of them brushed aside like the plague any personal claim to power merits consideration.

Stalin's inoculation did its work: It seems that many of us are born with a strong immunity to political activity, which is perceived as something forbidden once and for all to ordinary mortals, categorically banned, seditious, the kind of thing they "could put you in prison for." The very words "opposition," "faction," and "power struggle" are to this day redolent of the underground. Hence this ingrained fear of being caught out thinking "criminal" thoughts, this constant fussing: What will people say? How will they take it? God forbid that they suspect you of being untrustworthy.

It is time we grew out of this inferiority complex. Until we learn to stand spiritually erect, we will succeed in nothing. It was N. Chernyshevskiy who observed: You cannot train a person to be energetic in the grainfields, but meek in his allotted hut. We have apparently finally agreed to respect the economic interest of the individual. But what about his political interest? I suggest that this too merits respect.

The more people are ready to take the helm of power, the better it is for that power: There is a choice.

In Sverdlovsk there are more than 30 independent sociopolitical organizations, and in the oblast as a whole over 3,000. These are official figures: I trust that the bulletin of the Sverdlovsk party obkom lecturers' group is a reliable source. Let me tell you, it is a curious document. It is a guide (that is what it is called) to help the ideological aktiv. This manual was published to prevent lecturers from losing their way in the labyrinth of democratic programs. That being so, at least it will tell you how to assess the "Memorial" society or, say, the "Yedinstvo" ["Unity"] trade union.

And so, after paying tribute to the military-patriotic association "Kaskad" ("it has succeeded in setting up a system for working with difficult adolescents in their neighborhoods") and expressing approval for the creative work of amateur associations and special interest clubs ("they have livened up young people's leisure activity and organized a series of interesting exhibitions and festivals"), the guide, beginning on page two, offers an ideological rebuff to forces that have "become active and are trying to consolidate."

How many local independent clubs, unions, and organizations would you expect to find on the ignominious list of forces "alien" to our ideals? Virtually all of them are there. So, have these democratic associations, which differ fundamentally from one another not only in their ideas, but even in their colors, consolidated their forces? No, of course not, each of them has its own program, its own goals, its own path. They have only one thing in common—"patently negative trends can be detected in their activity." What trends? Take a deep breath: "orientation toward activity of a nature that is independent of party and soviet organs, and in some cases the manifestation of opposition views and sentiments; the spread of ideologically harmful and provocative views on questions of party leadership; the organization of rallies and marches; the desire to coordinate actions, collaborate with one another, establish firm ties with informal organizations in various cities, and set up all-Russian and all-union organizations; the publication of samizdat bulletins and pamphlets and the quest for permanent contacts with the mass media."

It is shameful.... Can you seriously "catch" someone doing what is not prohibited by law and is widely current in society? But the style, the tone!.... Do they remind you of anything? Yes, it is more or less the same kind of specialists who describe the characteristics and conduct of a criminal. An enemy. I need hardly say that this guide is known not only to those whom it is intended to guide, but those whom it is about. So it is hardly surprising if the enemy image so insistently created by the apparatus in the shape of political opponents sooner or later takes on the form of flesh and blood.

"We are in favor of dialogue with all democratic forces," obkom Second Secretary V. Manyukhin told me. "It is necessary to cooperate, to meet more often, we have so much in common."

Two attitudes to political opponents. One, sullen and suspicious, for internal "guidance." The other, open and benevolent, for the store window.

But meanwhile, Sverdlovsk's political clubs and associations are getting on with the job—gathering their forces.

The events of 29 December drastically brought forward the day when representatives of local democratic movements met for the city's first Civic Forum.

"We, participants in the first Civic Forum, people of Sverdlovsk, concerned at the state of affairs in the city and the country, note the crisis of power and the inability of the existing administrative organs to find a way out of the political and economic impasse....

"In the conditions of a crisis situation, the Sverdlovsk CPSU Gorkom Plenum failed to think of anything better than to identify as one of the main factors the attempts of 'certain groups of citizens and independent associations to exploit the situation for their own self-seeking purposes, including the struggle for political power'....

"The Civic Forum is to be regarded as a sociopolitical movement of the people of Sverdlovsk for the purpose of practical participation in the resolution of the vitally important problems facing the city and the country...."

The next day, the Center for the Formation of Civic Power was set up in the city. This created the impression of a coup in preparation. This impression was reinforced when it became known that certain mysterious conspirators are already sharing out the portfolios and forming a "shadow cabinet."

"What was all this?" I asked Sergey Solovyev, leader of the center and general director of the "Polyareks" Association.

"Nothing terrible," he shrugged. "Future deputies met, drew up a package of questions for consideration at the first session.... Well, obviously not all of us will be elected. So whoever is elected will take our ideas and proposals to the platform. What kind of a conspiracy is that, for heaven's sake?"

The specter of the "seizure of power" that had stalked Sverdlovsk for a week quietly disappeared, after kindling in the minds of the nomenklatura an anxiety that has not yet abated.

A power struggle is in progress, but it would be pure madness artificially to exacerbate it, when everything in the country is already on a knife-edge. When I say artificial exacerbation I do not only mean incitement to storm the important offices, but also excessive vigilance on the part of their incumbents. This latter factor is, I will not deny, becoming ever more worrying. We have learned too well the lesson that any revolution (and perestroika is a revolution) is only worth anything if it can defend itself. But a constant, tense readiness to rebuff an onslaught could now provoke all kinds of things.

No, defending perestroika today does not mean hampering the legitimate—let me stress, legitimate—operations of the most diverse social forces. Or intimidating people with the power struggle. Ultimately this is a struggle for real—rather than imaginary—power for the soviets. The more open and civilized this struggle is, the fewer pretexts there will be for extremism. You have to talk with the opposition. World civilization has yet to invent a better way of an understanding those who disagree with you. In countries experiencing a crisis and subjected to the operation of various political forces, as a rule committees of national consensus appear.

Consensus, not strife.

Vorotnikov Chairs RSFSR Supsov Presidium Session

PM2903132790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "At the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium:"]

[Text] A presidium sitting 28 March examined the results of the elections of people's deputies in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], autonomous republics, and local soviets of people's deputies in the Russian Federation.

It was noted that the election campaign in the Russian Federation was by and large marked by openness and glasnost, extensive use was made of the democratic mechanism enshrined in the new legislation on elections, and conditions were created for voting on a multiple-candidate basis.

At a result of the two rounds of elections 1,026 RSFSR people's deputies were elected—or 96 percent of the total number of deputies' seats—along with 2,530 people's deputies in the autonomous republics—88.4 percent—and 702,388 deputies to local soviets of all levels. Voter turnout was down on previous years. Some 77 percent voted 4 March, while less than 70 percent of the citizens on the electoral rolls voted in the runoff 14, 17, and 18 March.

Attention is also drawn to the large number of voting papers—approximately 10 million—deemed invalid. This illustrates clear failure to do their job on the part of many election commissions, whose members were unable to explain the voting procedure to voters.

It was indicated at the sitting that these shortcomings can to a significant degree be attributed to the imperfect nature of some articles of the election laws. The new RSFSR deputies must amend existing laws once they have generalized their experience of the election campaign.

The adopted resolution instructs Supreme Soviet Presidiums in the autonomous republics and local soviets of people's deputies to take the appropriate organizational steps to rigorously fulfill all the demands of the election legislation linked with repeat elections.

The presidium sitting examined the question of the date for the convocation of the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies (a decree will be published in the press).

It also discussed the progress made in preparing for the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. Mindful of the experience of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, it was decided to give the preparatory commission—which will comprise deputies elected from each region of the republic—the task of carrying out the preliminary work in connection with the upcoming congress.

It also examined some other questions of state life in the republic.

V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, chaired the sitting.

'Duty Reporter' Answers Readers' Queries

90UN1274B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Mar 90 p 4

[By S. Chesnokov under the rubric: "Duty Reporter"]

[Text] Can it be true that our Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, the people's deputy whom we trust so much, really took money from cooperative members? That is the conclusion that can be drawn from a TV speech by the deputy editor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. But we just cannot comprehend anything of the kind.

Professor N.D. Yegorov, chairman of the scientific consultations cooperative "Legal Aid" under Leningrad State University, has this to say:

It was not only I, but also my colleagues who were infuriated by that speech. The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA deputy editor insisted that (here I quote) "Anatoliy Aleksandrovich really received some bonuses or royalties, whatever you call them, from the cooperatives." Let me recall the truth as I know it all in detail, and the financial organizations that checked our work can confirm it.

The "Legal Aid" cooperative was founded in October 1988 and A.A. Sobchak was among its founders. He, by the way, never made this fact secret and used to mention it at his meetings with the constituents and in TV debates.

Doctors and candidates of jurisprudence at Leningrad State University became members of the scientific consultations cooperative. For his work there from October 1988 through April 1989 Professor Sobchak was paid a salary of R50 to R320 a month. You can judge for yourself whether it is too much or too little for an expert with his qualifications. During his work there he compiled expert appraisals and designed standard acts and legal papers for the transfer of enterprises and organizations to progressive work forms. This is basic activity of "Legal Aid."

After A.A. Sobchak was elected a USSR people's deputy, he stopped working for our cooperative and was released from its membership as of 10 May 1989 according to his letter of resignation.

I would not speak publicly about who earned how much had I not been provoked to it by the biased presentation of facts in the TV program. I think that the sole purpose of the TV appearance of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA representative was to compromise A.A. Sobchak, a USSR people's deputy who enjoys great popularity in our country. From a moral and ethical point of view the means chosen were far from ideal. Everyone must understand that there is a difference between "money received from some cooperatives" and money that was honestly earned.

How is it possible? Are we going to stay outside the elections? I mean we, thousands of correspondence course students who have come to Leningrad from all over the country for the winter exams. I understand that we do not have the right to elect deputies to the Leningrad City Council, but I wish we could in some way influence the choice of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] deputies—isn't it our common republic?

Here is the answer of V.I. Rozov, head of the Organization and Instruction Department of the Lensovet Executive Committee:

Correspondence course students who come here from other cities usually do not have a permanent or even temporary police registration in Leningrad. Unfortunately, neither do they have the right to elect deputies in our city, not even RSFSR deputies. If they do not go back to where they live, the students will stay outside the elections. The same is true of people from other cities who have been admitted to Leningrad hospitals.

Unfortunately, the election law does not provide for such occasions. It clearly needs to be improved upon so that people do not at least miss the next elections.

Duty Reporter Information

Today, 3 March, at 1100 there will be a meeting with people's deputies of all levels. The place of the meeting will be the stadium of the Izhorskiy factory association in Kolpino. The meeting is organized by the local "Voters' Association—52."

RSFSR Writers Plenum Proceedings Reported

PM3003124390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[V. Malukhin "Notes from the Seventh RSFSR Writers Union Board Plenum": "Two Days in the Central House of Writers"]

[Text] Representatives of Russia's writers organizations gathered in Moscow to discuss the draft new statutes of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic] Writers Union, set the date of the next congress, and formulate the organization's tasks "in conditions of the crisis situation prevailing in the country." It is true that, in the course of the plenum, the third item on the agenda was changed to read: "The future of multinational Russia and contemporary literature." The Russian writers congress will be held 11-14 December in the Kremlin.

The plenum opened without a quorum, as is customary in the House of Writers, and was virtually unconcerned with the problems of creative writing. While the report by V. Karpov, first secretary of the USSR Writers Union Board, at the "grand" plenum which was held the previous day dealt with purely economic and financial problems, the discussion at the RSFSR Writers Union Board plenum was devoted more to politics. What the two plenums had in common was a request by the leaders of both writers unions to be allowed to retire, and the unanimous rejection of their requests. "I am not a chervonets [gold coin in circulation 1922-47], so I do not expect to be liked by everyone," S. Mikhalkov said. "However, I have tried to the best of my ability for the past two decades to adhere to the middle road without which cooperation between the literatures of our Mother Russia is impossible.... Having just turned 77, I find that I am no longer able to perform the duties of chairman.... I do not know whether my comrades in the Russian writers organization will understand me, but I am confident that the Russian children will understand and approve of my decision for which, frankly speaking, they have long been waiting."

The Sixth RSFSR Writers Union Board Plenum, which attracted wide publicity, served as an unmistakable advertisement for the current, Seventh Plenum. However, on this occasion the atmosphere was not heavy with scandal. But it would be equally wrong to claim, as one of the speakers did, that "the specter of Sergiy Radonezhskiy is haunting this hall" where participants greeted intolerance, xenophobia, and insulting remarks with cries of delight and applause. I am referring to the speech by V. Leshchenko, "chairman of Uzbekistan's Russian—not Russian language!—Poetry Section": "For how long will we let them strut about in our land, for how long will the Judas of Zionism terrorize and crush our people, for how long can we put up with this?... I have to upset Citizen Sokolov, I refuse to call him mister, much less a comrade.... At home in Tashkent we have stepped on your lot. They no longer feel so free and easy. So that your Zionist associations have had it there, and long may Russia live.... Death to Zionism, long live mankind!" That was the last speech at the plenum. Maksim Maksimovich Shtirlits, who still lives in our memory, said that the last sentence is the one that is always remembered. S. Mikhalkov described this tirade as an "unholy row" and closed the plenum "with a feeling of satisfaction that it had gone better than the previous one."

However, while the appearance on the plenum rostrum of the self-appointed orator from a region which is very far from Russia can be explained in any way you like,

right up to describing it as a typical provocation, S. Kunyayev, editor of the journal NASH SOVREMENNİK is a different matter. To the delight of the gathering of Russian writers, he handed S. Mikhalkov a pair of men's pants with an imprint of a profile of Tatyana Larina and excerpts from "Yevgeniy Onegin" to be passed on to A. Ananyev, editor of the journal OKTYABR "because Anatoliy Andreyevich Ananyev had unleashed an anti-Pushkin campaign in his journal." This joke, which was in very poor taste, was hardly compatible with S. Kunyayev's own call to respond to foes "as befits true heirs of Pushkin—firmly, confidently, and calmly. With cool contempt rather than aggressive frenzy."

Quite a few similar "heirs of Pushkin" mounted the rostrum and they were invariably rewarded with applause. And although the tape recording contains much that will not appear in any stenographic record, I do not want to talk about it here. Any Western colleague of mine might be surprised at my stance, but obviously our writers have not yet managed to kill off our respect for the Russian writer's mission with their public remarks, a mission which they themselves are prone to forget more and more frequently.

Could this plenum of the RSFSR Writers Union Board be described as what is called a consolidating plenum? No, it could not of course, for the simple reason that it was a gathering of like-minded people. Whereas only A. Turkov's and M. Dudin's voices clashed with the general mood at the last RSFSR Writers Union Board plenum, there was no discord on this occasion. What is there to be discussed if, according to the opinion of Yu. Bondarev, "pluralism is necessary at the outset of the quest, when realities are studied, so as to arrive at unanimity as a guideline for action and progress." Nonetheless, the speech by L. Vasilyeva attracted attention: "I recall S. Kunyayev and F. Kuznetsov tending toward the left and V. Korotich and V. Sokolov tending toward the right. I recall T. Glushkova definitely on the left, and T. Ivanova very much on the right.... This is not meant as criticism. On the contrary, it is very natural to change one's views, to grow disillusioned with certain things, to make certain assertions. Just as it is very natural, in my opinion, to remain committed to certain political and literary views all one's life. What is unnatural is to assert that these views are the absolute, ultimate truth and to foist them on others." T. Glushkova immediately pounced on L. Vasilyeva for saying this, showering her with a series of deprecatory epithets.

V. Krupin, editor of the journal MOSKVA, described the plenum's moral standards as sharply declining, and noted that if he were a member of "Aprel" [liberal writers association] or a Radio Liberty staffer, he would have been highly amused by the spectacle, since the Russian writers left none of their weaknesses unexposed. Is there any need to learn democracy if we have ordinary human decency? A writer's job is human nature, knowing about human nature. And if we claim that no one is listening to us, that everything around us has been

taken over by opponents, it must mean that we are poor speakers because we also have an opportunity to make our voices heard. We are constantly denouncing others, as it were, writing and moaning. If you want to address yourself to anyone, you should address yourselves straight to the people. I am not a politician, nor do I want to be one. After all, we are not a political organization but a creative organization, and we should remember this. For instance, I am much less concerned about Gorbachev's entourage than about the company which Karpov, Mikhalkov, or Bondarev keeps, V. Krupin said.

However, the plenum did not share his opinion in the least. The expectations of both the supporters and the opponents of this literary camp were entirely vindicated. There were the usual anathemas—the specter of Zionism which is haunting Russia and the “extremist ultra press,” the “sociological babble” and the “consumerist trap,” the “eloquent theoreticians of radical economics” and the “putsch by literary general Ananyev,” “Korotich, the pit bull terrier of perestroika” and the “‘April’ blight” (a reference to the writers association). However, new overtones to well-known tunes were also in evidence along the lines of “Down With Everything!,” “Expose Everything!,” “Extirpate Everything!” which pale, of course, against the “Russophobia” and “necrophilia” which have gained wide currency in intelligentsia circles.

As is now the custom everywhere, some blamed the October Revolution and the partocracy for everything, while others maintained that the Soviet state was the best thing history has ever produced. Some perceived the presidential oath at the recent Congress of People's Deputies as a “prayer in the Temple of the People's Soul,” while other saw a bad omen in the fact that it had been sworn on the Brezhnev Constitution. Some promised to stay with the party to their last gasp, like the captain on a sinking ship's bridge, while for other Marxism had been contaminated from the outset with the poison of Cosmopolitanism and Russophobia. All this, I will say it again, can be heard nowadays at any rally, but there were new features which make it possible to look at the RSFSR Writers Union from a new angle. As far as can be judged, a gradual transformation of the writers organization into some kind of political structure is under way.

This idea rang out most clearly in the speech delivered by A. Prokhanov: “...A renaissance movement has emerged among Russian writers right now. It has sprung up in such patriotic writers organizations as the ‘Guild of Russian Artists,’ ‘Unity,’ and ‘Fatherland,’ encompassed wide circles of the cultural sphere, and spilled over into workers, scientific and technical, and Army circles. This movement has been dubbed ‘United Council of Russia’ or ‘People's Consensus’ and, having originated deep within humanitarian circles, has entered the broad arena, taken part in the election campaign, entered the hustings, and joined in the pre-election battles. Essentially, it is the embryo of a future party of national rebirth.”

Practically no one paid any attention to this speech which opened the debate. But what else if not party interest can

explain the coordination of the activities of both the controlled and the friendly press by the Russian Writers Union Board Secretariat, the establishment of support points, as it were, on the basis of regional writers organizations, the purposeful work with letters in support of the Russian Writers Union line, the idea of turning to the United Nations with a request to protect the peoples of Russia, and the study of the election tactics of “Democratic Russia”....

The emergence of yet another party is not likely to astound anyone. As long, of course, as it is not a question of a writers party. I personally would be seriously alarmed by such an evolution of the writers union. First of all, because nothing would remain of the writers' professional association. Those “not committed to the national ethic” would be driven out, as V. Lichutin proposed at the plenum, and so would all “apolitical” members who had not joined any group. We all know the meaning of armchair ideology when presented as real politics. And therefore, we can vividly imagine what Plato's ideal state run by philosophers would have been like, and we know what the theocratic republic in Geneva under Calvin was actually like. There is no reason to suppose that the new type of ideological statehood would be any better for society than the previous ones. But the main point is that a radical politicization of the Writers Union would mean that the number of writers would diminish in direct proportion to the increase in the number of politicians....

I would like to be proved wrong in my hypotheses, but how else are the documents adopted by the Seventh RSFSR Writers Union Board Plenum to be interpreted. I am referring to the “Appeal to the Peoples of Russia” which can be perceived as a political platform, and to the resolution which invites all Russian publications to print the “Letter of the Writers of Russia” and urges “writers and writers organizations in oblasts, krais, and republics to organize discussions of this letter at their meetings and to denounce any manifestations of Russophobia, chauvinism, Zionism, antisemitism, and fascism.”

Apart from this, a resolution was adopted calling for the question of A. Ananyev's position as chief editor of the journal OKTYABR to be discussed as a matter of urgency at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and a resolution denying the validity of the confirmation of F. Burlatskiy in the post of chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and demanding that this question be considered at an extraordinary plenum of the USSR Writers Union Board.

And, finally, the RSFSR Writers Union plenum urged that “historical justice be done, and Soviet citizenship restored without delay to the great Russian writer A.I. Solzhenitsyn who never severed his spiritual ties with the motherland.”

Penza Obkom First Secretary Elected

PM3003132990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: “First Secretary Elected”]

[Text] Penza—A party obkom [oblast committee] plenum was held in Penza yesterday to examine an organizational

question. The plenum relieved F.M. Kulikov of his duties as first secretary of the CPSU obkom in connection with his retirement on pension. From the three candidates a majority of votes elected RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Deputy B.F. Zubkov who used to work as second secretary of this CPSU obkom.

V.S. Bondarchuk, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadres Work Department, took part in the work of the plenum.

Moscow Plenum Discusses CPSU Platform

90UN1215A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Feb 90 pp 2-6

[Report on February 1990 Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

Speech of V.N. Senkov, first secretary of the Leninskiy CPSU Raykom

In the first place I should express my surprise that at the plenum of the party city committee to discuss a problem so important to the party—the Central Committee's platform for the forthcoming 28th Congress—there are no members of the Politburo or Central Committee secretaries in attendance. I do not think this is right.

Generally agreeing with the assessment of the importance of the document presented in the report by Yu.A. Prokofyev, I still cannot but express the idea that, unfortunately, it is becoming a tradition to have hasty preparation of the most important documents. In this sense the draft was unexpected since it was not published before the plenum of the party Central Committee and, in my view, it was about a year late. There are such dynamic processes going on in the country and the party that they require prompt evaluation and development of a decisive policy on the part of the Politburo and the party Central Committee above all, for otherwise all party committees from the bottom to the top will have to retire. First of all it is necessary to realistically assess the situation, and it is such that today we are essentially working under the conditions of a multiparty system and, consequently, transformations in the party should proceed at accelerated rates if we do not want to end up in political isolation. Several items which, in my view, should be more clearly expressed in the platform are fundamental in this respect.

First. On the question of the Russian Communist Party. It must be created. Yesterday a group of secretaries of local party organizations came to the rayon party committee and presented an initiative to go to the local party organizations of the city and the rayon party committees with support for the proposals of the Leningraders to create the Russian Communist Party. An organizing committee was formed yesterday. We must resolve this question, primarily because its creation will make it possible to strengthen

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and become its mainstay. And the second consideration. We must not put this initiative in the hands of those who would give the Russian Communist Party a different ideological platform. I think there should be an analogous initiative group in the Moscow Communist Party.

Second. We cannot close our eyes to the appearance of horizontal structures in the party. Councils of secretaries of party organizations at various levels are gaining more and more power. The advantage from their activity is unquestionable. Therefore we must determine their role and position in the overall party structure. We should give them the right to participate in the plenums, in the electoral organs with an advisory vote, in the preliminary discussions of the most important documents, and the convening of party conferences and congresses at the request of no less than two-thirds of the secretaries. All these points must be reflected in the new CPSU Rules.

Third. We must change over to real independence of local party organizations in deeds and not just in words. One of the most important issues in this respect is the preparation for the 28th Party Congress. I think that within the framework of the independence that is granted to the party committees in the proposed draft of the CPSU Platform it is necessary at the plenum of the party city committee to resolve the issue of conducting a report and election campaign after the congress. With observance of the general principles for nominating candidates as delegates to the congress and alternative, direct, and secret elections for party districts, city and party organizations should be given the opportunity to develop concrete procedures for these elections, taking their own peculiarities into account.

Concerning the utilization and distribution of party funds. I agree with the proposals made both in the report and the speech of Comrade Nosov that this question must be resolved immediately. No less than 50 percent of party dues should be left at the disposal of the local party organizations. And they should decide for themselves how to distribute them, how their staffs should be, what number of workers should be retained, and what their wages should be. I think these rights should be extended to the rayon party committees as well.

Now about the apparatus. I agree that the apparatus should be changed qualitatively and that it should become a real aid to the electoral organ. To do this, in particular, it should employ not instructors (even the name of this position is not in keeping with the spirit of the changes), but highly qualified and well paid consultants on various issues.

I think today we have not only the right but the real possibility to raise these and other issues before the party Central Committee because the gorkom [city party committee] is taking an increasingly clear cut position regarding many fundamental issues and is ceasing to be a party organization that is constantly trying to discern

the opinion of the Politburo. But this does not mean that the first secretary of the gorkom and the gorkom apparatus are beyond criticism.

One of the most crucial problems of the present day, [sentence as published] There are only two weeks left before the elections of people's deputies. It is no secret to anyone that the Moscow Association of Voters and other social forces are clearly determined in terms of their support for candidates, and they are even preparing voter lists and announcing the candidacies of the future chairman of the Moscow soviet and his deputies. And in this situation the city party committee has taken the position of an outside observer and in general the raykoms [rayon party committees] are not showing much activity either. I think the time has come for both the city party committee and the raykoms to clearly declare their support for candidate deputies and leaders of the Moscow soviet who are possible from our viewpoint.

I cannot but mention my first impressions of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I do not doubt the importance of the decision to introduce the presidential form of control. But I am alarmed by the haste with which this issue was handled and the fact that it was not discussed either in the party organizations or in the labor collectives or in the soviet sessions at all levels. We all remember the debates that were held concerning the difficulty in changing the USSR Constitution, but the question of holding an extra Congress of People's Deputies is already being raised. Is the question of the presidency the number one question today? At a time when the situation in the country is still complicated, when blood is being spilled, and when interethnic outbursts are literally ripping the country apart, it would seem that the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers has every opportunity with the power already given to him: to impose order and strengthen discipline, and an extra congress is indeed necessary, but only concerning the question of stabilizing the situation in the country and emerging from the crisis situation. And if the members of the party city committee support this proposal, it seems to me that we should ask the USSR people's deputies and members of the Moscow CPSU city committee to bring this viewpoint to the USSR Supreme Soviet. I suggest that this be included in the draft appeal to the party Central Committee.

[Passage omitted]

Speech of S.A. Vladimirov, secretary of the party committee of Moscow enterprises of the VILS Production Association

Concerning the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, from the preceding speeches and from the report I heard fairly mild assessments, loyal and promising. The most important political document of our time cannot contain such absurd, merely declarative statements or theses as, for example, "the most rapid formation of legal guarantees" or "cast off the yoke of the past once and for

all." The platform, comrades, looks solid, as it were, from a distance, but upon closer scrutiny it can hardly satisfy many communists.

There are many such references and at the same time the communists of Moscow, the ones who have been attentively following the activity of the city party committee, did not see in the platform a reflection of the results of the work done by the Moscow party organization in discussions in the local organizations. And the materials developed at the conferences in this same hall were published quite a while ago in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

We did not see in the platform such aspects as the election of deputies. We think that the forthcoming congress should be not only the highest party organ, it should be the forum of communists which should have a guaranteed vote of confidence.

Therefore it is surprising that the platform does not give a definite answer to the question of how to conduct elections of deputies at the party congress. After all, this is a crucial issue. In terms of time periods the congress is out of sequence and in essence it is extraordinary. Therefore, deprived of this vote of confidence we consider that the congress will forfeit its validity as of this moment. Therefore we are surprised about what happened to the proposal of Moscow communists in the platform concerning elections in party districts. Perhaps it should be worded differently? People can object and they have objected, incidentally, during the discussions that all this would be included in the draft of the new regulations. Yes, perhaps. But these would be the Rules of the 29th Party Congress. But with the rates of realization of political thought that are originating in the lower party organizations, as a political force we absolutely cannot wait until then.

Today we see the way the idea of the lower party organizations is being evaluated and accepted as simply the ineptitude and slowness of the Central Committee in questions of realizing democratic transformations in the party. But even this is not the main thing. The main thing is the result of the lack of courage on the part of the Central Committee and we have figuratively ended up where we began. We began discussing the platform here, we have returned and we are standing essentially at the starting point.

Actually today we are beginning a second round of discussions of the same issues about which the Moscow party organizations made its suggestions. In the form of a thesis they were also to be heard in the speech of Comrade Prokofyev at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. This speech showed that Moscow has started thinking and acting differently and has restructured its work fairly significantly. And how could the Central Committee not notice this?

Here I have a question: Do we really need a member of the Politburo more than a secretary of the gorkom? We need a gorkom secretary! We are now working and he is here. But, unfortunately, they have not been listening to us.

And therefore one can express regret that the Central Committee is not allowing the entire party, and not just Moscow communists, to work faster. Excuse me, our legs—the lower party organizations—are getting ahead of us with respect to many issues while our heads are standing still. This is in questions that pertain to elections to the congress from the party districts, in terms of reports, and so forth.

And the Moscow party organization must defend its viewpoint. I think that on this plane the idea of an appeal to the Central Committee is undoubtedly right and the draft that was handed out to us contains a kind of springboard. The only thing one might want would be to hear sharper and more concrete complaints against the Central Committee.

In the first part of the draft it states very clearly that the lower organizations should be directed toward direct elections with more than one person running, the introduction of certain provisions of the new Rules, particularly retaining 50 percent of the dues, and so forth. This is indeed good. Incidentally, communists resolve these issues by secret voting. Communists of our party organization gathered two days ago at a party conference. Since we did not find an answer to the question that interests and disturbs us in the platform, we are making a decision: to return to the Central Committee with a demand to publish the party budget at various levels with a demand to name all of our ruble denominated assets, chattel, real estate, and foreign currency assets. We are making a decision concerning 50 percent of the dues and we are making a decision about elections. We are doing all this secretly, comrades. Other communists are also beginning to do this on a large scale. Actually, we are not the first ones.

Regarding the second part. In no case, of course, can we come to any kind of split, that is, we must retain the idea of consolidation. Not unity! We are already sick of unity. There can be no such thing among 19 million people, but consolidation around some idea should be in the platform as it is reworked and augmented. And I think the idea of consolidation should stand out more boldly in the appeal as well. On the whole I suggest using as a basis this document which has been given to us as an appeal.

Speech of A.A. Mikhaylov, chairman of the board of the Moscow Writers' Organization, RSFSR Writers' Union

We have been waiting for this document. Whether it has satisfied us either fully or partially is another matter. It is important that the draft platform indicates certain key aspects of political and social development from which the party was supposed to determine its positions in order not to end up at the very tail end of an extremely dynamic movement of history. I am looking at this from a standpoint within the party and therefore I shall single out two aspects: the party's rejection of a monopoly on power and a new understanding of the principle of democratic centralism. By rejecting a monopoly on power the party is opening the way to real democracy

and at the same time is placing itself in equal conditions with all other associations and parties which will be created if they do not already exist. And the task of communists is very difficult for the burden of a difficult past lies on us—and under these conditions we must fight for influence among the masses and for the position of the ruling party. This is possible only on the path of decisive renewal and purification. The party must return faith and ideals to the people. If you recall, a year ago at a city party conference I spoke of the loss of faith in communism and the loss of the communist ideal. True, at that time V.N. Shostakovskiy, arguing with me, asserted that the people still believe in communism. I do not know whom he has in mind, which people. I would like to see them.

But here in the CPSU platform I read what I have long been waiting for: "Our ideal is humane democratic socialism."

And so the ideal has been formulated. True, before we did this it was done by the East Germans who called their party a party of democratic socialism. But better late than never.

The formula has been found but the main thing is still for the people to believe in this ideal. And all efforts of the party should be focused on the propaganda and realization of this ideal.

But, having said "A" one must say "B." Since the renewed party is conceived, I quote: "As a party of socialist selection," it logically follows that it should be called a socialist party. And this question—of renaming the party—must be raised at the 28th CPSU Congress.

I should also like to turn to the following thesis from the section entitled "Toward Party Renewal." I quote: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a self-controlling sociopolitical organization, a voluntary union of like-thinking communists." And it goes on to say that this party "expresses the interests of the working class and all workers."

In the first place I would like the peasantry and the intelligentsia to finally stop being appendages of the working class, anonymously included among "all workers," if only because our scanty output, without which we cannot exist, is still being produced by the peasants and the intelligentsia, one way or another, is still making a certain contribution to perestroika. In the second place, and this is the main thing, we must not call the party a "union of like-minded communists." Even a small party cannot consist solely of people who think alike. The party is not a computer system, it consists of a mass of people who think creatively and have different understandings of many issues although they are devoted to a single ideal. Hence the debates, discussions, and pluralism of opinions of which we are so much in favor. Incidentally, the idea of like-thinkers is refuted in the same section of the draft platform. I quote: "There should be a statutory guarantee of collegiality in the work of all party organs, pluralism of opinions, freedom of

criticism, diversity of approaches and platforms, referendums in special cases, and minority rights to defend their views...."

But what kind of like-mindedness do we have here! Like-mindedness is a true sign of stagnation and, of course, we must eliminate from the platform any mention of like-mindedness that ended up here out of habit.

I am neither a social scientist nor a philologist and possibly I have not found the precise words to formulate this scientifically. I make this reservation because after my speech at the city party conference one literary scholar at the meeting of "April" advised me: "If you have lost faith in the party, go and turn your party card in to the raykom."

I entered the party in 1943 at the front. The party organizer called me in and said: "It is time to enter the party." "But who will give me a recommendation? I just came to this unit from the hospital a couple of months ago." "You have distinguished yourself in battle," the party organizer said to me, "you have been awarded an order, they have written about you in the newspaper, we will accept you because of your combat description." Entering the party at the front, in the infantry, gave me one advantage: being first to get out of the trench onto the mound and run to meet the machine gun and automatic rifle bursts: "Communists, ahead!"

This was 47 years ago. During the decades there were mistakes and delusions that are typical of many people. I have not always had the courage to speak out and go all the way against injustice. I take responsibility for this along with the party and at the same time I wish to return the people's faith in it so that everyone will know that, if necessary, a party member will be the first to go out on the mound without looking back.

As as far as returning my party card to the raykom goes, my children will return it when the time comes.

And allow me to say something else—about the mass media.

Their role in the formation of public opinion and their positive influence are immense. But the overall tendency of the mass media today is an intentional or unintentional striving to shake even more the mechanism of power which is so unstable already. And in their drive to sell newspapers they have a great penchant for sensations and exposures. There is no doubt that the press has done a good deal that is useful in this area. But from time to time I have thought: It would be nice to find an editor—an odd man out—who would create a newspaper entirely oriented to the positive experience of perestroika, who would seek and find it and would contribute to its proliferation. There is no such editor today....

During the past year or two the Union of Writers and the Moscow Writers Organization have been constantly subjected to critical attacks. And they are largely justified, but one is surprised by the insulting tone in which the

criticism is given and the complete lack of a desire to note the steps that have been taken toward the democratization and normalization of life.

On 25 January we held a general meeting of Moscow writers. We prepared for it long and carefully. We made public the draft of the new regulations of the Union of Writers. The report proposed a plan to rearrange the organization's entire structure. In a long article in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA ON 4 February there was not a word about all this. But there was more about the plenum of the Russian Union, more about the rampage caused by the provocateurs in the Central House of Literary People on 18 January. Again, as on the Moscow television program, there was a hint that someone had brought them in. I shall explain again: On the instructions of "April" leaders—this was their "open microphone"—all of them were sent to the Central House of Literary People.

Why this lack of objectivity? This overwhelming desire not to notice anything positive, anything constructive? Who needs this?

On a Moscow television program a couple of days ago Malgin, who was not accepted into the Union of Writers because of moral considerations, stated his case. He responded in a self-denigrating tone to several esteemed writers who are members of the admissions commission. He settled accounts with the Union of Writers from the Moscow television screens and on foreign radio stations. Why pander to this sort of thing? And although he is apparently a candidate deputy, we know him for what he is.

I would like to appeal from this podium to the Moscow city press and especially the television stations to give more objective attention to the life of the Writers' Organization.

Speech of V.V. Nazarova, director of the Central Scientific Research Institute of the Textile Industry

In the first place, I should like to check on the understanding of the goal of our plenum today. As I understand it, today we must answer this question: Whether this document is the basis, the blank piece, the metal which should lie at the basis of its further improvement. In the second place, we must earmark the technology, the mechanism itself which will transform the platform from a Central Committee document into the party platform and be a basis for discussion at the congress.

In answering the first question I am relying on the preliminary discussions in the collectives, the bureau of the rayon party committee, and meetings with secretaries of party organizations. I can answer confidently: "Yes, there is a basis, the blank piece is suitable, it is the right alloy." It is very important that this basis was adopted by the collective party organ the CPSU Central Committee. This is an essential stride. The draft also gives the basic contours of the mechanism for resolving these special issues.

Then I will discuss certain questions of improving and finishing the platform. On the editorial plane the document is uneven and it is poorly structured. The preamble and the first part of the platform will not stand up under criticism. Today this is a source of examples of sophistry over textbook logic. We must answer the question: Is it a wise biblical approach when while closing the doors we open the windows or are we deliberately leaving a crack so it will be possible for the ship to sink? Five years of perestroika have shown and confirm that effective utilization of vagueness in legislative acts does not work to the advantage of perestroika. This is largely the reason for our failures.

The question of the Russian Communist Party is quite critical. It is indeed, comrades, the most crucial and the most difficult one. On the one hand, afraid of not keeping up with events, many people are oriented today toward our small republics. The national criterion, in order to preserve a small nation, has worked for millennia and continues to work. But to place it at the basis of our actions in Russia, in my view, is simply dangerous. There must be certain other criteria. We can transform Russia into small principalities, for example, Bashkiria and Tataria. And we can receive unpredictable results if we are guided by national criteria in Russia. We think and discuss. On the pages of our Moscow press there should be a column about this most crucial issue. I do not think a referendum is needed here. We should enlist science.

It seems to me that the decision of the Central Committee Plenum concerning the national issue does not contain an answer. And, in my opinion, the article by N.N. Moiseyev which was published just before the plenum in *KOMMUNIST* gives a more constructive approach.

Concerning the mechanism for finishing the platform. It seems to me that we are simply not in a position to create any kind of new mechanism for this in a short period of time, and there is no need for this. We must rely on what exists but significantly increase its effectiveness. This will be primarily through further work and feedback. Individual excerpts in the press only create the appearance of feedback. The press—central (Moscow)—should show the dynamics of the further work on the platform in the various sections with a substantiated rejection of all that is not accepted. These should not be separate publications but a demonstration of regular, systematic work. I recall the 19th Party Conference. Returning from the conference we were still unable to answer the questions as to why one thing was accepted and another thing rejected. And reasonable proposals disappeared and were reflected in subsequent decisions of party organs.

And the next question directly related to the mechanism for completing work in the platform which is being discussed here is the question of elections. Life has already gotten ahead of us and today in places where elections are needed they are already being conducted.

We must grant the party organizations themselves the right to resolve this issue directly.

[Passage omitted]

Speech of A.Ya. Nemtina, secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU

Today PRAVDA published an article which many of you, perhaps, have already read: "Do Not Leave the Battle" by correspondent Mironov. It is about the fact that on the wave of rally democracy one party leader after another, or entire elected party organs, are retiring. Certain hotheads have already, just as during wartime, covered the oblasts and cities where this has happened. This situation is encompassing more and more regions of our country. Apparently there are reasons for this. First of all there is the negative socioeconomic background. But why are we communists letting go of our positions without a fight? Why are we not working to get ahead? I can see several reasons. On the one hand there is our lack of preparedness and on the other our lack of attention to social problems.

But if not us, then who? These are fresh observations from yesterday at the plant imeni Mikoyan.

(I hope Comrade Goryushkin, the secretary of the party committee, is not offended—I respect him. He is a real political fighter who has performed well both in the party organization and in social life.) But at the same time there are facts such as that the plant dining room has only 30 percent of the food it needs, the housing problem, and so forth. This is an enterprise which produces the most important defense products for our country. He may object to dividing up functions, but if we party leaders forget about the needs of the workers, we are not worth our salt. And in this connection I see that today we must "come down" from rally democracy and face our problems.

Concerning the platform. On the whole I would like to recognize that the platform that was published is a basis for discussion—this is my view—but the February plenum was nonetheless fruitless. Of course there is much that is debatable in the published draft: I do not think it is so important who will stand at the head of the party—the Politburo or the Politispolkom [political executive committee]—as is the number of people on the Central Committee—this is for communists to decide, apparently, through their delegates. The idea of cooperation does not seem democratic. I must say that many local party organizations do not support it.

The main thing today is something else—how do we get to this congress? How do we preserve the party and the country? How do we protect our fragile democracy and perestroika? Unfortunately, nothing is said about this in the platform.

The ideology of the present, transitional period of preparation for the congress was developed extremely inadequately. Therefore I have a couple of suggestions.

Specifically. The first has to do with glasnost in our work. We have a right to submit complaints today against the CPSU Central Committee because of its lack of a position and its lack of complete openness regarding a number of issues. Without this there can be no confidence in authority. Frequently this literally knocks the ground out from under the feet of members of the city party committee. A lack of openness in the Gdlyan affair and tardiness of information will lead to a strike in Zelenograd! We must solve this problem openly. Gdlyan is guilty—he must be punished. But it seems to me that we should punish the supervisory organ as well—the Union Procuracy—it should be held accountable for a lack of control.

There are so many discussions, comrades, about various dachas—at every rally. Crimean dachas, as many as you wish. But why did nobody mention them at the Central Committee Plenum. After all, the decisions have already been made, but everyone remains silent. Now we learn through the secretary of the party committee of the CPSU Central Committee that certain benefits have been eliminated, but where is the administration of affairs of the Central Committee and why is it silent?

I think the party gorkom should also show initiative and make public its incomes and expenditures for last year. One gets the impression, especially now when participating in the preelection struggle, that all of our dues go exclusively for the wages of party workers. And in general during the period of preparation for the city conference we apparently must look to see how today we can eliminate the expenditures we can get by without and use the money that is released for ideological work.

Here is the conclusion: The gorkom must continue its policy of increasing glasnost and demand the same thing of the CPSU Central Committee. In the matter of fighting against a lack of faith in the future and against rumors we have a right to count on a great deal of assistance from the mass media.

The second thing is about power. They say that power means responsibility. Sometimes we do not take enough responsibility. From the draft platform it is clear that none of the members of the Central Committee Politburo or the USSR Council of Ministers is in any hurry to take responsibility for the omissions and mistakes of perestroyka. This, to put it mildly, does not make the ruling party look good and does not elicit applause in the local party organizations.

It is clear to everyone that the economic reform of 1987 has bogged down. We went to the market and we came to commodity exchange in kind. This January's results do not cause optimism even now.

Therefore I consider it necessary to have reports from members of the CPSU Central Committee in the local party organizations before the congress. I think members of the city party committee should also speak.

There are now many ideas about direct delegation of representatives of communist parties of the union republics to the Central Committee. Possibly we too should consider the question of direct delegation to the CPSU Central Committee of candidates nominated at the Moscow city party conference.

I think that on the whole the idea of a presidency is justified. Apparently there is simply no other way out. But it is not a matter of the name but of the courage to make decisions and carry them out to the end. Without this no laws can ever work.

We too are faced with a difficult transition period after the 4 March elections. In this connection there is concern about the course of the election campaign. Many candidates are not receiving support from the collectives that nominated them. This criticism pertains both to the party organizations and the party gorkom about which we have spoken today.

The task today is to make sure that the people do not come to the soviets with an attitude of competition about who has the better views and opinions but with a friendly attitude and a desire to work concretely and carry out the orders of the voters. In this connection the gorkom and raykoms must help the new soviets to master the levers of power.

And, finally, the third thing. About our purely party affairs.

On the whole I support the drafts of the plenum decree and the appeal to the CPSU Central Committee. I think they give us a program for our work during the next few months. All the time is tightly scheduled. In order for the delegates of the 28th Congress to be able to participate effectively in the preparation of the materials and the work of the rayon and city conferences, their direct elections, obviously, must be completed no later than the beginning of May. Then in May it would be possible to hold rayon conferences and at the end of May or the beginning of June—city conferences where they could formulate the position of the party gorkom for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Direct elections of delegates in the districts (nomination, registration, and voting will probably take place in two rounds) will take no less than two months. This means that according to the concrete mechanism for elections and the composition of the electoral districts the raykoms must be determined within practically two weeks. Therefore we must make this decision today without waiting for the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Two proposals for the draft documents. Regarding the draft of the decree where it speaks about the creation of a work group of the Moscow city committee for generalizing remarks about the platform. Possibly this group should include not only members of the gorkom but also secretaries of local party organizations. For instance,

each rayon could send a representative. They could work on various commissions on various sections of the platform.

Regarding the draft of the appeal to the CPSU Central Committee where it speaks of the creation of the Communist Party of Russia. Today there are various points of view regarding this. I think we need a council with all communists of Moscow and all party organizations and after that we should make a final decision.

In conclusion, about the Democratic Platform. Perhaps a couple of words. There was pluralism of opinions before Stalin. And it is becoming the norm of our party life again today. Various platforms have appeared, including the Democratic Platform. In my view, our task, the task of the gorkom, will be to compare various platforms. We must bring them together somewhere, coordinate them, work out a new, common line, and reach compromises. I think the point of compromise means the unity of our actions. It is important not to turn the party into a theoretical discussion group or, as they say now, a discussion club and not to make it a jumping off point for the political careers of certain people. Debates by "parliamentary methods" should be within the framework of the norms of party democracy.

And the last thing is that we can look at many things in different ways but we must single out the main thing. Today this is the preservation of democracy, the unity of the country, the fate of the party and—the most important thing—improvement of the life of the people of Moscow.

Speech by Yu.G. Borisov, first secretary of the Moskvoretskiy CPSU Raykom

We have been awaiting the published draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress as a document not only with a political interpretation of our present and future development and problems and tasks of perestroika, but also with particular approaches to their solution. Therefore the draft was received in different ways, as was shown by the meeting of secretaries of party organizations of Moskvoretskiy Rayon with G.A. Yagodin, member of the CPSU Central Committee. There is a certain satisfaction derived from the fact that the Central Committee plenum took a certain step to comply with the wishes of communists and that finally there is some direction in the development of the society, the party, and the state. The party refrains from declaring its leading and directing role and expresses its readiness from now on to prove it through democratic methods, calling upon the broad spectrum of political forces in society which must be united for the good of perestroika.

In spite of this satisfaction there are a number of misgivings which arise with the first, superficial reading of this draft and therefore I would like to share my ideas. The more so since they coincide with the opinion of the secretaries of the party organizations of the rayon as expressed yesterday in the party raykom.

With all the comprehensiveness of the approach to the draft it is fairly declaratory and therefore is perceived in various ways by communists. Such wordings as "man is the inherent goal of history," the "formation of a self-governing society," "human-oriented architecture of cities," and many others erode the platform and make it fairly theoretical in the style of the pre-perestroika period, while this platform should be a working document for the actions of all party organizations and, in all probability, for our activity as well for a certain period of time. We frequently find mutually exclusive concepts here. For example, Section 3 renounces the right of the existence of private ownership while at the same time in Section 4 the freedom of sociopolitical choice is declared. One gets the impression that the platform is some kind of compromise that was reached after discussion at the plenum. And this stamps it with clear cut evaluations and their scientific substantiation, which leaves no room for the rank-and-file communist to see the line of the Central Committee in more expressive terms.

The greatest dissatisfaction is evoked by the fact that the third section is devoted to economic problems. The term "plan-market economy," in my opinion, is so severed from life that it can only raise questions. But it is not even a matter of definitions. If you read the section carefully you can see how theoretical it is. The section does not reveal the role of the party in this sphere and the result is unpredictable.

Our opponents are just waiting for the party organizations to narrow the sphere of their activity and move on to the sphere of the place of residence. Remember that the cause, the detonator for the recent retirement of the leaders of a number of obkoms was their unsatisfactory solutions to the socioeconomic problems of the residents of these oblasts. Departure from socioeconomic issues is fatal for a political organization which retains the right to gain the title of vanguard of the people only through concrete work.

Like any communist, I was especially interested in Section 7, which is devoted to the actual restructuring of the party. With all the depth of this section, it also raises questions. The lack of a developed ideological concept in the platform shows the extraordinary position in this area of party work. And, after all, ideology cannot tolerate emptiness.

The platform does not give an answer to the main question: How to arrange direct communication and feedback from the Central Committee to the local units. It is necessary to achieve equal responsibility of lower party organizations to higher ones—and there are some positive aspects in this area; but in the reverse direction, from the Central Committee to the local organizations, the responsibility here is clearly not yet at the proper level. It is clear that all questions of organization and regulations cannot be included in this section. A special plenum of the Central Committee will be devoted to a discussion of the draft of the CPSU Rules. And we must

address this plenum in order to defend the opinion of the party gorkom both concerning questions of the election of delegates to the congress and concerning a number of other issues which we discussed at the plenum.

But certain questions must be expressed more clearly. This pertains primarily to the principle of democratic centralism. Let us say frankly that even the very wording frightens a number of rank-and-file communists today. When democratizing this principle today we frequently forget about principles of working democracy for the party which were developed by V.I. Lenin. In my opinion, they are as timely today as they ever were. So perhaps we should return to them, taking into account the modern requirements of our life. Of course, today we should not be taken up with superficial cosmetic changes. But the concrete aspects of restructuring life within the party should be reflected in the draft. This was also discussed by comrades who spoke previously: leaving 50 percent of the party dues at the disposal of the local organizations; elections to the congress in the local party organizations that are direct, secret, and equal for the various party districts; the need for state-legal regulation of the status and functions of the party and many other issues. And this will not be excessive concentration. Rank-and-file communists are expecting concreteness and clarity and not vagueness and detachment of our documents and decisions. Incidentally, this misgiving was quite clearly expressed by a number of secretaries at the meeting of the party raykom yesterday.

Working with me in the apparatus of the party raykom are people who are interested in the meaning of the entry: "The apparatus should be optimal in number." They do not understand how this is determined: From above or from below. Obviously it is necessary to develop a mechanism for forming the apparatus. Ambiguity never contributes to better work. And in general we lose a lot in work with people when we are not completely frank with them.

And I should like to express another idea that is encountered very frequently at meetings with the party committee and the residents. The party must take an absolutely clear position regarding those who have discredited the high calling of a communist in the highest echelon. These include individuals from the times of stagnation and those who were relieved of their duties after April 1985 under various pretexts but bore no responsibility. We must make a political assessment of their activity—such is the opinion of the rank-and-file communists. And it is true: In order to unite, we must first separate.

I wish to support the point in the report about the need to hold as soon as possible an all-Russian conference on creating the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Here is a suggestion: Let the procedure and norm of representation be determined by the Bureau of the Central Committee for Russia. And a broad spectrum of the party aktiv can be enlisted in the organizational work—this will make it possible to conduct the conference without

delay in order to choose authorized representatives from Russia to the CPSU Congress.

There is no doubt that the adoption of the draft platform for the congress opened a decisive state in preparations for it. This document must be discussed in depth in the party organizations. But one thing is clear: In order for it to consolidate and unite the rank-and-file communists, it must be oriented toward an in-depth development and reflection of the party tactics and strategy in the current difficult situation in the country. So that the party and its Central Committee will work to take the lead, for the future, and not be dragging behind on the tail of pere-stroyka.

[Passage omitted]

Speech by V.L. Ivanov, first secretary of the Lyublinskiy CPSU Raykom

The day after the publication of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee the party aktiv met in the party raykom. In the speeches of the participants the assessments of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the platform were quite varied. It was noted with satisfaction that the long-due discussion of the situation in the party had finally taken place. They heard the demands of communists for a new procedure for electing delegates to the party congress and the approaching deadlines for holding it. But at the same time it is our common opinion that the CPSU Central Committee plenum is quite late with this agenda. The CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo were unable to promptly perceive the growing tendencies in social life. Judging from the summary document of the plenum, no voices were heard from the local areas or from the immediate participants. It was also an impermissible luxury to delay for such a long time the publication of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform while the situation in the country was getting worse literally with each passing day. All this contributes to a weakening of the party position and is leading it to an ideological and organizational crisis. The party leadership is constantly late in making decisions. Everything is done after the fact. For example, the proposal to abolish Article 6 of the Constitution. Let us Moscow communists, to whom the entire country is looking, keep up with the times and work to accelerate.

In spite of the fact that certain foreign publications have again called the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum landmarks and history-making, a number of essential questions have remained outside the draft platform proposed to us. It would seem that the plenum decisions should be the first to provide an analysis of the mistakes made by the leadership of the party and country even in the period of perestroyka and to suggest ways of rectifying them. Increasing responsibility in the party should undoubtedly begin with the leadership organs. The platform does not contain clear cut suggestions for getting out of the economic crisis but only general ideas about a plan-market economy.

I support Comrade Senkov's statement. He said that the question of introducing the position of president of the country was not raised in time.

During the discussion of the draft platform with the secretaries of local party organizations they confirmed the fear that for many of them it is not a guide for their further work. It is too wide-ranging, it is slogan-like in nature, and it suffers from a shortage of concrete approaches to solving the problems that face the party at the present time. The references by certain comrades to the fact that this task was not set, that the platform is a program document, and so forth are unconvincing. Now we need a document that contributes to strengthening the tie between the party and the people, that makes it possible to regain their confidence and to halt the growing exodus from the party.

Analysis shows that in the first stage of perestroika the party was indeed relieved of the so-called ballast, but now the ones who are beginning to turn in their party cards are communists who are really devoted to perestroika but have lost faith in the party's ability to be in charge of it. Another question. The organizational division of the CPSU gorkom suggested that before 20 February information be given about how many party organizations had made a decision to keep 50 percent of the party dues. The information from the party aktiv shows that in a month such decisions will be made in a number of organizations and this will cause a chain reaction—and again the decision regarding this issue seems too late. Right now, at this plenum, we must adopt a decision specifically for Moscow in which after March 1990 we make into law this provision that 50 percent of the dues must remain with the local organizations. This will be in harmony with the decision in the CPSU Central Committee Platform that party organs of all levels should arrange their work on the basis of the interests of the local party organizations and communists.

Obviously, this will entail a reduction of the party apparatus. I think the city party committee should make an independent decision enabling the rayon committees and local party organizations to determine for themselves the structure, number of members, and salaries of the party apparatus. This is quite within the capabilities of the communists of the rayon party organizations and it would be a significant step toward real democratization in the party. And it should be taken by the Moscow party organization. There is the crucial question of paying dues from pensions and stipends. Party rules do not envision these dues. And we are losing so many veterans to whom attention is not devoted in the platform we are discussing, for during the period of increasing inflation they are receiving minimal pensions and are unable to make ends meet. Therefore they are leaving the party.

The regular CPSU Central Committee plenum will open soon and we must demand that its participants make a decision to change the instructions that were adopted not by the CPSU Central Committee but by its apparatus and to relieve pensioners and students from paying dues

from the pensions and stipends they receive. Dues should be taken only from earnings as it says in the CPSU Rules. The CPSU Central Committee Platform does not rule out the possibility of creating new parties, but this is a slogan not from yesterday but from the day before yesterday. In practice we have been working under the conditions of a multiparty system. Instead of stating this fact, the platform, in our view, should have evaluated the existing political movements and determined the point at which the CPSU interacts with them. For we cannot rule out the possibility of rendering them organizational and financial support so that they could form parties which may be in opposition but which still hold progressive positions.

The question of the time periods for conducting the report and election campaign in the party is fundamental and the rayon party aktiv is unequivocal: The reports and elections cannot be held until after the congress. At present the efforts of communists are directed toward conducting the elections of people's deputies, which could take place either in March or in April of this year. Simultaneously with the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the draft of the party Rules it will be necessary to hold elections of delegates to the congress—direct, secret, and competitive—in the districts. And our party aktiv is in favor of conducting these particular elections. The mechanism for these elections is still unclear. It cannot be ruled out that they will be conducted according to the same formula as the elections of people's deputies, and this means that they will take a considerable amount of time and will require a large amount of hard work on the part of the local party organizations. And, comrades, let us look the truth in the eye. Today our party itself is heterogeneous. This means that the elections will simply involve a competition of deputies but there will also be a keen and uncompromising struggle and the conflict of various ideas. And under these conditions can we really allow ourselves to strap the local and rayon party organizations with the report and election campaign, thus binding them hand and foot. One must also take into account the circumstance that new Rules will be adopted at the congress, and this means that it would be expedient to form the party electoral organs on the basis of the new principles of intraparty life, that is, after the congress.

And the last thing. It is our common opinion that the creation of the Russian Communist Party is an essential necessity. Even now we have an example of how in Lithuania the ruling party is not adhering to the positions of the CPSU. There is reason to think that a similar situation could arise in a number of other union republics. Without the existence of the Communist Party of the RSFSR it will be very difficult to create the political mechanism for interaction among the ruling parties of the union republics. I am deliberately making such a point of this issue today so that we will make haste in resolving it. Therefore we should not be speaking about a conference of Russian communists. We need only the constituent congress. And it can be held only in Moscow

and before the 28th Congress. And the Moscow CPSU Gorkom should be the one to initiate it.

[Passage omitted]

Speech by E.P. Ryabtsev, secretary of the party committee of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences

Probably like many other comrades, I have a critical evaluation of the platform proposed for the congress by the Central Committee. I agree with the opinion of Comrade Simonyan, the secretary of the party committee of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, that actually to an immense degree it does not stand up to the Democratic Platform. In what stage are we? Well, first of all, we are in a transitional stage and in a condition of crisis. But how do we emerge from this period and how are we to act during this period? You are not likely to find answers in this platform. Therefore the platform, in my view, absolutely does not mobilize communists and does not provide a program of extreme party measures to get out of this crisis and it does not take into account the serious proposals from Moscow communists that were developed by the party gorkom and the conference of secretaries of local party organizations. Nor does it take into account the proposals of the Democratic Platform. It seems to me that only with a platform that is compressed in meaning and developed in actions will we be able to overcome the split in the party on the eve of the congress. And everything is leading to that.

In my view, the Central Committee Platform should be radically reworked taking into account the reasonable proposals developed by the Moscow communists. I have already listened to many comrades here and listened to the report from the first secretary of the party gorkom, but there is one thing I have not heard: Tomorrow there will be a city conference devoted to the Democratic Platform, many communists will be participating in it, the process of nominating delegates is taking place in the party organizations, and essentially a kind of structural organization is being formed within the party. What is the gorkom's attitude toward this phenomenon, how should we react to this situation, and what do the comrades from the city committee think about this?

A couple of ideas about party renewal. In order for the main party masses to be linked to the party committee we need, like we need the air we breathe, to have direct competitive elections of delegates to the congress from the party districts. This is clear to everyone. We know that the Central Committee will be formed from them. It seems to me that a communist who has become a part of the Central Committee must arrange his work relying mainly on the concrete party districts. This makes the ties between the lower and higher party organs direct. There will be systematic reporting by members of the Central Committee to the rank-and-file communists.

In this connection one is also faced with necessary considerations about simplifying the existing party structure which now inherently has many levels and the

hierarchical system of its construction. It must be decisively simplified. What must be done, for example, with the obkoms and gorkoms in order to accomplish this? I have one answer: radically simplify their functions and narrow them to the level of only doing coordination work. In this connection it would be expedient to create a coordination bureau of the obkoms and gorkoms which would be elected in the party organizations. This will make it possible to essentially simplify the party apparatus, to reduce its numbers, and to free the lower party level, the raykoms, from petty tutelage.

As concerns the apparatus of the raykom itself and its bureaus, it will be clearer to the lower party organizations how the raykom should be in order to become effectively working organs.

A couple more suggestions. It is necessary to introduce into the party regulations a new provision concerning delegates to the congress and their rights, duties, and responsibilities. It is also necessary to develop and approve the rights, duties, and responsibilities of members of the party Central Committee. What we have today is a parody of the Central Committee, in which its members do not participate in the development of documents, where nobody consults with them, where they are completely detached from the party masses.

And the last thing, I do not agree with the comrades who sometimes say that there is no need to create a Russian Communist Party. They also give the argument that the Russian Communist Party, having more than 10 million members, will somehow impose its will on all the rest of the communists. It seems to me that the kind of party that the Russian Communist Party would be would play an exceptionally important role and I am in favor of that.

[Passage omitted]

Speech by S.V. Bulatov, secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Machine Plant imeni P.O. Sukhoy

My speech is occasioned by the dissatisfaction of communists in our party organization with the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and the interim results of the February plenum of the party Central Committee. The CPSU Central Committee Platform reflected a number of suggestions made by communists in the platform of our party organization as early as September. But life is changing rapidly. And that which was being discussed just yesterday must be put into action today. The CPSU Central Committee Platform has no concrete items regarding the form of the transformations that are taking place and those that are earmarked. A number of sections are merely statements and slogans. Many suggestions from local party organizations are simply not taken into account and, on the contrary, we should like this document to give an assessment, to show the communists' attitude toward various phenomena, and to further deepen the processes of democratization in the party and the society.

We have a negative reaction to the suggestions of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to hold the report and election campaign before the 28th Party Congress. This is in a situation where the absolute majority of speakers at the plenum discussed the expediency of holding the elections after the congress. It turns out that once again he is not listening to the opinions of the communists. The selectivity of the departures from the existing CPSU Rules is also bewildering. It is possible to conduct a full-scale report and election campaign before the congress on the draft of the new regulations, but for some reason it is impossible to have direct competitive elections to the 28th Congress with a final decision at the level of a formed district. The Rules that are in effect will not allow it. The question of the time periods for conducting the report and election campaign still remains complicated and there continue to be two opinions. The most reasonable one, in my opinion, is that communists of local organizations should determine for themselves how to conduct the report and election campaign. And the direct elections to the 28th Congress should be held as early as possible so that the delegates will be involved in the work of preparing the congress documents.

We have now encountered a proposal to hold in reserve the party dues advanced by a number of party organizations. This proposal is linked in some way to the speeches at the conference of party clubs held on 20-21 January. And there are various justifications: higher salaries for party workers, a lack of faith in the party apparatus. But this problem would not exist if the party Central Committee today, not in words but in deeds, were to increase the rights of the local party organizations and give them the opportunity to dispose of a considerable share of the party dues. Point 70 of the existing Rules makes it possible to solve this problem in the CPSU Central Committee. So it is necessary to provide for glasnost in the party's financial affairs.

Now a couple of words about the speeches at the conference of party clubs on 20 and 21 January. The day before yesterday in the plant party committee we familiarized ourselves with the materials and statements of this conference. Members of the party committee noted that a number of points of the platform of this conference are coordinated with the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the platform of the plant party organization. But how long are we going to remain silent about such events, not to mention speeches that deviate sharply from Leninist principles and statements that refute the idea of a socialist and communist society, reject the Communist Party, and recognize only a social democratic party? How long are we going to be like a unified party that is leading to different goals?

Now about one question that was touched upon by Comrade Shostakovskiy. We definitely must publish such documents as the platforms of combined party clubs. But what confuses us today is that we receive much information not from the platform itself but from the speeches that were given at the conference.

And in general these speeches should be made public along with the platform and then everyone will have to show his face. And to be honest, we are all in favor of perestroika. But what kind of perestroika and how? This is what we must decide.

Comrades, we see that the Moscow city party committee is significantly changing its style of work, holding conferences with secretaries of local party organizations and party raykoms, and taking into account the opinions and wishes of communists when working up the documents of the city party organization. At the same time the party city committee must more persistently bring our decisions and opinions to the CPSU Central Committee. And with respect to a number of issues the city party organization should have a more independent policy and not wait for the decisions and opinions of the Central Committee.

And another thing. After the Central Committee Plenum Yu.A. Prokofyev for some reason immediately held a press conference with journalists and we secretaries of party organizations were not able to obtain more or less detailed information about the course of the plenum until Tuesday, 13 February. And before that it was quite difficult to do good explanatory work among communists and nonparty members. And the communists noted this. I think we should do the opposite. The party comrades should come first and then the guests.

[Passage omitted]

Speech by D.M. Dankin, director of the Institute of Party History of the Moscow City Committee and Moscow Committee of the CPSU

I do not have a speech from the agenda but rather a procedural issue. I suggest that we add to the agenda of our plenum a question which has been essentially discussed today but is of principal significance for the city party organization. I would word the question as follows: "The tasks of city communists for stabilizing the political situation." What do I have in mind? Assessments or even informational reports about the events that are already taking place or are in the offing have been mentioned only in passing, as it were, in a whisper. Political strikes. Tomorrow, essentially, regardless of what V.N. Shostakovskiy may have called this measure, a parallel party structure will be formed in the city party organization. Careful preparations are being made for a demonstration by many thousands of people which has already been called the "February revolution." I am a bit of a historian and I would compare this not with the events of February 1917 but with the events of July 1917 in Petrograd. What alternatives might the city party organization have regarding this demonstration? To leave things as they were on 4 February and look on from the sidelines? Or to take charge of this demonstration and not allow it to become a chaotic march and attack on staff headquarters? On 4 March, as you know, are the elections, for which we also have determined our positions precisely. Today we have heard a proposal to name

the candidates for whom the Moscow communist-bolsheviks are to vote and support, and not only in the districts, but also preliminarily (we should not make this a secret either), and to name our candidates for the post of chairman of the Moscow soviet and chairman of the Moscow soviet ispolkom, which will largely determine the course of the elections. As concerns tomorrow's conference, I would suggest that the comrades supporting the Democratic Platform accept this proposal: Make up the delegation of the Moscow city party committee headed by one of the members of the bureau or the entire bureau of the Moscow city committee and send them there to express their attitude toward the documents and the organizational activity of the comrades who have rallied around the Democratic Platform. There is an entire range of phenomena in our party's history and its historical experience, beginning with deviations and platforms and ending with splits and factions.

It has already been said today that in terms of its essence and content the Democratic Platform is not much different from the documents proposed by the plenum of the party central committee, but in terms of form and in terms of what is being done today, this is closer to factional activity than to the discussion of a platform. Of course I am not ready to propose all the formulas for the entire gorkom. I again insist that we include on today's agenda—putting it off until evening if this is difficult in order to give the bureau of the city committee time to prepare—the question “The tasks of communists for stabilizing the political situation in the city.” If we do not do this we will be emasculating all of our discussions of party democracy. Because this will then have to be done hastily either by members of the bureau of the city party committee or by the secretaries of the gorkom, or by participants in conference of secretaries of party raykoms. It will be necessary to develop plans of measures and determine our position toward demonstrations and elections and so forth. I ask that you put to a vote the question of having this issue discussed at the plenum.

Chairman: In the first place, D.M. Dankin had the opportunity to introduce this proposal when we accepted the plenum agenda five hours ago. At that time the bureau of the city party committee had a chance to prepare as well. We have held a meeting of the bureau of the Moscow city committee regarding this issue and the secretaries of the CPSU raykoms met. And if the plenum considers it necessary to go into this discussion then we will probably make such a decision. Do you agree? But now is not the time to change the agenda but to continue the work.

Speech of V.A. Prokhorov, secretary of the party committee of the Scientific Research Institute of Long-Distance Radio Communications

I should like to say a couple of words about tomorrow. Informally, if one may put it that way, we are already living under the conditions of a multiparty system. Let us admit that. Formally, this will take place after the congress and we will again waste time talking about how we will work under the multiparty system. But the city

committee, the party central committee, and the higher party school, in my opinion, are doing nothing to achieve this. So far this concerns only the local party organizations and the rank-and-file communists.

Chairman: You are mistaken, the Democratic Platform has already been prepared to a considerable degree by the Moscow Higher Party School.

V.A. Prokhorov: Perhaps, but as before it is not easy to understand how production party organizations will operate under the conditions of the multiparty system and what their role in production will be. Imagine what would happen if there were some other party organization of anarcho-syndicalists or monarchists, for example. After all, they can be created as well. Therefore today we must, in the first place, study the work of communist parties abroad under the conditions of a multiparty system. I can honestly say that I know practically nothing either about the anarcho-syndicalists or the constitutional democrats. If they had not written about this party in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY I would probably not have learned that such a party had been created. There is absolutely no information. This is a serious shortcoming in the work of the ideological division of the gorkom and the Higher Party School. We must study what kind of a party this is, how to work with it, and what its regulations, program, or platform are. This must be done today so that after the congress we will be able to do political work under the conditions of the multiparty system. This will be work not from a position of power, such as the party management organs have done for a long time (even today certain speakers have also spoken from this position) but under the conditions of a roundtable discussion. Even today we must determine what our views have in common and what our principal differences are. I think that today the party, having the legislative initiative, should prepare a draft law on the party and take it to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In conclusion I will to support the suggestion of the secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Aviation Institute concerning immediate elections of congress delegates by direct and secret voting according to the party districts and the creation of a commission of delegates to prepare for the congress.

[Passage omitted]

Speech of V.I. Mitrokhin, secretary of the party committee of the Moscow Higher Party School

Among the factors that brought me to this podium I would single out two. The first is my dissatisfaction with the content and rates of the restructuring going on in the party and a certain disenchantment with the content of today's discussion. Taking into account time constraints, my speech will be schematic.

My first point: I think that members of the party Central Committee who are registered in the Moscow city party organization should in the near future appeal to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and suggest that

next week they should hold an extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee at which they should discuss the following issues:

1. The personnel changes in the party leadership, and if one is to speak more concretely about those who work with personnel and ideology in the party and the Politburo, this means Comrades Razumovskiy and Medvedev.

2. At the plenum they should co-opt for the CPSU Central Committee the most respected, honest, principled, and prepared communists and change the activity of the Central Committee over to emergency conditions so that they can adopt political decisions and each day inform communists and the people of what is being done to bring the party out of the crisis, what the political situation is, and what the Politburo proposes to do in the near future.

3. They should consider a program of concrete measures to be undertaken by the Politburo and the Central Committee before the 28th CPSU Congress.

My second point: The Moscow city party organization at this critical time for the party must be the initiator of a proposal for a collectively and purposefully prepared constituent conference on questions of the formation of the Communist Party of Russia. I will not discuss the arguments, there are too many of them, but this is not political arithmetic where there are pluses and minuses as was discussed by Yu.A. Prokofyev; this is political algebra and we communists of Russia must consider more seriously. I would assume that at this conference we should form a democratic constituent committee which would be entrusted to prepare theoretical and political documents for the 28th Congress which could compete with various platforms and the dogmas to which the conservative part of the party leadership adhere.

My third point: We should conduct an extraordinary plenum of the city party committee with approximately the same agenda. If one is to speak of concrete personnel issues, we are speaking of personnel of the Moscow City Party Committee of the CPSU who deal with ideological work.

On questions of theory. My colleague, the first secretary of one of the party raykoms, in reviewing the CPSU Platform said twice that there is a lot of theory there. Allow me, dear colleague, to disagree with you. There is not enough real theory there. Nor is there enough constructive and clear cut theory there. But this is a draft. And all of us communists will have to work on it.

And my last point is related to the Democratic Platform. I am assuming that the Democratic Platform is a reality. The organizational actions of this platform are also a reality and, based on this reality, we must determine our position and arrange our relations with this far from homogeneous movement.

The Moscow Higher Party School and the Democratic Platform. In the school there is a group of scholars who

work on the development of documents and participate in this movement, but far from all of them are communists. And this is also a reality in all of its diversity and contradictoriness.

Realism in evaluating the situation and practical action are not the least of the conditions for effective politics, especially today and tomorrow.

Krasnoyarsk Kray Leaders Censured

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in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by V. Ovcharov under the rubric "In CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee: "Billionaires Without Housing"]

[Text] "Many working people are now saying that cadres are in no hurry, spend a long time dithering, questions accumulate, but the leaders continue to hold sessions. Perhaps our conference too, unless it leads to a change of affairs, will be called on more conference—only at summit level this time. And that will be simply a scandal, if after our talk nothing substantial happens either here or in the center. We must not allow it! We must resolutely put the matter right!"—these were the words with which M.S. Gorbachev completed one of his main meetings on Krasnoyarsk soil in September 1988. Since then 18 months have elapsed. And however sad it may be, it looks as though the party and state leader's fears have begun to acquire real and alarming contours.

In any case the materials of the recent sitting of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee incline us to this conclusion. The question under discussion was: "On shortcomings in the work of communists who are leaders of the Krasnoyarsk Kray party, soviet, and economic organizations and a number of ministries in fulfilling CPSU Central Committee resolutions on the development of the social sphere's material and technical base." There was a discussion of the most painful subject for Krasnoyarsk people—the pace and scale of the construction of housing, hospitals, schools, and clubs in the kray....

The tough, principled talk in Moscow was preceded by a check on the local fulfillment of the two CPSU Central Committee resolutions of 1987 and 1988.

Let us draw attention to the fact that the first resolution was adopted almost two years before M.S. Gorbachev came to the kray. Yet we well remember that during that trip on the streets and in the plant workshops conversation with the Krasnoyarsk people inevitable turned to the troubles of the social sphere. The dilatoriness in resolving the housing question caused particular concern. Indeed, the workers of the land in which several European countries would "drown" annually bring output worth R16 billion to the state coffers but themselves have no normal living conditions.

So has the kray succeeded in effecting such an urgent and drastic turn toward people's needs?

Judge for yourselves. But first about one important consideration expressed before the start of the sitting by B.K. Pugo, chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Today some comrades and mass media, he noted, are trying to almost completely "remove" the party from the solution of economic problems. In connection with the transfer of power to the soviets, they say, it should no longer "interfere" in these questions.... It should indeed not interfere. But party organizations and party organs must in no case, do not have the right to, leave economic questions unheeded. It is our direct duty to assess the attitude of communists, and especially leaders, toward the matter.

Many serious rebukes were to be heard at the sitting against V.M. Stepanov, secretary of the Krasnoyarsk CPSU Kraykom [kray committee]; V.I. Sergiyenko, chairman of the krayispolkom [kray soviet executive committee]; A.N. Troshin, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]; S.I. Sadovskiy, USSR first deputy minister of power and electrification; A.N. Pukhteyev, USSR deputy minister of the coal industry; P.P. Selskiy, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] deputy minister of construction in the Urals and West Siberian region; and other party, soviet, and economic leaders.

It was admitted that a number of measures have been implemented in the development of the kray's social sphere and to increase the pace of housing and cultural and consumer construction. Last year for the first time in several years recently the state plan for the construction of housing with state capital investments was fulfilled 100.8 percent: In all 2,159,000 square meters were constructed. Compared with 1985 capital investments in the social sphere increased 40 percent....

But there has not actually been a drastic shift of the kind which alone can rectify the critical situation. The level of housing construction in the kray remains one of the lowest in the country (15.1 square meters per inhabitant, putting it in 46th place in the RSFSR). In the kray there are 224,000 people waiting for housing, 50,000 are waiting for their children to be admitted to preschool institutions, and over half the hospitals and polyclinics are in unsuitable premises constructed in the thirties and forties.

The Party Control Committee sitting also cited the following disgraceful fact. The kray center's local soviets have been unable for a single year in this five-year plan to fully assimilate planned capital investments for the construction of housing and cultural and consumer establishments (except for schools in 1989) and the municipal services networks. For Krasnoyarsk as a whole nearly R137 million was unused in 1986-1989, which is about one year's plan. In other words, in one year out of four there was no construction at these establishments!

Responsibility for the regular nonfulfillment of the local soviets' plan targets and the demands for an improvement in the quality of construction is borne by the local organs and leaders of the RSFSR Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberian regions (the minister is V.N. Zabelin).

So what is happening? What are the reasons for all these disruptions? To judge by the speeches delivered at the Party Control Committee sitting by the above-mentioned leaders, they are virtually all of a particular "objective nature": the shortage of construction capacities and materials, discrepancies in planning and appropriations, some people's lack of discipline and other people's lack of organization, and so on and so forth. I shall not venture to argue with the specialists, especially as at the present transitional stage our economy has become thoroughly entangled. But I shall make so bold as to reduce all these reasons to two main troubles. Alas, they are not new. The coordinates of the present problem areas in the kray are merely a continuation of those which were extremely obvious during M.S. Gorbachev's trip 18 months ago: totally unjustified deformations in investment policy and economic leaders' adherence to the old economic thinking.

How have these lessons helped the kray and ministry leaders in the past 18 months? Here's how. The leading workers of the USSR Gosplan (deputy chairman A.N. Troshin) and a number of ministries, primarily the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification (minister Yu.K. Semenov) and the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry (minister M.I. Shchadov) have failed to fulfill the CPSU Central Committee instruction on the revision of the proportions of the funds earmarked for production and nonproduction construction in Krasnoyarsk Kray and on the increasing of the planned appropriations for the development of the social sphere's material and technical base—that was the conclusion reached by the Party Control Committee representatives. The proportion of capital investments in nonproduction establishments in 1989 was 26.1 percent which is lower than the relevant indicator for the country. Throughout the system of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification the proportion of capital investments in the kray's social sphere last year was 17.1 percent (15.8 percent on average for the four years). For the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry the figure was also 17.1 percent (11.2 percent for the four years)....

And so the familiar circle has closed. On the one hand the continuation of the "ministerial colonizing policy" and on the other the kray leaders' timidity or inability to defend people's fundamental interests. Although, if you think about it, the departments should also be interested in improving the workers' lives: After all, they are workers in their sectors. And they will not be satisfied with references to the fact that the sectors themselves have allegedly now found themselves in a tighter financial situation. The economy is all very well but, as M.S. Gorbachev said, "It is important to remember the main thing: People live here." And it is difficult to explain this

"policy" to those miners in Dubinin settlement who to this day inhabit 100 ramshackle prefabricated homes (which in the event of a fire burn down in 20 minutes); During M.S. Gorbachev's trip M.I. Shchadov, minister of the coal industry, promised very rapidly to move these people out of their huts. A stenographic record was even read out on this score at the Party Control Committee sitting. But 18 months have elapsed and the ministers are still awaiting what the minister promised personally.... So utter irresponsibility is the culmination of the closed circle.

The comprehensive program approved by the USSR Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction] for the development of the construction materials industry designed to ensure an increase in the volumes of housing construction from 2.1 million to 3 million square meters a year is being fulfilled unsatisfactorily in the kray. The ministries' leaders are failing to earmark in full the capital investments envisaged by the USSR Gosstroy for the development of enterprises of this industry. As a result of 18 planned production capacities only five had been commissioned in 1989. But the saddest thing is still to come: For 1990 the ministries have earmarked only half the R207 million envisaged by the government for these purposes: Of R60 million the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification has earmarked only R39 million, the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry has earmarked only R5.5 million out of R17 million; the RSFSR Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberian Regions only R30 million of R57 million, the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry R1.9 million of R9.1 million, and the USSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work R2.9 million of R15 million....

The CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee has severely pointed out to the communists who are leaders in the kray and a number of ministries the serious shortcomings allowed in the organization of the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee resolutions on the development of the social sphere's material and technical base and the improvement of the kray working people's socio-consumer conditions on this basis and the lack of control in assimilating local soviets' planned capital investments.

Will they succeed in breaking the vicious circle acting as a noose on the social sphere in Krasnoyarsk Kray? We will know this in exactly one year's time, when it has been decided to return to the problem.

Kaliningrad Liberation Anniversary Celebrated

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[Excerpts] The 45th anniversary of the capture of the fortress town of Koenigsberg, now known as Kaliningrad, is being celebrated today. Here is a telephoned report by our correspondent, Stanislav Chekalin:

[Chekalin] [passage omitted: Chekalin narrates the events leading to the liberation of Kaliningrad and describes the celebrations, which are reaching their climax today] I remind you that before entering East

Prussia, the 11th Guards Army of the 3d Belorussian Front which occupied the main axis of the assault liberated Lithuania from fascist occupation. At the festive jubilee meeting held in the Oblast Drama Theater Army veterans adopted an appeal to the citizens of Soviet Lithuania. I shall allow myself another quote, this time from the appeal. Dear fellow countrymen, citizens of Soviet Lithuania, the veterans write, we understand and profoundly respect your wish to see your native Lithuania free and independent. After all, 138,000 of our comrades-in-arms perished fighting for this freedom and independence, and to shake off Hitler's yoke. Surely, this cannot be forgotten. Surely, our fraternity and friendship which were sealed with blood jointly shed during the Great Patriotic War cannot be violated, in the complex conditions of radical perestroika now engaging the whole of our country, because of the unreasonable actions of a few political intriguers?

As you know, there were Lithuanian detachments in Chernyakhovskiy's Army. They also took part in this fighting. [passage omitted: program for today's celebrations]

Commission Adopts Resolution on Kemerovo Pollution

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in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Emergency Situations"]

[Text] At a routine session of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Emergency Situations, the question of the fulfillment of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 12 June 1987 and other USSR Government decisions on environmental conservation in the city of Kemerovo was examined.

The commission, whose session was led by USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, noted that as a result of measures adopted in 1987-1989 on the construction of purification plants in Kemerovo and on the decommissioning of obsolete production units at enterprises of the State Agrochemical Association, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, and the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, the discharge of pollutants into the environment has been reduced by 20 percent. Some 5,000 people have been moved out of the health protection zones of industrial enterprises situated in Kemerovo.

However, the commission called the attention of USSR ministers Yu.K. Semenov, S.V. Kolpakov, N.V. Lemayev, M.I. Shchadov, and B.M. Belousov and State Agrochemical Association Chairman N.M. Olshanskiy to the fact that the ecological situation in Kemerovo remains tense and that the main sources of pollution are the enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, and of the State Agrochemical Association located in the city.

On certain days, especially in unfavorable weather conditions, the average daily concentrations of harmful substances in the city's atmosphere are several times higher than the established health safety norms.

The further improvement of the ecological situation in the city is in many ways held in check because of insufficient attention to the construction of nature conservation facilities on the part of Kemerovo Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], which was granted the right to determine autonomously in which directions to channel capital investments, and also on the part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic] Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberia Regions of the USSR. The construction of nature conservation facilities in Kemerovo virtually came to a halt in 1989. An analysis of the plan for building these facilities in 1990 shows that this state of affairs is not changing. On a variety of pretexts, contracts have not been concluded for the reconstruction and retooling of a significant number of production units at enterprises of the State Agrochemical Association, the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, and the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry. The RSFSR Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberia Regions of the USSR not only steers clear of concluding contracts for the fulfillment of nature conservation measures, but carries out unsatisfactorily even the levels of construction and installation work that were adopted in the plan.

The decision taken on this question outlines a number of specific measures for improving the material and technical base of Kemerovo's construction organizations, increasing the volume of work on building nature conservation facilities at Kemerovo's industrial enterprises by the direct labor method and relocating citizens living in the health protection zones of these enterprises, switching Kemerovo's electric power stations and the boiler houses in the city's Rudnichnyy Rayon to gas, reducing the discharge of pollutants from the exhaust fumes of internal-combustion engines into the city's atmosphere, and improving the system of monitoring atmospheric pollution in Kemerovo and the waters of the river Tomi.

The commission noted that the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy has not fulfilled the USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 12 June 1987 as regards the decommissioning of coke battery No. 4, and demanded of S.V. Kolpakov that this task be fulfilled within the month. The ministry was entrusted with formulating within a month and submitting to the USSR Council of Ministers proposals agreed with Kemerovo Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] on finding jobs and making material and domestic provision for the dismissed workers and members of their families, and also on other social questions connected with the decommissioning of the battery. At the same time, the commission recommended to the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy and Kemerovo Oblispolkom and Gorispolkom that, with the

participation of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, the USSR Ministry of Health, and scholars, specialists, and representatives of the public, they examine the Kemerovo coal tar chemical plant labour collective's request for an extension of the term of operation of coke battery No. 4 and if need be to submit agreed proposals to the USSR Council of Ministers.

Klochkov Backs Strong Unions in RSFSR

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[Report delivered by I.Ye. Klochkov, deputy chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, at the constituent congress of RSFSR trade unions, abridged: "For Strong, Renewed Trade Unions in Russia!"]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies and guests of the congress!

The Russian Federation is a unique state formation in terms of its territory, natural treasures, number of living peoples, and cultural traditions. More than half the population of the Soviet Union live here. The republic provides 61 percent of the country's national income and produces 92 percent of the oil, 77 percent of the gas, 62 percent of the electric energy, and most of the products for defense and export. Logically, all this should provide for the well being and flourishing of the population. But in fact the picture is different. The fate of the Russian Federation and the peoples who populate it is a bitter example of the deformations of past years.

Democratization and glasnost have made it possible for all of us to see with our own eyes and recognize the truly dramatic situation that has developed in the republic: a standard of living that degrades man and a catastrophic shortage of everything—housing, hospitals, schools, and cultural institutions, the unsightly appearance of large and small cities, the villages that have lost their population, and the lack of roads. The demographic situation has been deteriorating for decades in a number of regions, and mainly in places where peoples with small populations have lived for ages in the North and Far East. All these are the realities of our Russian life which cannot be tolerated any longer if we seriously intend to renew our homeland.

The problems of the Russian Federation are, without exaggeration, of key significance for the destiny of our union. Without a sovereign, renewed Russia there can be no union of sovereign republics restored on new principles.

To restore Russia as a truly independent republic and to provide for the free development of each ethnic group living on its territory comprise the most important and pressing task of the present day. Only on the basis of consolidation of all forces that are truly concerned about the fate of Russia is it possible to find a way out of the impasse. The inferiority of the forms of Russian statehood have had a negative effect on the republic's economic and social development and have reinforced the

residual principle in solving its problems. Moreover, Russia has frequently been equated with the center. Some people, especially recently, have tried to find here the source of almost all the problems and difficulties that have beset the country and accuse us of "socialist colonialism."

The formation of a high legislative organ of the Russian Federation will make it possible to actively develop legislative work, to form the necessary sociopolitical institutions for the country, and to adopt a package of laws that make it possible to begin economic reforms from below, on the basis of autonomy and economic independence of the enterprises and regions and elimination of the shortage of man's personal interest in the results of his labor.

Tasks of the Constituent Congress. The Concept of the Activity of Russian Trade Unions

Our constituent congress is called upon to discuss and develop principles for uniting the trade unions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and, on this basis, to consolidate the trade union movement of Russia, to renew and strengthen its organizational forms, and to create a common Russian trade union center as an organ equal to the government of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet, and other republic social organizations and movements.

The convocation of the constituent congress is the result of the movement from below in the local trade union organizations and labor collectives. The preparation for the congress was led by the organizing committee created in keeping with the decision of the Sixth All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] Plenum. The organizing committee considered its central task to be to study as deeply as possible and generalize the processes of restoration and renewal in the trade unions of Russia and to reveal new tendencies in the activity of local organizations and other trade union structures.

The organizing committee relied on the opinions of delegates to the congress and local organizations expressed in the mass media and in report and election meetings, interunion and branch conferences, plenums, letters, and directly during the meetings in the local areas. The organizing committee operated openly, publicly, and democratically, in a situation of free and businesslike discussion of problems with consideration of alternative variants.

You know that the Sixth AUCCTU Plenum adopted a decision concerning the formation of the Russian Trade Union Council. But the entire course of the preparations for the congress and the study of public opinion and attitudes in the lower trade union units increasingly led to an understanding that deep transformations in the economy and political structure of the society require a reinterpretation of the role and position of trade unions in Russia and their organizational structure. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the principle of

democratic centralism, command methods, strict subordination of lower trade union organs to higher ones, the minority to the majority, as well as the entire trade union structure do not correspond to the changing conditions, production relations, or the development of democracy.

A study of world experience in the activity of trade unions and the tendencies that have been manifested recently in our country suggest that a possible and more rational form of organization for the trade union movement would be the principle of federalism, which presupposes voluntary unification of local trade union organizations into both professional and regional unions and councils.

Moreover, any trade union organ is created taking into account the opinions of local organizations for better protection of their interests at the appropriate level. These electoral organs can be structured on the basis of direct delegation and representation from local organizations, which have the right to recall and replace their delegates. This principle will make it possible for them to maintain constant communication with the trade union masses and express their interests not formally but in essence. In this case decisions must be made, as a rule, under conditions of agreement (consensus). In the event of possible disagreement the minority has the right to defend its position.

Professional and regional associations of workers structured in this way may enter the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) as member organizations.

The concept of "independent" trade unions which is to be included in the name of the federation also requires clarification. Of whom and of what should our trade unions be independent?

You know that at the Sixth AUCCTU Plenum the trade unions declared themselves to be an independent social force with a clearly determined program of action for protecting the interests of the workers. Under the new conditions whereby the changeover to a market mechanism, diverse forms of ownership, and a multiparty system have become a reality, Soviet trade unions can perform their protective functions only if they are fully independent of any political organizations and state, economic, and administrative organs. Their independence lies in the adoption and implementation of their own platforms for practical actions, the suggestion of alternative programs, the right to legislative initiative, the election of management organs and cadres without intervention or tutelage from any outside parties, and expression of their disagreement with the decisions of the state, economic, and other organs that encroach on the legitimate rights and interests of the workers. Trade unions are independent when, within the framework of the Constitution and the law, they have only one higher authority: the opinion and will of their members. The independence of Russian trade unions has nothing to do with trade union separatism or the ideas of anarcho-syndicalism. Only within the framework of a unified,

independent trade union movement in the country will the trade unions of the Russian Federation be able to operate effectively.

The proposed name of the trade union is undoubtedly not indisputable. At the congress it would apparently be expedient to exchange opinions on this question as well, taking its fundamental significance into account. But in this report allow me to discuss precisely this definition on behalf of the organizing committee.

On the territory of the RSFSR today there are more than 380,000 local organizations, more than 5,000 rayon and city organizations, and 110 oblast and kray committees that are included in 32 trade unions. Here we have formed 77 oblast and kray trade union councils, including the Moscow city council. They unite about 77 million trade union members, or 54 percent of the overall number of them in the country.

And the proclamation of a federation means not the destruction of the structures that have developed but a consolidation of the trade union movement in the republic on new principles of federalism and independence. In practice this means:

- voluntary entry into the federation and free withdrawal from it;
- equal rights for all members of the federation;
- their independence in determining the norms of their internal life and directions of their activity;
- collegiality in the work of the management organs of the federation and their responsibility to member organizations;
- respect for minority opinions and the minority's right to protection;
- solidarity of member organizations in realizing the goals and tasks of the federation.

The federation must be open to all trade unions and professional associations of the RSFSR.

But we should continue the process that has already been started of creating branch republic committees (as of today there are eight of them in operation)—essentially bases for the formation of future trade unions of Russia—and also improving the principles of the formation of kray and oblast trade unions of a new type, which has been tested in practice in Kalinin, Kuybyshev, and a number of other oblasts and have proven their effectiveness.

The new approaches to the organization of the trade union movement create broad possibilities for the formation within the framework of the trade unions of narrow professional groups of workers (associations, guilds, societies, and so forth) for purposes of better representation and protection of the specific professional interests of the people, regardless of their political views, nationality, or religious convictions.

Supporting the radical economic reform and the development of a multisectoral economy on the basis of diverse forms of ownership, the trade unions of the republic also protect the legitimate interests of workers of state enterprises, collective and peasant farms, cooperatives, lessees, and persons engaged in individual labor activity.

Understandably, the process of creating a federation of independent trade unions in the RSFSR should develop over time and take a natural path if we wish to retain our major initial thesis—voluntary entry of member organizations into the federation. At the same time, we must not postpone or prolong the entry into the federation of those organizations that have determined their ideas and can make a decision immediately after the congress.

Therefore, the organizing committee considers it important at today's congress to discuss the basic principles of the organizational structure of the federation and then publish them as a draft for extensive discussion in the trade union organizations, thus laying a basis for the process of creating the federation. At the congress it would be expedient to elect the management and working organs of the new trade union center of Russia and to instruct them to consider and resolve all organizational problems having to do with the entry of member organizations into the federation and, having extended the mandates of the delegates, perhaps six months later hold another meeting of the congress in order to evaluate the organizational period and adopt a final decision.

In our view, trade unions, associations, and societies that have formed republic electoral organs and have organizations of branch trade unions of the USSR, and also regional trade union councils and other social associations operating in the sphere of the professional and socioeconomic interests of the workers, could be considered member organizations of the federation. The main condition for membership in the federation should be the recognition by member organizations of its basic principles.

The new principles of the structure and activity of the federation of independent trade unions of the RSFSR also requires new approaches to the formation of its management organs.

Taking into account the numerous proposals from the local areas, for the first time, as you know, members of the future trade union center of the Russian Federation have been chosen by direct delegation at branch and interunion conferences and expanded plenums of trade union central committees on the basis of consultations with the local organizations.

The organizing committee assumes that the presidium of the council of the federation could also be formed on the basis of equal, direct representation of the members of the council of the federation from each branch trade union, trade union organizations of autonomous republics, and economic regions of Russia that have been formed in the system of the national economy.

In order to organize current work of an executive nature, in our opinion, it would be expedient to form a secretariat of the council of the federation. The secretaries of the council would not be elected but would be approved by a decision of the FNPR council, with an eye toward assigning highly qualified specialists in the corresponding areas of the federation's activity to these positions.

It will be necessary to have an apparatus of consultants, experts, and other specialists with high qualifications in questions of wages, price setting, working conditions, ecology, spiritual life, and law to support the work of the council of the federation and its electoral organs. In particular, with an increase in the role of judicial defense for trade unions, it will be important for them to have their own legal services. The apparatus should be small and mobile. It should obviously be formed on a competitive basis for the term of office of the council of the federation and should be maintained not by membership dues but with funds from the economic, commercial, and other activity of the federation. And it should be especially noted that the overall number of members of the apparatus (of the federation and the AUCCTU) should not exceed the present number.

We should also think about the procedure for electing the chairman of the federation and his deputies. It is being suggested that they be elected directly, at the congress, by a secret vote, and on a competitive basis so as to make this procedure more democratic and open.

It is important that the council of the federation develop a fundamentally new style of work from the first days of its activity. Born of our times, this organ should be free of the vices of the command-administrative system.

In the development and implementation of the trade union policy it is necessary to provide for the primary role of the members of the council and the presidium over the apparatus and to be concerned about enlisting each of them in active work on a regular basis. To these ends it will be necessary to develop and approve the status of a member of the council and determine his rights and responsibilities. It will be necessary to take a different approach than heretofore to the formation and organization of the activity of the permanent commissions. They must have broad authority and the possibility of working on problems in depth, and commission members should be released from their regular jobs for a certain period of time while retaining their average earnings.

On behalf of the congress, I should give the council an order not to command the trade union organizations but to help them in their work, to work hand in hand with them, and to live with their common interests. The most important task of the council of the Federation of Trade Unions of Russia and all members of the organizations is to strengthen the local trade union unit. We should be concerned about increasing the authority of the trade union committee and its chairman and their social protection. It is understandable that at first this will depend on support from the trade union members and the labor collectives

themselves. They are the main power and support of the trade union committee. At the same time, the council of the federation and all of its structures are intended to protect each trade union worker who is staunchly defending the interests of the workers.

It is necessary to increase the role of the trade union committees in the creation of the trade union structures. They must have the full right to decide for themselves what kind of higher organ they need: a rayon committee, oblast committee or council of chairmen, a bureau or a republic committee. The main thing is to avoid standard solutions and uniformity and rely on the opinions and assessments of the trade union masses themselves.

The council of the federation plays an exceptionally large role as the center that unites and consolidates the trade union movement of Russia on the basis of solidarity and mutual support of all detachments of workers in the republic. The council is called upon to interact closely with republic trade unions in solving branch problems and with trade union councils in solving regional problems, and to actively represent and protect the interests of the workers of Russia in the government and the republic Supreme Soviet. The need for this is especially great since the AUCCTU, when jointly representing trade union interests in the RSFSR organs of power, has done so unenergetically and inconsistently.

In connection with the formation of the Russian trade union center there arises the question of the division of functions with the AUCCTU, and it must be resolved by these two elective organs. It is important to clearly delimit the tasks carried out on the scale of the Russian Federation and at the level of the republic authorities, and also problems which the trade unions and workers of Russia must solve through the unionwide trade union center and its interaction with the country's government and Supreme Soviet.

It is also important to discuss at the congress problems related to the federation's financial and economic activity and its structures. All the logic and the new principles for building the federation dictate the need to take a new approach to the formation of the budgets of trade union organs at all levels as well. Obviously, this process should begin from the bottom, with the local organization. Under these conditions oblast and kray councils and committees will form their own budgets, taking into account the funds obtained from the trade union committees for specific programs in their activity. At the republic level, in the trade union center, and in the branch committees it would be expedient, in our view, to create "solidarity funds," which could be formed by deducting a certain percentage of the trade union funds and used for socially significant purposes. The trade union budgets formed this year should obviously not be touched, but the procedure for forming the "solidarity fund" should be determined in six months at the next congress.

Priority Issues in the Protective Policy of Trade Unions of Russia

The economic reform, based on the development of commodity-monetary relations and the use of the market mechanism, essentially changes production relations and sets for trade unions the task of reorienting their activity resolutely for the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the working man. Fundamentally important decisions in this area were adopted, as we know, by the Sixth AUCCTU Plenum in September of last year.

At our congress this course and these ideas should be further developed.

Protective functions acquire deeper meaning for the trade unions of Russia under modern conditions. We are speaking not only about the professional and social protection of workers from arbitrary administrative, departmental, and local actions but also about protection of the interests of the ethnic groups of the republic and their ethnic merit from the uncontrolled mismanagement of the union departments.

The trade unions of Russia are far from indifferent to the situation in which the republic has ended up as a result of mistakes and omissions in the distribution of productive forces on its territory and the barbaric exploitation of its natural resources. Distortions in economic policy have led to significant disproportions between the development of heavy industry, the extraction industry, and the production of consumer goods, the share of which in Russia is approximately half the necessary level.

In their first congress the trade unions of Russia must announce at the top of their voice that they are in favor of real independence and the right of the Russian Federation, its Supreme Soviet, and its government to dispose of its industrial potential and natural resources. These questions should be reflected in the USSR law "On Common Foundations of Leadership of the Economic and Social Sphere in the Union Republics on Principles of Self-Management and Self-Financing."

The economic principle based on the law of equal rights of all Union republics is, in our view, the only true path to strengthening cooperation and friendship among the peoples of the Soviet republics and the basis for a future union agreement.

The Russian Federation, like the rest of the country, is experiencing a transition period in the economy. The rank-and-file workers and their families are experiencing the lack of balance in monetary circulation and the consumer market, the shortage of goods, the increasingly critical food and housing problems, and rampant speculation.

Under these conditions the primary task of the trade unions should be fighting for the creation of a mechanism for social protection of the workers and individual social groups whose existence is supported by fixed incomes—pensions, stipends, and grants. The price the

people will inevitably have to pay during the course of reconstructing the economy should be an acceptable one, and tens of millions of our compatriots should not be cast to the brink of poverty.

The decisions and legislative acts adopted by the government and the Supreme Soviet must take the social consequences into account and not allow the standard of living of the population to drop as low as it can go.

Major efforts should be devoted to invigorating the economy.

The economic reform in Russia still includes more negative than positive aspects of the incipient market relations. This leads to a stratification of the population according to income, an overall reduction of the standard of living, increased anarchy in production, and decreased discipline and respect for honest, conscientious labor without any apparent signs of improvement even in particular areas. Under these conditions the republic government should be resolute in surmounting the crisis situation in the economy of the Russian Federation and think seriously about the correctness of the policy of economic reforms that has been chosen and how radical they are. It is necessary to analyze the causes of the mistakes that have been made recently.

In our opinion, not a single legislative act or government decision affecting the interests of the broad masses of workers should be made without a consideration of alternative plans. Haste and mistakes in this cost our economy, and ultimately all Soviet people, a great deal. More attention should be given to the experience in economic reforms and the introduction of market regulators in China and a number of other countries.

The trade union center of Russia, expressing the interests of the workers, is called upon to make its contribution to the development of the economic policy and, in cooperation with the government and the Supreme Soviet, at the same time to play the role of a constructive opponent, to analyze the decisions that are made from the standpoint of their social suitability, and to suggest their own variants of solutions to the problems.

The food problem remains extremely critical. The situation with respect to the supply of food products for the population is especially bad in the majority of large industrial centers of Russia and the Far North, which due to objective factors cannot provide their own food. The situation in the Russian Non-Chernozem Zone remains as critical as before. The food problem is of primary importance and has priority both for the government and for the trade unions.

The new laws on land and ownership open up possibilities for the development of initiative, the return of the peasant to the land, and the restoration of his feeling of being a master. And the forms of organization of labor and production should be determined by the peasant himself.

But regardless of how progressive they may be, these forms cannot solve the problems without technical equipment, without the corresponding capital availability, and merely with incantations that "the peasant is the master." Today one agricultural worker in the RSFSR has 15 mouths to feed (as compared to 11 in 1969), which is more than in any other union republic except for Armenia. But at the same time the Russian Federation lags considerably behind the majority of republics in terms of capital availability for agricultural production. For example, in Estonia this amounts to R229,000 per 100 hectares of agricultural land, in Belorussia—180,000, and in the Non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR—R142,000.

From year to year we repeat the same figure for losses—up to one-third of the agricultural products perish on the way from the producer to the consumer. But the situation is practically not changing.

As before, there are not enough storage facilities, processing capacities, or specialized transportation.

Much has already been said about the neglect and impoverishment of Russian villages. Even the postwar destruction inspired more hope because then one could see the people's desire to restore what had been destroyed. Now many empty villages are going to ruin and there is no one who wants to restore them. About one-half million able-bodied people are leaving the Russian villages each year.

The appeals from certain people's deputies who are members of the scientific community to "place their stake"—that is, eliminate 20 percent of the farms in one fell swoop and then, supposedly, everything will take care of itself—are pure profanation unless they are backed up by a program for construction of roads, a network of processing enterprises, and farms that are turned over to the peasants free of charge. And this will require money and long-term effort.

The trade unions are in favor of a strong state program for the restoration of the Russian rural villages, reasonable redistribution of part of the national income into this sector, mass and goal-directed use of capital investments and material resources, and reorientation of the branches of industry, science, and currency resources. This is where we must "place our stake" if we want feed the people. I do not think there is any need to prove that the restoration of Russia must begin with the restoration of the rural village and a real repayment of debts to it. And we must begin with a concern for the rural worker and the conditions for his life and labor.

The labor collectives are actively expressing dissatisfaction with the rates at which the housing problem is being solved and with the actions of the Russian government and local management organs in their implementation of the program "Housing-2000," which is losing the trust of the people.

There is alarm about the considerable arrears in the construction base and the lack of construction materials. Things are being held up significantly by the excessive centralization of the construction and distribution of housing, which causes a lack of motivation and dependent attitudes.

The housing problem can be alleviated only with the active participation of the people themselves. In order to awaken the people's initiative to build their own home or apartment they must be motivated economically. It is time to get rid of outdated dogmas and restrictive normatives and instructions and to create conditions for the equal development of diverse forms of home ownership, making it possible for workers to have housing they like and can afford.

At the same time, we must not allow possible changes to lead to injustice with respect to veterans, disabled persons, the underprivileged, and families with many children or to encroach on the interests of youth and military servicemen. Therefore, while being in favor of making timely changes in the housing policy, we also support the right of each Soviet family to obtain free housing or equal value in the form of credit within the socially guaranteed minimum. This right and the procedure for exercising it require a legislative solution.

Questions of material, food, and housing provision are undoubtedly the main ones. But they do not exhaust the problems that beset the workers of our republic today.

At the congress, in our opinion, we should clearly define our position with respect to many of them which have already been on the agenda for a long time.

The trade unions of Russia must come out strongly against "black Saturdays" and in favor of a 40-hour work week, the most rapid release of women from manual labor, and longer paid leaves and larger stipends for caring for children. Workers working on loan in cooperatives and workers and employees of joint enterprises and also enterprises that are reprofiled as a result of conversion and, finally, students and working youth need reliable legal protection.

The economic reform has done little for youth. Today every third graduate of a specialized vocational and technical school is not hired. More than half of the young people under 30 years of age questioned by sociologists in large cities of Russia stated that their only hope is help from their parents. In many youth dormitories workers and students live in conditions that degrade human dignity.

Social apathy is becoming more and more widespread among youth. Youth are now faced with a choice of whom to follow and which social and political goals to use as an orientation. Against this background, which has destabilized society, nationalists, right-wing extremists, and organized crime are waging a battle for youth.

We must be clearly aware that a radical renewal of the trade union movement will not occur without the active participation of youth in it. The trade unions will not receive support from the most dynamic and potentially active and socially defenseless part of the population unless they are able to express and defend the interests of young workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and students at various levels. In protecting youth the trade union are protecting the future of the republic and the country. This yardstick of responsibility should obviously be used to measure the results of the activity of the trade union councils and committees in solving youth problems.

Russia needs its own law on employment and its own program for fighting unemployment which reflect the peculiarities of a republic which has a great shortage of work force in some regions and a shortage of jobs in others.

In connection with the changeover to a multisectoral economy and diverse forms of ownership as well as the appearance of a labor market, there arises a need to clearly define the concepts "employer" and "hired worker" and to develop new forms and methods for their interaction and the protection of their interests.

Protection of the labor of workers in production should be raised to the level of tasks of state importance. The RSFSR at the present time is among the republics with the highest level of industrial injury. In 1989 the number of people who died in production increased as compared to 1988. Production conditions do not meet the requirements for labor protection for 2 million workers employed at enterprises under republic jurisdiction.

There is no normative-legal regulation of labor protection at the republic level. There are no special legislative acts on these questions. The nature and conditions for the labor of many categories of workers are not taken into account, especially for those working under severe climatic conditions in the North, Siberia, and the Far East.

The population of a number of rayons of Bryansk Oblast that suffered from the Chernobyl disaster are being left essentially without the proper attention. Here even in the zone of strict radiation monitoring, where about 300,000 residents live, they still do not have the necessary quantity of dosimeters, protective devices, and specialized technical equipment. There is a critical shortage of doctors. They have not arranged for the import of fruits and vegetables that are guaranteed to be free of radiation. Seeing no hope for improvement of the situation, many families are abandoning their homes.

Trade union organs cannot and do not have the right to abandon these people in their time of need; they should be with them and doing everything possible to alleviate their condition, and they should demand that the government of the country and the RSFSR immediately implement the complex of measures that have been earmarked for these regions.

One of the most important protective functions is social insurance for the workers. This year's union budget for this exceeds R70 billion. More than half of this sum goes to the Russian Federation.

During preparations for the congress various opinions were expressed regarding the organization of social security. One thing is clear: Radical changes are badly needed here. The most appropriate, in our opinion, are proposals to establish two insurance rates for enterprises and organizations and to form two corresponding funds: the fund for pension support, whose administration is to be turned over to the state, and the social insurance fund, which will be left under the jurisdiction of the trade unions. Payments for all kinds of stipends and also for the organization of sanitary-health resort treatment and recreation for the workers, their children, veterans, and disabled persons are made by the collectives themselves directly from the latter fund.

Additionally, we should separately develop a special system for social security for cooperative workers.

Questions of the management of state social insurance are closely linked to the solutions to such regional problems as protection of the health of the workers, maternity and childhood, and concern for veterans and disabled persons, and they require an increase in the role of territorial trade union organs in this matter. A great deal of independence should be granted in the work for social security for trade union councils of union and autonomous republics of the krais and oblasts of the RSFSR and local trade union organizations.

Restructuring of the work for social security should take place simultaneously with the reform of wholesale prices and the increase of the rates for dues. All these are large and important measures that affect the interests of millions of workers. One would think that the delegates to the congress will express their opinions about this.

Methods and Means for Trade Unions To Perform Their Protective Function

In order for the trade unions and their elective organs to be able to perform their protective function effectively they must have the necessary arsenal of means, rights, and capabilities.

Many Russian trade union units still make poor use of the levers of influence for preventing illegal management decisions. Moreover, they frequently experience pressure and even dictatorship from the apparatus of local party organs and neglectful treatment from executive organs of power and republic departments.

Certain chairmen of trade union committees of enterprises that have been drawn into "triangles" and "quadrangles" find it easy to put their signatures to various documents along with the business executives, frequently behind the backs of the workers, thus before their eyes becoming additional "bosses" who stand "above" them instead of alongside them.

It is extremely important to help the trade union committees to overcome the accelerating dependence on economic workers, and the republic trade union center to persistently achieve a legislative reinforcement of the social protection of chairmen of trade union committees and other activists. And not only for their term of office but also after they return to their previous labor activity so as to completely eliminate cases of administrative arbitrariness.

One of the most reliable levers of the social mechanism for protection is the collective agreement. Over many years it has been formalized in such a way that it has lost its initial basis. Now they have removed practically all restrictions on the development of the collective agreement and the collectives have gained new independence. They have the right to decide at their own discretion the purposes for which they will use the money they have earned and to establish the priority and sequence of the solutions to social problems.

Trade union organizations must instill the collective contract with new content that reflects the expression of the will of the workers and the needs not only of the collectives as a whole but also of individual social and professional groups, in keeping, of course, with the real possibilities. Only with this approach will this document become an effective instrument for regulating labor relations, overcoming the contradictions that arise, and, in the final analysis, reducing the social tension in the collective.

The trade unions must create a system of social guarantees for workers at all levels—union, republic, kray, oblast, and at the level of the enterprises. The key units in this system of social protection, in addition to the collective agreements, should be the agreements of the Russian trade union center with the government and branch republic committees and regional trade union councils with the ministries, departments, and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies. The subjects of the agreements could be wages, working conditions, employment, housing, and other most crucial social problems.

Such tested means of fighting as rallies, demonstrations, and picketing should become effective weapons for the trade unions in defending their demands. They focus the attention of the public and state and economic organs on crucial problems and force them to sit down at the negotiating table. Trade union organs of all levels must master active forms of struggle that have been lost over decades of passivity, a lack of will, and "political comfort."

We should also take advantage of the possibilities offered by the USSR law "On the Policy for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)" and above all the "peaceful" methods—reconciliation commissions and labor arbitration. In keeping with the law, the trade unions must have the right to declare a strike as an extreme measure in fighting for the interests of the workers. But when taking advantage of it they must recall that this is a double-edged weapon which strikes

simultaneously not only at the economy of the enterprise and the national economy as a whole but also at the long-term interests of the workers themselves. In our view, it is absolutely unacceptable for trade unions to use strikes for political purposes.

While speaking of all forms of struggle, at the same time we must recall the crisis in our economy and do everything possible to prevent knock-out blows to it, especially by means of strikes.

The newly elected RSFSR Supreme Soviet will go to work in the near future and a new Russian government will be established. The trade union center of Russia and all republic trade union organs and organizations are called upon to establish a constructive dialog with the government and state organs of the republic as well as businesslike cooperation for successfully resolving the most crucial and immediate problems bothering the workers of the Russian Federation.

The mass media are the most important instrument for forming public opinion. The trade union center of Russia must have its own newspaper, press center, and radio and television stations.

In a word, comrades, I should like to emphasize once again that the trade unions of Russia can become strong and independent only if they are real, persistent, and principled defenders of the interests of the workers.

For Spiritual Regeneration of the Peoples of Russia

While consistently satisfying the material needs of the people, the trade unions are called upon to defend their spiritual interests just as firmly and in keeping with principles.

Man does not live by bread alone. His full development is unthinkable outside the culture and traditions that go back deep into history, or without the succession and links between generations.

For centuries Russia has been living side by side with various peoples and nationalities. We have been living as good neighbors, respecting one another's national culture, language, religion, and customs. There is no more important task today than to protect and proliferate this common property and not let the nations fall into the abyss of dissension and conflict.

As never before we must take advantage of professional solidarity to completely eliminate interethnic conflicts and resolutely speak out in defense of the rights of the Soviet person of any nationality to live and work in any autonomous republic, oblast, or kray.

While expressing alarm and concern about the declining standard of living, we cannot but mention the spiritual and cultural misfortune of the workers, the youth, and the entire Russian population.

Four out of every five workers and kolkhoz workers have no opportunity to go to theaters, and one adolescent in

Russia has a chance to go to one performance in six years. Only one-half million rubles' worth of representative artworks are sold in Russia each year. As a rule, even modest plans for the construction of art institutions and clubs and the restoration of architectural monuments are not carried out.

The disparities in the spheres of cultural service in various social groups and regions are increasing. The concept of spiritual provincialism has become a reality in Russia.

This situation is considerably exacerbated by the unrestrained commercialism and the prices in culture which are increasing without compensation. In their drive for the ruble, for easy money, the wheeler-dealers are catering to the lowest tastes and needs. In this respect, unfortunately, we are repeating the negative experience of the Western pseudoculture of the 1960's. A dull commercial swell of violence, permissiveness, and pornography is increasingly swallowing up movies, video salons, the stage, and many theaters. If we do not halt these processes now it is difficult to imagine the degree of spiritual poverty and despair that could await us in the future.

Our intelligentsia has the final word here. Russian educators and art figures through their talent, beneficence, and intellect have always served the people with honesty and devotion. On behalf of the Congress of RSFSR Trade Unions we appeal to the masters of literature and art and the creative unions of Russia: "In this time of crisis for the culture, raise your voices in defense of morality and truly spiritual values!" The trade unions, based on the highest interests of the republic, its peoples, and all workers, are called upon in all ways to support the healthy forces of the society in the struggle for its spiritual recovery. The trade unions are prepared to cooperate with any religious institutions along this path.

In our opinion, the situation that has developed requires the adoption of a state program for the development of the culture of Russia—a program that guarantees people access to cultural values and the observance of social justice in this. It is necessary to resolutely reject the residual principle in financing culture. With the adoption of the USSR law on common foundations of local self-management and the local economy, in our view, we should envision through Russian legislation the creation of regional funds for financing cultural programs, or in any case at least release culture and sports institutions from all kinds of payments into the budget.

Local soviets with the participation of the trade unions could introduce benefits for underprivileged categories of workers, pensioners, students, and school children so they could visit museums, theaters, concert halls, and sports facilities. In many countries these categories of the population are allowed to enjoy services in the sphere of culture free of charge. We could revise the system of incentive measures for state enterprises, concerns, joint stock companies, cooperatives, and individual citizens who invest money in the nonmaterial sphere. Some of their profits, for

example the part used for the development of culture and sports, could, in our opinion, be tax exempt.

Trade unions have traditionally participated directly in the organization and financing of mass cultural and physical education work in the labor collectives, with children, in the clubs, and in sports facilities. More than R1.5 billion from the trade union budget go for these purposes in Russia. This shows the trade unions' real concern for the people, and the workers value it highly.

I should like to mention especially the use made, by decision of the 18th Congress of USSR Trade Unions, of R1 billion of union funds over a 10-year period for the development of a base for leisure and recreation for workers of the North, Siberia, and the Far East. With these funds we have already constructed, repaired, and reconstructed 1,500 facilities and it is intended to construct another 2,000 of them. They will be able to serve more than 13 million residents of the North, Siberia, and the Far East each year. This is a real manifestation of trade union and worker solidarity. There is no doubt that it is important to complete these vitally important humanitarian programs.

In addition, many trade union committees today are raising the issue that the spiritual development of the workers should be financed to a greater degree from state and local budgets and funds of enterprises. Indeed, it is wrong for trade union membership fees to be used to compensate for shortages in state financing in the sphere of culture and sports.

At the same time the trade unions cannot, they simply do not have the right to curtail their participation in the financing of cultural and sports work among the workers, children, and youth. This could finally undermine its material foundations, which are shaky to begin with. One cannot agree with certain trade union committees which, under the pretext of independence but essentially because of group egoism, are closing down and selling houses of culture, sports facilities, libraries, adolescent clubs, and pioneer camps. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people, adolescents, veterans, and underprivileged people have already been cut off from artistic creativity since they cannot afford these pleasures.

Esteemed comrades! In conclusion we wish to state quite definitely that the formation of a federation of independent trade unions of the RSFSR will not lead to national isolation and separation and will not infringe upon the country's trade union movement. This step creates quite new possibilities for the Russian trade unions to participate actively and interact closely with the trade unions of other republics both within the framework of the country's trade union center and on a bilateral basis.

Taking advantage of the presence at our congress of representatives of trade union councils of fraternal union republics, we should like to express our readiness for this kind of cooperation and strengthening of our cooperation and unity on a country-wide scale. The trade unions

of Russia do not claim any exclusivity; they strive to be among the rest and an equal among equals.

At our congress it would also make sense to exchange opinions on the prospects for further development of the whole trade union movement in the country. We are proceeding toward a new type of trade union agreement, real sovereignty of the union republics, and their economic and political independence. Here arises the question of the expediency of retaining the current principle of construction of the country's trade unions on the basis of strict centralization. We must look for new organizational forms.

These questions will have to be resolved by the 19th Congress of USSR Trade Unions. In our opinion there is a need to move its dates up and hold it this year.

The speaker emphasized that they are counting on having discussion at the Russian congress enrich the ideas of deep reform and regeneration of trade unions of the republic and fill them with new content.

Moscow Soviet Apparatchiks View Future

90UN1404B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kakotkin: "They Expect To Stay on Their Feet"]

[Text] Are big changes coming to the Moscow soviet? For the time being it is difficult to answer this question with a simple "yes" or a categorical "no." But in any case one thing is known: New forces have come to power in the capital, and one already sometimes hears the bellicose calls of the newly elected deputies "to find the place that the apparat of the Moscow Soviet deserves."

What is left for the workers of the Moscow soviet? Our correspondent addressed the same question to several officials of the apparat: Do you fear for your future with the change of power?

S.I. Veselovskiy, head of the general department of the Moscow soviet executive committee:

"I have already worked 16 years in the system of the Moscow soviet, and I have seen much. There are only two people like me. I am calm about the upcoming changes and feel fairly confident. If the new authorities will evaluate people according to their qualities as efficient workers, I do not think that I am threatened with dismissal. In case of an unpleasant outcome, I will still have work. I can work as the deputy administrator of a trust or an economist-manager in a joint enterprise. They respect education and experience."

S.A. Zavalov, assistant deputy chairman of the executive committee:

"In principle I support the platform of the 'Democratic Russia' bloc, although I understand what it might cost me. To say that I look upon the immediate future with

optimism would be to sin against the truth. Speaking honestly, I do not want to leave. If such a thing happens, it will not be so terrible. By specialty I am a road-builder, and I believe there will be enough roads to construct in our times."

V.D. Shvagin, reviewer of a section:

"I would say that we are in a position of complete uncertainty. For the time being we are ignorant of the new structure, the staffs, etc. My personal prospects are similarly unknown. As you understand, I, a classic apparatchik, am not burning with a desire to go, for example, to the ZIL [Moscow Automobile Factory imeni I.A. Likhachev] as a fitter, and all the more because I have personal experience of such work. If it happens, I will try to use my knowledge in a humanities specialty: At one time I worked as a teacher of scientific communism. But in general we will not have much choice. Apparently I will go wherever they send me."

V.M. Shvydko, chief specialist of the department of social development:

"My chances of being spared are practically zero for the immediate future. Before my transfer to the Moscow soviet I worked in a party gorkom [city party committee], and our new deputies should have a look at my papers as they decide my fate. By specialty I am a construction engineer, but I have no idea regarding my future work."

Moscow Mayoral 'Candidates' Interviewed

90UN1404A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Domnysheva under the rubric "Pulse": "The Moscow Soviet: Vacancies at the Helm"]

[Text] "Too many problems." "The new authority does not intend to joke around." "A city for the people."

Moscow will learn the name of its new mayor and chairman of the Moscow soviet in the third week of April. For now we can only surmise who will stand at the head of that most complex organism which is the capital. Various names are mentioned, but one most frequently hears Bryachikhin, Popov, Prokofyev, Saykin, and Stankevich. Our correspondent met with three of them. We decided to propose that they try to address these positions.

Thus, five questions to the potential aspirants:

1. You are one of those whom the voters see in the position of chairman of the Moscow soviet or the Moscow gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee]. Which position would you prefer for yourself?
2. What are your strategy and tactics for the coming work?
3. What is the main action of your program?

4. What are your first steps as mayor or chairman?

5. What are your strong and weak points?

Saykin, Valeriy Timoveyevich, 53 years old. Native of Moscow. Career path: From worker to general director of ZIL [Moscow Automobile Plant imeni I.A. Likhachev]. Since 1986—chairman of the Moscow soviet executive committee.

1. I do not see myself as chairman of the Moscow soviet. If I run, then it will be for chairman of the Moscow gorispolkom.

2. There are too many problems in the city. They have come into existence and accumulated from one year to the next. It is very difficult to solve them in a short time. Therefore I would pick out the most urgent areas where maximum effort should be applied. Issues of housing, the supply of goods to residents, and improving the city need attention in particular.

3. I consider solving problems of housing construction in Moscow the most important task. A shortage of construction materials and workers, the low level of mechanization of construction, and poor quality—today all of these are some of the causes for people's bitter dissatisfaction with social issues, and they are right to be dissatisfied.

4. I would start with housing....

5. Weak point.... Perhaps I have put off my acquaintance with Moscow's huge economy too long. I have studied it only now, toward the end of my activities. Another weak point is that I have relied upon myself too much when solving problems. As for strong points, I have a great desire to inquire into all the questions and problems of the city's development.

Bryachikhin, Aleksey Mikheyevich, 48 years old. Three years ago he headed the Sevastopol party raykom [rayon committee], and he is now known beyond the borders of Moscow as well for his new forms of work with the population and the informal associations. Out of the 14 workers in the raykom's party apparat, 11 were nominated and elected deputy by the residents of the rayon, including the first secretary.

1. I can justify both positions. Although no one has proposed anything of the sort.

2. The main thing is that Moscow's status be determined: Rights, duties, functions, and positions in order to exclude rule by dictate by the ministries and departments. Without that there will not be any serious changes. For the time being the Moscow soviet has almost no rights in Moscow and it passes decisions which are not carried out. I believe it is necessary to create a new structure for administering the city's economy, because the old one is ineffective.

It is very important to complete the formation of a full-fledged body of deputies as quickly as possible. We

must learn how to hear and take into account the opinion of everyone, including the minority.

We must occupy ourselves with a general plan for the capital based on a new structure of administration. Moscow can no longer develop as an industrial center. We have already crossed the boundary of what is reasonable. The way out is to decrease the industrial potential.

4. I will enter the office.

5. My weak points are, perhaps, my emotions and impatience. I do not like it at all when we have agreed on something and it does not take place. My strong points are professionalism and competency and I am a candidate of economic sciences, but I do not just know life from books. I believe one of my main features is obligation. I do not like chatters, and I try to maintain the principle of pay according to work. They say that I am a difficult but dependable boss.

Stankevich, Sergey Borisovich, 1954. USSR people's deputy. Candidate of historical sciences. Senior scientific associate at the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Active participant in the democratic movement.

1. Moscow soviet, probably....

2. A new generation of politicians has come to the Moscow soviet: A "party of malcontents" has won, as the joke goes in the CPSU Moscow gorkom [city party committee]. Finally there is a chance to let citizens learn the difference between apparat administration and democratic administration. The democratic majority of the Moscow soviet is making the transition from propaganda through slogans to victory through results.

Of course it is impossible to "build" an efficient and philanthropic economy in one city individually taken over by democrats. But we can and must stop the increasing devastation that threatens us. In particular, we are getting ready to insist that perestroyka laws passed by the Union and republic parliaments work at the local city level, too.

The new authority does not intend to joke around—it will get what it wants—although it does not intend to lose its sense of humor either.

3. Among the chief actions of our program is an attempt to seriously improve the housing situation. With the help of the public we intend to conduct a general inventory of the capital's residential and nonresidential resources: We will uncover lodgings that are being concealed from the accounts, those that are uninhabited, and those that are used inefficiently or illegally. We will reduce to a minimum any industrial construction in the city, and we will concentrate as much of the construction industry's capacity as we can on equipping and repairing housing and building schools, clinics, stores, and kindergartens.

The main principle for all our activity is: A city for the people.

4. One of our first steps will be the creation of a Moscow bank of reconstruction and development. For Moscow, perestroika must have a firm financial base. Simultaneously we need to regroup and retrain the cadres: We need qualified managers.

5. My strong points are realism, persistence, and personal democracy. My weak points are my emotions, enthusiasm, trustfulness, and a chronic lack of sleep.

Western Republics

Results of Belorussian Elections Assessed

90UN1186B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 10, 5-11 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Shagun: "The Leaders Remain the Leaders"]

[Text] The activeness of the workers was higher than ever before at the 4 March elections to the republic Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies. A total of 6.256 million of the 7.23 million registered voters turned out for the elections. And in Brest and Vitebsk Oblasts the entire population with voting rights turned up at the polling stations.

The list of contenders for the deputy mandates was also large, an average of five for each seat. But in the large cities and industrial centers there were many okrugs where the labor collectives and the public nominated 15 or 18 candidates.

The election campaign, particularly in the last weeks before that Sunday in March, was very stormy. Large meetings took place in the capital and in various cities in the republic. At those meetings the candidates spoke about their programs and set forth their views on the republic's socioeconomic development. There were lively election debates in the local press and on radio and television. It was during the course of these discussions that the true leaders of the republic's future parliament emerged.

Even the most preliminary results indicate that there will be no casual people in the republic parliament. It will be made up of people who have shown their fellow citizens that they hold active positions in life and have done fruitful work in the political, economic, and cultural spheres.

Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Ye. Ye. Sokolov, Chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium N.I. Dementey, and Chairman of the republic Council of Ministers M.V. Kovalev obtained the required numbers of votes and have been elected to the Belorussian Supreme Soviet.

Although the "social portrait" of the parliament will be complex because only 100 of the 310 seats on the territorial okrugs were filled in the first round of voting,

we did draw some preliminary conclusions with the help of the Belorussian SSR Central Electoral Committee, Ivan Valishevich Likhach.

Leaders in industry and the agrarian sector and engineers and technicians and others associated with material production will make up about 50 percent of the deputies in the republic Supreme Soviet. Representatives of science, culture, and education will comprise about 15 percent and of public health, about 6 percent. There are still few workers and kolkhoz [collective farm] farmers among the deputies—about 2.5 percent. Young people and women obtained no more than 7 percent of the seats.

The elections have shown that those party, soviet, and economic leaders who have moved away from perestroika processes have lost the trust of the voters and will not become people's deputies. Thus, for example, the entire leadership of Molodechno and Bobruysk—major industrial centers in Minsk and Mogilev Oblasts—was voted out. Some workers in the Mogilev party obkom [oblast party committee] did not make it to the republic parliament. At the same time the first secretaries and chairmen of rayon executive committees and of the group of rayons suffering from the Chernobyl accident were elected as deputies to the republic Supreme Soviet.

A significant number of seats in the republic parliament will undoubtedly be gained by the Belorussian People's Front. Of the five deputies elected on Sunday in Minsk, four support the platform of the Belorussian People's Front. The leader of this public movement, the scientific associate from the republic Academy of Sciences, Z.S. Poznyak, made it to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

In the other 42 electoral okrugs in the capital, where the second round of voting will soon take place, supporters of the Belorussian People's Front hope at least to gain mandates in one-third of the okrugs.

The unique "white-and-green" faction in the Supreme Soviet will be made up of ecologists, physicians, and other specialists who counsel in favor of the fastest possible normalization of the ecological situation in nature and among man in Belorussia.

In general, after the final voting, the most diverse forces will be represented in the republic parliament. And now the question on the agenda is that of dialogue and mutual understanding between the "left," the "right," and the "center."

Moldavian Finance Minister Released From Post

LD2103174390 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 13 Mar 90 p 4

[Text] The Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet presidium has released Comrade Adrian

Leonidovich Budyanu from his post as Moldavian minister of finance in connection with his transfer to other work.

Ukraine To Form Peasant-Democratic Party

90UN1156A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 12 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by N. Pugovitsa in Lvov: "A Step Toward Creating a Peasants' Party?"]

[Text] Prominent scholars, leaders in the Committee of Agro-industrial Entities of Lvov Oblast, a number of agricultural firms and agricultural trade enterprises, kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], have formed an action committee on the establishment of a Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party.

Among all segments of society, the statement they adopted reads, peasants and those who have tied their fate to the village are the most socially unprotected. They receive the lowest pay for their difficult labor. Their lifestyle and housing conditions are the least comfortable. Their children constitute the lowest percentage of students at institutes of higher education. Peasants get the worst medical care and have little opportunity for cultural and spiritual development. Who will protect their interests? A party which places universal human values above class values, which revives national agriculture using various forms of management and ownership might become such an organization, the statement emphasizes.

The action committee proposed a set of draft statutes of the Peasant-Democratic Party, and these were published by the newspaper LITERATURNIA UKRAINA (the organ of the Ukrainian Writers' Union). What are the main provisions of the statutes? The party unites within its ranks, on a voluntary basis, representatives of the village and city who are honest, diligent in their labor, and modest in their lifestyle—peasants and laborers; workers in culture, education, and public health; scholars; and writers. The final goal of the party's activity is proclaimed as being "the building of a Ukrainian national state of democratic socialism." In accordance with the draft statutes, the party is to function mainly on social principles and to fight for extending equal rights to all parties, societies, and organizations in delegating its representatives to the parliament and local soviets. It is proposed that half of its financial resources (which are envisaged as coming from voluntary payments and contributions) be given to charity funds in its territory.

Time will tell whether or not the peasants of the republic share the Lvov action committee's view on the need to create a new political organization—the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party.

Ukrainian Informals' Election Tactics Criticized

PM0304144790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by own correspondent V. Drozd under the rubric "Epilogue to the Elections": "Time of Reckoning"]

[Text] The Ukraine—unsponsored organizations in the republic's western region are celebrating in the streets. They secured an impressive victory in the elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets. Their understandable jubilation marries ill with the disappointment, bewilderment, and bitterness felt by the members of party committees who are finding it hard to come to terms with such a crushing defeat. This slump in morale forces them to stop and think no less than the reasons behind it. If we are going to be totally frank, this defeat is a perfectly deserved retribution (if it is appropriate to speak of such a thing here). Retribution not only for all the past "pre-April years" but also for the sluggishness, indecision, and inconsistency shown since 1985. Also retribution for the inability to stop and consider—one of the cornerstones (if not the most fundamental aspect) of all politics.

No one should have dragged their feet at local level in the post-April years with regard to telling the truth about the past. They should have worked hard to ensure that the seeds sown in April changed at least something for the better in every successive fall harvest. That should have been done without blaming their own sluggishness and laziness on those at the top (everything always follows the same principle: If something works out well it is thanks to us, but if something goes wrong Moscow is to blame). They should have worked out their tactics with regard to the forces becoming involved in political life. However, instead of establishing "who's who," with whom they should cooperate, and from whom the mask of national careerists should be torn, they are still pretending that the people in question are bastards [nezakonnozhdenyye deti]. That being the case, it is hard to take their claims, means, and methods seriously.

If we take a closer look at the political and economic slogans under which unsponsored organizations conducted their election struggle, we will find much that is attractive. Who could fail to respond to the appeal to work for a sovereign Ukraine whose potential would be placed at the service of the region itself? Who could object to a flourishing national culture or refuse to show concern for large, needy families and invalids?

Where are the resources for this going to come from? The political trends united in the Ukrainian Democratic Bloc (UDB) even have a ready answer to this. V. Chernovil, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), spoke most frankly on this subject during a debate on Lvov television. He said: The republic's economy must be removed from the diktat of the USSR, because otherwise everything will be cleared out in return for "a few worthless Russian coppers." According

to him, there must be radical reforms in rural areas to free the peasants from collective farms, which are forms of "state slavery," scope must be given to foreign capital and foreign technology in order to "teach people to work," and the way opened to private ownership. (The inevitable question is: Is it the workers and peasants they have in mind in this respect or those who have amassed substantial sums of money?) Economists from "Rukh" recently elaborated on this program: The region is expected to prosper "on the basis of its own resources." The clarification in terms of time is far removed from the draft program for the socioeconomic development of the republic's western region, Galicia, published at the end of last year. But the aim is clear: If unsuccessful in removing the entire Ukraine from the USSR, the UDB is prepared to do this with part of the republic, Galicia. Cautious hints at this can be seen in fleeting proposals on the need to restore the Communist Party of the West Ukraine. All this is testing the water for the same idea: To throw a caftan sewn in Lvov over the entire Ukraine. But who has drawn the "pattern"? And have the "cutters" asked the Ukrainian people their opinion on the matter: What kind of clothing do they find most comfortable to wear and what color would they like?

Candidates from the UDB spoke frankly of their intentions on the eve of the elections. Although "Rukh" has been dreaming of exactly the same thing since it was in diapers. Now its leaders prefer not to emphasize one particular nuance: Its draft "birth certificate" contained the words: promote perestroika. The word "promote" disappeared in the later edition. As time has shown, stylistic amendments have been concerned not so much with the name as with the clarification of objectives. "Rukh" has thereby made it clear that it considers itself to be an independent political force which has no intention of helping anyone in anything and that it alone truly reflects the interests of the Ukrainian people. Here is further evidence of this. Justifying the need to convene another "Rukh" congress, its leaders said: "It is now clear that as long as there is one party (the CPSU—V.D.) with one center for all the peoples of the USSR, there is going to be national, social, and spiritual oppression. At the present stage we would like to see the Ukrainian Communist Party as a separate left-wing party under a democratic standard, a party that is not run from Moscow." But this is just a blind. The authors then become totally frank: Turning "Rukh" into a political party is the only way to guarantee the building of "real, lasting independence for the Ukraine." But independence primarily presupposes responsibility. But the further "Rukh" goes, the more blatantly it demonstrates political intolerance and the organizational alienation of healthy forces rather than goodwill and concord. "Rukh" leaders D. Pavlychko and I. Drach spoke openly about this recently in Transcarpathia when announcing the formation of a political party on the basis of "Rukh" and in opposition to the CPSU and their own resignation from the CPSU.

There is endless evidence in support of this. While "Rukh" says that it is primarily motivated by concern

for people's future, candidate deputies from "Rukh" for some reason constantly "forget" to add that the path that they are proposing so as to resolve the impasse will not be easy. As they keep quiet on this score, people get the impression that UDB deputies know the secret of rapidly improving the economy, the environment, and the spiritual sphere and resolving the problems of religion and the region's complex history.

We have already met "forgetful" (in their own favor) candidate deputies in previous elections. They too promised a land flowing with milk and honey. But what happened? When they counted up how much it would cost to realize these Manilov-like [reference to character in Gogol's "Dead Souls"] promises it became clear that this kind of money could not be found: not only in the Ukraine but in the whole country. One can only regret that the statement to this effect was brief and soon forgotten. It would not have hurt to think about this on the eve of the recent elections.

This idea also shaped the tactics adopted by the UDB candidates. They had so much to say about someone trying to drive a wedge between the intelligentsia and the workers and peasants. In a recent address on the formation of a Ukrainian democratic peasants party (signed by scientists) one finds this rhetorical question: "Peasants! Who is protecting your interests?" If the intelligentsia is really so concerned about the lives of the peasantry, why does it not give up its seat in the republic parliament to a peasant? Or, when it comes down to it, should every cobbler stick to his last? If you study the list of deputies to soviets at various levels, you are immediately struck by the fact that the intelligentsia is in the supreme, oblast, and city soviets, while "ordinary working people" have been given mandates for lesser organs of authority. And the young people can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Or perhaps the UDB leaders feel that young people are capable of nothing more than filling the role of extras at rallies and in support groups?

In this connection you cannot fail to recall the creative intelligentsia's special responsibility for truthfully elucidating the region's history. A difficult lot fell to it. Everything that the country experienced under Stalinism also befell the western region and sowed fear, confusion, and disappointment which live on in people to this day. Who, if not the local creative and scientific intelligentsia, can help people to understand the innocent and the guilty, and the pain and the loss experienced equally by all of our country's peoples? Help them to come to terms with personal resentments and believe in the healing strength of perestroika?

Despite this, you can see that many local writers and scientists appear to be competing with one another as to who can throw the sharpest, most painful stone at their own past (and also, in passing, at the present) and who can find the most offensive, painful words to address to Moscow, the party, and the Soviet Union.

Even if you can somehow understand the critics who have been unable to reveal themselves, you must at least feel amazed by the moral complaisance of the modern-day Chekhov darlings who were nourished and treated kindly by those years. Surely that is the reason why they are so active now, so that people will not remember how they zealously praised the old order, eager to grab what they could for themselves?

However, in the struggle for people's deputy mandates, UDB candidates sometimes appeared to completely forget all scruples. Even the "partocracy" would not have risked placing whole families and clans of relatives to stand as candidates for deputy. But the leaders of informal associations crossed this moral boundary without a moment's hesitation.

But did they just cross it once? V. Chernovil, one of the UHU leaders, skilfully sidestepped the ticklish issue of what he lives on in a television interview. His reply was that the UHU pays him. Is that so? And what about the foreign handouts reported on in the republic press?

"Pan Vyacheslav," as he is known by his followers, is always quick with his answers. But even he was slow in coming up with an explanation for the duplicating equipment sent to him from across the ocean. Why should "they" be so generous? Especially as the medicines which arrived on the same flight proved not to be as reliable: They were past their "use by" date. "Rukh" made a lot of fuss about this gift. They kept quiet about the defective goods. It would not hurt those who seriously believe that "they" would be prepared to give the last shirt off their back for our sake to think about this. How could the medicines and duplicating equipment turn up in the same package? Is it not because the UHU leaders boast that they gave birth to "Rukh"? We will not try to establish the exact kinship here. We will just point out that none of the unsponsored organizations' leaders tried for a people's deputy mandate with an empty purse.

What is the explanation for the silence by many party workers and the mass media in this situation? Their reticence has given people reason to believe, for example, that everything promised by the UDB is easily attainable. Their silence about those making the promises and about their methods of struggle is tantamount to blessing their moral stand and the methods used to attain their objectives.

It is only to be regretted that in this wild outburst of emotions few party workers and journalists firmly opposed the defamation of everything good that has existed and still exists in the party and our country. V. Sekretaryuk, former first secretary of the Lvov party gorkom (city party committee), proved to be among them. With the arrival of Ya. Pogrebnyak, first secretary of the party obkom (oblast party committee), he was found a position with "a more manageable workload." With his knowledge of the job, he seemed to be the very person who could "retrieve his losses in the partocracy." However, to the honor of Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, once

involved in the election battle he conducted himself with dignity, without playing to the gallery or foregoing his principles, and entered into dialogue with activists from unsponsored organizations. The party gorkom and obkom should have supported him. But they did not: They were offended and perceived some ill intent, some plot, some intrigue in Sekretaryuk's stand....

And V. Lutsenko, second secretary of the Rovno party obkom, really came under fire from unsponsored organizations! Simply because he consistently defended everything good in party history and affairs and spoke out against people who used Taras Shevchenko's words to make this threat: "Blood will flow in rivers into the Black Sea...." V. Lutsenko had it his own way, in the good sense of the word, at numerous meetings, at rallies, in the press, and on the radio. But the obkom party bureau lacked the same firmness in its defense of its comrade, who refused to be a lamb to the slaughter for the rallying mob. But Rovno is not the only place this has happened. A plenum of the Voroshilovgrad Obkom had no problem in accepting the resignation of I. Lyakhov, obkom first secretary. The reason: That was what the people wanted—i.e., the people at rallies. But it was the people who had expressed their attitude to Lyakhov when they elected him deputy to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the oblast soviet. (Incidentally, was it coincidence that the wave of resignations by obkom party bureau first secretaries reached its peak before the elections?)

Unfortunately, the Lvov party obkom clearly lacks efficiency and firmness in its defense of party honor and the exposure of intrigues by extremist, nationalist forces. Although there are more than enough grounds for this. Here is the most recent, for example. Addressing students, one of the republic's newly-fledged people's deputies urged young men and women not to fear jails and camps and urged their parents to sacrifice their children, who, he said, must fight for Mother Ukraine. Addressing another audience, his colleague "advised" them to surrender their party membership cards.

And a third actually urged his audience to take to arms: There is no point, he said, in talking with these communists about peacefully handing over power....

It cannot be denied that in the run-up to the elections informal associations of all hues were perfectly frank about their aims. They went for it. They wanted power and they got it.

In Lvov their job was not only made easier by the "changing of the guard." By failing to analyze informal associations' programs and actions, party committees were not only accessory to the deception of the people but also appear to have absolved themselves of responsibility for the future of the UDB's policies.

However, members of the Lvov party obkom were not capable of such subtleties. In remote mining regions of the oblast they "ensured" that Ya. Pogrebnyak, first secretary of the party obkom, was elected Ukrainian people's deputy....

... Un-sponsored organizations in the republic's western region are still celebrating in the streets. The celebrations will inevitably be followed by ordinary workdays, with all their mundane concerns. Those who have taken power will be "riding on the crest of a wave" for a while, of course. They will continue to curse the past and blame everything onto the legacy it has left. But every day spent on this exercise will not be able to stave off the approaching day of reckoning....

Ukrainian Party Clubs Prepare For Party Split

PM0404151590 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 31 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent N. Belov: "Reformers or Splittists? Notes on the Conference of Ukrainian Party Clubs"]

[Text] Kharkov—Ukrainian communists are seeking ways to escape from the crisis situation, endeavoring to make a fresh assessment of the party's role and place in society. These were the aims set by the organizers of the conference of party clubs and representatives of the Ukrainian party organizations which uphold the positions of the "Democratic Platform Within the CPSU." The conference was billed as the first of its kind although a similar meeting was held in Kharkov six weeks ago. The idea of holding a conference for representatives of the republic's party clubs and of determining their attitude to alternative platforms, the draft CPSU Statutes, the status of the Ukrainian Communist Party within the CPSU, and the report and election campaign was also put forward at this regional meeting.

Comparing the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Congress and the "Democratic Platform" (party clubs), the conference's participants agreed that they have much in common. Both propose to radically renew the party on the basis of democratization and a multiparty system. The differences lie in the nature of the proposed transformations. But it has gradually become clear that the representatives of the party clubs are not united.

"We are united by our desire to break away," V. Levchuk, member of the Kharkov party club, said without a trace of irony.

The speakers gave different reasons to justify the need for an organizational split between the supporters of the "Democratic Platform" and the CPSU. It is said that it is only a matter of tactics—of whether to break away before or after the 28th CPSU Congress. Conference guest V. Lysenko, cochairman of the Moscow party club, outlined the immediate tasks as follows: It is necessary to register members of the "Democratic Platform" before 1 May, create a regular press, and in mid-May convene the second conference of the "CPSU Democratic Platform."

No one listened to those people who favored preserving CPSU unity. A. Sirota from Lvov spoke of work conditions in the Western Ukraine. According to him, "democratic dictatorship" by Rukh, whose members have established strict censorship and seized all duplicating equipment, has won the day there. Under these conditions, the speaker insisted, we cannot proceed to split.... But not only was there no support for his opinion but people even seemed not to heed it.

Where they are gradually trying to lead those people who joined the party clubs in the hope of speeding up the restructuring and democratization of the party only became clear to me on the second day of the discussion of the draft statutes and the Ukrainian Communist Party's status. Thus, the title of the draft resolution "On the Draft CPSU Statutes" was transformed into a resolution "On the Draft Ukrainian Communist Party Statutes." The resolution "On the Status of the Ukrainian Communist Party Within the CPSU" lost the words "within the CPSU." The statement "On the Current Situation" was amplified to read: "On the Current Situation Within the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party." In short, the masks were removed to reveal a split and division.

Passions began to seethe during the discussion of the resolution on the Ukrainian Communist Party's status. The original text unequivocally stipulated its independence from the CPSU and the need for its own program and statute. As for the CPSU, it was "allowed" to retain its role as an ideological and political alliance of independent republic communist parties.

Here V. Ryzhov, member of the Kharkov party club and deputy chief designer at the F. Dzerzhinskiy Machine Building Plant, was unable to contain himself:

"What are we doing?! Workers will not allow us to enter the plant after this resolution. The working class favors democratization but not national isolation. Yet you want to drive all of us into a corner on the nationalities issue...."

After long votes and revotes they came to rest on a compromise wording. And hastily voted for the other conference documents. Yet there was no one there to vote: Some delegates had left early, while others ostentatiously left the hall as a sign of dissent.

"Some 109 supporters of the 'Democratic Platform' gathered for the conference from 20 oblasts in the Ukraine. There were only a few worker delegates, mainly from the eastern oblasts of the Ukraine. It simply did not prove possible to elaborate a clear stance as to whether the supporters of the 'Democratic Platform' should retain their organizational unity with the CPSU, create an independent social democratic party, or uphold the autonomy and independence of the Ukrainian Communist Party. It was hard to escape the impression that the members of the party clubs had fallen into the web of national problems and gotten themselves entangled in them. However, there is nothing surprising in that, in my view: The participants in the conference included 36

members of Rukh—an organization which has already announced its intention to become an independent party and is recruiting supporters where possible.

Shortly before the conference, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat confirmed the Ukrainian communists' desire for constructive cooperation with all political organizations that uphold the positions of perestroika and socialism. It was also stressed that under current conditions it is up to various groups of people whether they set up parties. But according to the CPSU Statutes a person cannot be a member of several political parties.

All the Ukrainian party clubs, including the Kharkov party club, were set up by permanent party officials and "apparatchiks" who, with their "inside" knowledge of the party's problems, have said that it cannot work like that any longer. Most members of the party clubs favor the radical renewal of the Communist Party on a democratic basis. That is the renewal for which the CPSU Central Committee is striving. It is important to choose together the path that leads to radical reforms within the CPSU rather than to a split.

Potential Donetsk Oblast Leaders Profiled

PM0504100990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Own correspondent B. Glotov report under the rubric "Subjective Observations": "Are There Any Leaders in the Donbass?"]

[Excerpts] Donetsk—The last few months in the Donbass have "yielded a good harvest" of political passions. Several rallies, hunger strikes, and strikes have been organized by the strike committee in Donetsk. The main aim of all this was to get the party obkom [oblast committee] and gorkom [city committee] to resign. So, how did it end? At this stage, the strike committee and the forces supporting it have lost. Most probably because they tried too hard to force the pace of events and lacked the ability to conduct a considered dialogue and reach a reasonable compromise. Indeed, is there any need to go overboard, as they say, by demanding the immediate resignation of the party obkom if it is soon going to be reelected anyway at the oblast report and election party conference? [passage omitted]

Resignation is sometimes painful but usually straightforward the whole. Communists and the inhabitants of the Donbass are now concerned with a different question: Just who is the oblast leader going to be? After all, it cannot be ruled out that the first secretary of the party obkom will be elected chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies. Whereas in the past this kind of matter was decided by party and soviet bodies behind tightly locked doors, glasnost and democracy have now lifted the veil of secrecy. It is being discussed in squares and corridors, in offices and at labor collective meetings. Just who will the people name?

Ye. Mironov, second secretary of the party obkom, has recently noticeably raised his profile. In dialogues with the strike committee he has shown decisiveness, firmness, and strength of character. But Yevgeniy Vasilyevich has only worked here a few months, after coming from Moscow where he was a CPSU Central Committee inspector, and so, as he himself admits, he does not have a great deal of experience.

By the old standards, Yu. Smirnov, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], could be considered a real contender for the leading post. But he too has not been working in this position for very long and so he still has much to learn about the job.

The workers' strike movement has produced several colorful figures. These include miners V. Ladygin, K. Fesenko, Yu. Boldyrev, and others. Since the July strike they have come to play a prominent role in the life of the miners' labor collectives. The miners listen to what they have to say. However, at present "destructive" motives predominate in the actions of these leaders of the workers' movement: Addressing rallies and during the strikes they always call for someone to be "removed" and something to be abolished and eliminated. Their programs contain few constructive features aimed, say, at improving the oblast economy.

What do people think about their leaders and, in particular, about the nominations to the top position in the party obkom organizational department?

"It is hard to say anything for certain," V. Borovik, head of department, said in answer to my question. "At least, we cannot see anyone suitable for this post in the oblast party and soviet bodies at present. Moreover, the situation is not inclined in their favor at the moment."

Yes, the rating of representatives of the party and soviet apparatus in the oblast has noticeably dropped: Voters refused to place their trust in many of them in the recent local soviet elections. In Donetsk, for example, almost all the party gorkom and obkom secretaries suffered defeat. But why, strictly speaking, should a leader be sought solely among party and soviet leaders? Why are we artificially narrowing the choice as we have in the past? Why do we not look further and go to enterprises and labor collectives, for example, to look for a leader? Incidentally, as a journalist I have met a considerable number of bright, talented people among economic leaders.

The Donbass also has a wealth of such people. People are familiar with the names of directors of powerful coal mining, metallurgical, and machine-building enterprises. To mention but a few: Yu. Baranov, V. Kuzara, V. Prishchepa, V. Ilyushenko, A. Bulyanda, V. Slednev, G. Skudarko, and M. Malyuga.

"The Donbass, as you well know, is a special region," V. Mamutov, assistant director of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, believes. "So the leader of this region must match up to the challenge: He must be experienced,

authoritative, bold and decisive, with a broad perspective on the economy and politics."

Valentin Karlovich is one of the authors of a program to extricate the oblast's national economy from its crisis situation. In his opinion, the quickest way to do this is to turn the Donbass into an independent economic region and remove the region's main enterprises from the jurisdiction of sector ministries. The main point of this measure is to ensure that soviets of people's deputies and labor collectives become the real masters of their territory rather than the departments, which is how the situation stands at present. The program has been approved by the oblispolkom. But at the moment it resembles a car without an engine: How much more time is going to be spent in coordinating action with the republic and the center? That is why a powerful "tow truck" is needed now: someone with vigor and interest who is capable of working together with like-minded people to galvanize people into putting these plans into practice without waiting for favors from the ministries.

Miners at the Zasyadko Mine, for example, believe that you do not have to look far for such a person as he is right here under our noses, as they say. They can see their director, Hero of Socialist Labor Ye. Zvyagilskiy, in the role of the oblast's political and economic leader. This is no accident. It is the general opinion that he is a leader with a modern way of thinking, broad economic expertise, and an ability to unite people. Ten years ago, having "sorted out" one mine, he came to this enterprise, which had fallen chronically behind. The mine is now "back on its feet" and regularly meets plans every year. The collective builds its own housing, boarding houses, hotels, kindergartens, and hospitals. It even has several agricultural enterprises and workshops to process meat and dairy products. This means that the miners' diet includes not only meat, but sausage products as well. The mine maintains extensive ties with foreign firms. It uses its foreign currency to acquire imported equipment and industrial goods for the miners and their families.

"In my view," D. Talalayev, first secretary of the Kiyevskiy party raykom [rayon committee], said, "Zvyagilskiy finds it rather constricting within the framework of just one mine and needs a broader outlet for his abilities. I think he is the leader who can organize matters in such a way that people in the Donbass live just as well as the miners at the Zasyadko Mine."

It cannot be ruled out that the miners of this enterprise and the first secretary of the party raykom were just giving their own, subjective opinion. However, why not treat it as a real proposal when discussing the nominations for the post of oblast leader? There are going to be a lot of other proposals at the forthcoming oblast soviet sessions and the oblast report and election party conference. But one thing is beyond doubt: The Donbass deserves to have its affairs run not by timeservers but by competent people who are not indifferent to people's

needs and interests and who are capable of extricating the region's national economy from its economic impasse.

Ukrainian Plenum Sociopolitical Decision

90UN1299B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY
in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum decision: "The Present Moment"]

[Text] 1. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum believes that the social and political situation in the country and the republic has become critically tense. The situation is being made worse by inconsistency in realization of the economic reform, mismanagement, shortages, and inflation. Social differentiation is intensifying, disregard for the law is growing, morality and law and order are on the decline, and profiteering and crime are spreading.

Forces which, lacking a specific socioeconomic program, are conducting a direct and open attack on the party and socialism, are showing themselves increasingly assertively. They are organizing pressure on the party committees and local soviet ispolkoms [executive committees] and endeavoring by unlawful means to distance the legitimately elected authorities from performance of the functions entrusted to them.

Under these conditions party committees and organizations are displaying confusion and an inability to respond promptly and flexibly to changes in the political situation, and are attempting to tackle new tasks by the old methods. A gap has emerged between the center and the local authorities and between the party committees and the communist rank and file. The danger is arising of the party's unity being undermined and its structures destroyed.

It is today a question of the fate of the party and socialism, and the future of the USSR and our republic.

The plenum emphasizes that the Ukrainian Communist Party is today the sole political force capable of securing the citizens' nationwide and national interests and of changing the situation in the republic for the better.

2. To instruct the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and the party committees to adopt decisive measures to stabilize the situation. To closely combine all this work with discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, using it primarily for the consolidation of the communists and the whole people.

To prepare this March the draft Central Committee platform for the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, proceeding from the fact that this should be the program document of the Communist Party of a sovereign Ukraine within a renewed Soviet federation. To submit the draft for discussion by the primary party organizations and to publish it in the press.

The plenum is emphatically opposed to the attempts to disrupt the process of perestroika in the party committees and organizations by way of the spurring of mass meeting chaos and other forms of power pressure. The Central Committee Commission for Organizational-Party and Cadre Work is to prepare proposals on the procedure of the election of delegates to rayon, city, and oblast conferences, and to congresses of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party on the basis of direct, secret, and multiple-choice elections.

3. The plenum considers the most urgent task to be the realization of special measures pertaining to economic recovery and instructs the communists in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and the republic government to accelerate the formulation and enactment of a law on the economic sovereignty and self-administration of the Ukrainian SSR. To publish proposals for the draft law in the republic press not later than this April. To provide for the reliable protection of the republic economy in relations with the other union republics and the central authorities, and resolutely counter departmental arbitrary action.

In economic and social policy to give priority to the solution of the food problem and the implementation of comprehensive measures pertaining to protection of the interests of the peasantry.

Evaluating the ecological situation in the republic as intolerable and sharing the concern of the public at large in this connection, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum supports the measures approved by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet geared to a fundamental improvement in environmental protection, the preservation of people's health, and the solicitous use of natural resources.

The plenum supports the need for an acceleration of work on elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station] and the movement in 1990 of people away from the areas where the radiation level is a threat to their health. In this connection the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee demands of the communists working in the republic Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee decisive action to protect the interests of the population which has suffered from the accident. The plenum deems it extremely necessary that the union government draw up and approve an appropriate state comprehensive program and also a program of operations pertaining to the withdrawal of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] from operation.

The plenum views as irresponsible the demands of extremist groups concerning the removal of the party organizations from enterprises of industry, construction, and transport, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] and the outfits of other spheres, advocating the active enlistment of communists in the development of the economy and the accomplishment of

production assignments. The plenum advocates that the primary party organizations be accorded extensive rights and their direct participation in the shaping of the policy of the party and its personnel corps.

The plenum calls on the party organizations and the communists to step up their efforts at the final stage of the election campaign and to support the candidates who take perestroika to heart and offer realistic and constructive programs.

Noting with concern that the organs of state power in the center and locally are not making full use of their constitutional authority, the plenum appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet to ensure unswerving compliance with current laws and speed up the enactment of new ones which reliably guarantee stability and order and protect citizens' life, honor, and dignity.

The plenum makes it incumbent upon the party committees and organizations to conduct a constructive dialogue with all public forces adhering to the positions of a socialist choice and to actively counter the attempts by extremists to manipulate public opinion and spur tension by way of the spread of every conceivable rumor, invention, and insinuation. It is the duty of communists to show the true colors and aims of the organizers of provocative actions and emphatically rebuff their attempts to penetrate the youth milieu and take advantage of the absence there of sufficient experience of life and politics.

5. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms [oblast, city, and rayon party committees] to extensively inform the working people through the press, television, and radio of the development of the situation in the republic and the country and the progress of the accomplishment of political, economic, and social tasks, and to explain the positions of the party committees on the issues disturbing people. To adopt measures for a solution of the most acute problems in the field of journalism.

It is essential that the communists working in the mass media and all journalists recognize in depth their personal responsibility for the possible consequence of ill-conceived, politically unconsidered speeches, which could lead to an explosion of negative emotions and outright violence. That the party committees actively resist the aspirations of individual groups to use the mass media for their own egotistical, ambitious ends, and oppose the blackening of journalists adhering to party, socialist, internationalist positions.

6. The plenum emphasizes that particular importance today is attached to the ideological and organizational strengthening of the party ranks, the communists' unity of action, the comradeship of the party, and the strengthening of its ties to the people.

It is necessary to dissociate from those who have in practice placed themselves outside of the party and who do not share its program goals. To deem it expedient in the process of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress for the primary party organizations to make an evaluation of the ideological and political positions of each party member.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum emphasizes that the social and political atmosphere may be changed for the better not by talk, mass meetings, or picketing but only by persevering, disciplined labor, the consistent solution of urgent questions, and the conscious performance of one's civic duties.

The participants in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum address the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo in order to express the concern of the republic's communists and working people at the dangerous development of the social and political situation in the country and the abrupt stimulation of destructive forces endeavoring to frustrate the process of perestroika, thirsting for power and calling for civil disobedience.

We express confidence that the party committees and organizations, communists, and all working people of the Ukraine, rallied around the CPSU platform, will display an understanding of the crucial nature of the present moment and a high degree of organization, and will resolutely rebuff the anti-perestroika forces and do everything to overcome the difficulties and ensure the dynamic development of the economic and social sphere of the republic and the spiritual regeneration of our people.

Ukrainian 'Rukh' Leader Drach Interviewed

90UN1312A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 25 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Ivan Drach, writer, people's deputy of the republic, and chairman of "Rukh" movement, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent G. Dolzhenko; date and occasion not specified: "Ivan Drach: 'Many Sympathize With Us'"]

[Text] In translation, "Rukh" means "Movement." That is what the people's movement of the Ukraine for perestroika is called. This also emphasizes devotion to the ideas of the renewal of society. "Rukh" has existed for only half a year, but during this time it has travelled a path from total nonacceptance to a recognition of its political strength and to official registration. Our correspondent talks with Ivan Drach, chairman of "Rukh," a people's deputy of the republic, and a writer.

[Dolzhenko] Ivan Fedorovich, I am eager to ask you a question with respect to recent events in the life of the republic. A group of representatives of the intelligentsia addressed an appeal through the press to the members of "Rukh" and to all citizens of the Ukraine to establish a

party based on the movement, for which it proposed convening a special congress of "Rukh." What brought this about?

[Drach] I will begin with what is known: As long as a monopoly of truth and authority exists, the revival of a real democracy, rather than a paper democracy, is impossible. And for the time being here, the first and the second are in the hands of one ruling party. And, I will note, a lot of effort is being applied to preserve this situation. Even though the question of a multiparty system has been decided in principle. Until recently, some circles have charged the atmosphere of the republic with fear and uncertainty; they spread rumors about impending coups, strikes, and pogroms, although there was not even a trace of anything of the kind. M. Khronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, even mentioned from the plenum rostrum a supposed existing rate for beating and murdering servicemen—from R50 to R2-3,000. You ask, why are such myths created? I think in order to be able to cry later: "Let us hunt down those 'Rukh' characters and other democrats."

[Dolzhenko] Today, "Rukh" unites communists and religious figures, and representatives of other democratic currents. How do you envisage the cooperation of the "Rukh" party and the CPSU? Will they not turn out to be on different sides of the barricade?

[Drach] This is exactly what we do not want. The "Rukh" Party must become the nucleus and the vanguard of all progressive forces of the movement, and let all of those who want to cooperate with us and who share our views remain in its ranks. Today, there is nothing more valuable than a united people. Only through joint efforts can the command-bureaucratic machine be dismantled. As for the cooperation or confrontation of "Rukh" and the CPSU, then, I think, that there is no problem here either. "Rukh," you see, will not be the only political rival to the CPSU. The association "Green Earth" is planning to make an announcement concerning the organization of its party on 26 April, the fourth anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]. Recently an appeal was made by rural workers on the need for the creation of a Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party.

Indeed, the CPSU itself is very multifaceted, and I would say more exactly—multiprogrammed. And the poles of these programs will never come together.

[Dolzhenko] But "Rukh" is far from being uniform. Individual statements simply scare people away, and they give reasons for conservative forces to stamp people with all kinds of labels, to accuse them of nationalism and other mortal sins. For example, appeals for sovereignty are frequently associated with secession from the USSR. And how painful it is for non-Ukrainians to hear this! I would like to hear from you what attitudes predominate in "Rukh," and what views are professed there?

[Drach] The theoretical basis of "Rukh" takes its principles from the philosophical legacy of the revolutionary democrats T. Shevchenko, L. Ukrainki, I. Franko, and M. Dragomanov on the one hand, and public figures from the post-revolutionary period M. Grushevskiy and V. Vinnichenko, on the other hand, for whom the ideas of national superiority or isolation were alien. They were moved by anguish over their much suffering people. This same anguish today moves us to unity and to the fight for a better lot. Did we not come to the threat of total annihilation of all existence on this at times abundant earth as a result of an ecological catastrophe? Do we not stand on the edge of an economic and spiritual abyss? That is why we are for economic independence and the revival of the cultures and national virtues of all of the peoples who populate the Ukraine.

Who does not like this program? Slogans are being used in an underhanded way in our name that are calculated to trample our most sacred ideals and to sow discord and distrust among peoples. But recently, in a rally in Kiev on 15 February, some scoundrels desecrated a Ukrainian national sacred object—they set fire to the grave of poet V. Stus, apparently provoking retaliatory action. It did not succeed. But the guilty parties are nowhere to be found. To this day, they have not found the thugs who broke the sculptures of national heroes I. Gonta, M. Krivonos, and B. Khmelnytskyi in the I. Gonchar amateur museum.

[Dolzhenko] Judging by everything, the reaction to this vandalism among the people is the reverse of what was expected—the popularity of the movement is growing. What does "Rukh" represent today, half a year after the congress? At that time, I recall, the delegates received mandates from 280,000 persons.

[Drach] We do not conduct a strict account of the members of "Rukh." Moreover, many among the population sympathize with us, but for various reasons do not want to advertise this. However, you can judge the authority of the movement by the human chain between the cities of the republic which was organized on the eve of the council of the Ukraine on 21 January and which stretched for 600 kilometers. According to various calculations, about 3,000,000 persons participated in it. An even mightier chain is planned for 16 April—the day of the Chernobyl accident. It will stretch between the nuclear stations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and the Baltics. The sympathies for "Rukh" are attested to by the past elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of the republic. Many of our supporters became deputies, and they acquired especially many seats in the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

[Dolzhenko] The last question: How are mutual relations with the working class shaping up in "Rukh?"

[Drach] A popular thought exists: They say that if the store shelves were filled with commodities, there would be no need for perestroika. I categorically do not agree

with this. A spiritual revival of the nation is just as necessary as is bread. The Ukrainian intelligentsia sensed this first and most sharply. It became the basis for the establishment of "Rukh." At first, the workers and the peasants somehow stood to the side. It should be taken into account that the first speeches of the writers—and it was they who turned out to be the initiators by virtue of their independence from the system—were given a hostile reception, and a stream of one-sided and frequently distorted information came down on the reader. But under such conditions, it was difficult for an untrained reader to get his bearings. And, nonetheless, primary cells began to appear at enterprises. And now more and more supporters from the worker environment are flowing into the movement. Of course, their number is not comparable, for example, in Lvov and in Donetsk. But this only means that there is still much work for our forces.

Ukrainian Communist Party Plenum Viewed

WA1304193090 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian

No 9, 26 Feb - 4 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by SOYUZ correspondent Nikolay Baklanov: "The Search for Modern Paths—Notes from the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] "Concerning the present moment"—this was how the main question was formulated that was examined by the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party held in Kiev. Despite the rather ordinary sounding agenda, this plenum, in the opinion of many of its participants, was one of the major landmark stages in the life of the party organization and, without doubt, it will predetermine in many ways the outlook for the development of the sociopolitical situation in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The opening address by V. Ivashko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, set the tone for the frank and demanding talks of the communists (incidentally a detailed report was telecast from the meeting hall by republic television). Speaking of the reasons for convening the plenum, he emphasized that life itself compelled that this be done. The people are deeply disturbed by the destabilization in society, by the manifestations of extremism, and by the rise in national, and at times even religious intolerance. Even the territorial unity of the Ukraine itself is threatened. Announcing themselves at the top of their voices, those destructive forces that are not restrained by anything are carrying out an open attack on the party and on socialism. They are coming out in a more and more organized and directed way against the organs of authority both in the center and locally. These processes have increased substantially now in the final stage of the election campaign. Groups that are diverse in their political coloration have united

around one aim: to destroy the party under the slogan of the fight against the apparatus.

All of this is occurring against the background of sharply decreasing discipline and order, disregard for the law, and an increase in crime. Poor economic management, the increase in shortages, inflation, and the unrestrained shadow economy are also having a negative effect on the social psychological situation.

Unfortunately, V. Ivashko noted, under these conditions part of the communists, primary party organizations, and party committees were taken aback, and lost the initiative and the ability to influence the situation.... Therefore, the plenum of the Central Committee must evaluate the political situation in the most objective and fundamental way possible and work out a specific plan of action to get out of the crisis. The evaluation of the sociopolitical situation which was heard in the opening address was supported by many of the speakers at the plenum, to which were invited leading workers of the republic and the oblasts who are not on the staff of the Central Committee, a large group of first secretaries of gorkoms [city party committee] and raykoms [rayon party committee], secretaries of party committees, managers of enterprises and kolkhozes [collective farms], research institutions and educational institutions, and representatives of the working class, the peasantry, scientists, the artistic intelligentsia, and members of the press. They presented many facts that indicate that the question now concerns the fate of the party itself, the future of the republic, and, indeed, the future of the whole country.

V. Fedorov, first secretary of the Zhitomir Obkom [oblast party committee], reported, for example, that the so-called "civic front of the Zhitomir area" demanded the immediate transfer of all authority in the city and oblast to a "provisional coordinating soviet," the elimination of the oblast party newspaper, the transfer to local authorities of all property, buildings, and structures that belong to the party. In the process, it was announced that the building of the "former" obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party would be the place of work of the "provisional coordinating soviet."

Challenges like this, the speaker continued, are undoubtedly dictated by an organized force. Nonparty leaders of the "civic front" have begun to head the trade union committees of the largest enterprises in Zhitomir. Attempts are being made to create a party organization within the framework of the "front." Documents of the Moscow party club were taken as the basis of its platform and regulations, with the prospect of transforming it into a social democratic party.

I. Trushlyakov, the director of the Nikolayevskiy transformer plant (this very large enterprise produces more than 4,000 types of articles for electronic, calculator, computer, and other equipment), noted that recently, because of the strike movement in a number of regions of the country, especially in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Moldavia, and the Baltics, the steady rhythm of work of the collective he heads has begun to break down. And this is not the only case. Thousands of enterprises, including those that are located in the Ukraine, are sustaining colossal and irreplaceable moral and economic losses.

V. Shevchenko, an electric welder of the Znamensk mobile mechanized column No 133 of the trust "Kirovogradselstroy," a former participant in the January meeting of M. Gorbachev with representatives of the working class, peasants, and engineer-technical workers, talked about the fact that only discipline, order, and unity around the party will help us get out of the crisis. Rallies will not help the matter. Because of the disorders, workers lose both in a material and a moral sense. And the main thing is that they lose confidence in the future....

The opinion that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in danger was expressed in a speech by M. Khronopulo, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. He said that today they want to take the union apart to please their own egotistic aspirations under various chauvinist, nationalist, anarchist, and other slogans, and they are rending political and economic bonds, discrediting the party, and slinging mud at state organs, such as the KGB, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and especially the armed forces.

It is understandable that it is not possible in a survey of remarks from the plenum of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party to retell or briefly quote all of the speeches heard at the plenum. But, it seems, that even the cited statements are enough to convey the atmosphere of anxiety over the future of the republic and the country as a whole that reigned in the conference hall. Also, in giving an impartial and profound analysis of the causes that provoked the crisis phenomena in society, the plenum participants did not at all try to frighten themselves or the population of the republic. Their task, it seems, was quite different: after analyzing the situation soberly, and exposing the errors committed in five years of perestroika, to attempt to find their own way that is capable of raising the standard of living of the people in the republic and, of course, to raise the authority of the Communist Party.

What is it, this way, whose preliminary outlines were made at the plenum that was held? It must be said immediately that it is based on the CPSU platform and certainly proposes the future presence of the Ukraine within the composition of the union. At the same time, the members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and those invited to the plenum repeatedly emphasized the necessity of ensuring the economic independence of the Ukraine within the framework of a union federation on the basis of a new union treaty. And the government of the republic, the soviets, and local economic organs, not waiting for additional decisions, are planning to put this fundamental approach into effect without delay.